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Note from the editors
Introduction: the state and the economy 
Among the propositions the new economic sociology has 
formulated over the last four decades, only a few can 
reach a level of consensus as high as the one concerning 
the role of the state within western economies: far from 
being opposed to the economic sphere of life, as some 
traditions of thought might have put it in economics (Hay-
ek, 1944) or political science (Lindblom, 1977), the role of 
the state appears to be decisive if one is to understand 
how markets evolve (Fligstein, 2001), how firms are 
shaped and change (Roy, 1997; Fligstein, 1990), and how 
professions consolidate or lose territory (Abbott, 1988). 
This consensus has opened research questions that this 
issue of the newsletter explores: how should “the state” 
be conceptualized? How can it be empirically grasped? 
What has been its role in different national settings? 
The classical way to tackle these questions is by distin-
guishing between “strong” (France, Italy, Japan) and 
“weak” (United States, United Kingdom) states. Three 
articles of this issue challenge both the way these ideal-
types are usually embodied and how they are conceptual-
ized. Monica Prasad shows that while the American state 
has long been considered a paradigm of a weak state, a 
recent and converging stream of research demonstrates 
that it has been actually much more powerful and inter-
ventionist than it seemed. This is not to say, of course, that 
the American state has no specific features which need to 
be explained. Recalling the argument of her last book, 
Prasad (2012) delves into one of these specificities, the 
weakness of the welfare state. According to Prasad, the US 
state developed in this idiosyncratic way because it first 
developed as an agrarian state, and interventions driven by 
farmers of the South and Midwest finally undermined the 
development of a public welfare state. 
The contribution of Tommaso Pardi also deals with an 
allegedly paradigmatic embodiment of a weak state, con-
sidered, what is more, at the very top of its neo-liberal 
tendencies: the British state in the early 1980s, under the 
reign of Margaret Thatcher. Here again, the picture Pardi 
offers of British state involvement in the economy is coun-
ter-intuitive. Far from being committed to the systematic 
dismantling of any form of industrial policy, the British 
state appears to play a key role in the reshaping of the 
British automotive industry. Following and discussing the 
framework of Neil Fligstein (2001), Pardi shows that the 
state interventionism in this case was motivated by a sys-
tematic defense of the interests of industry subcontractors, 
rather than by protectionism towards the main producer, 
British Leyland. 
If “weak states” do not seem so weak on closer examina-
tion, the same qualification goes for allegedly “strong 
states”, such as France. Adopting a long-term perspective, 
Pierre François and Claire Lemercier, focus on some of the 
most spectacular tools states can mobilize to interfere with 
the economy, nationalization and state-owned enterprise 
(SOEs). They show, first, that when placed in a systematic 
and longitudinal set of comparisons, the French case does 
not seem so unusual: SOEs are not so much typical of a 
country than they are of a period, that of post-World War 
II, where they occur in most of the Western economies. 
Second, placing French SOEs in the interlocking direc-
torates network, they show that SOEs did not disrupt the 
network; on the contrary, they melted in mechanisms that 
existed long before they were created. 
These three papers not only show that the classical histori-
cal embodiments of weak or strong states should be re-
considered, but also that the categories used to study the 
ways that states influence the economy can be rethought: 
for all three of them, the most relevant question may not 
be a quantitative one, about the “weight”, the “size” or 
the “strength” of the different states, but a qualitative 
interrogation, about the way the state intervenes and the 
tools it mobilizes. This shift is particularly well exemplified 
in the last two papers of the issue. Both of them present a 
way to reconsider the way state engages with markets. A 
classical way to address this question is to show how states 
are involved in the creation and in the dynamics of markets 
(Polanyi, 1944; Fligstein, 2001). The two papers here sug-
gest looking at how the market can be considered as a 
tool for the implementation of public policies (François, 
2007). Studying the public policy dealing with the use of 
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pesticide in French vineyards, Ansaloni and Smith show 
how state representatives are now convinced to implement 
strategic aspects of this policy (the training of actors) by 
market mechanisms. They also show that this choice has 
political consequences, in that relying on such mecha-
nisms, in this specific case at least, means that giving up 
the ability to define “the public interest.” 
Dealing with a completely different topic – the regulation 
of the market for medicines – Etienne Nouguez brings 
together two seemingly unrelated streams of research: the 
sociology of prices and value (Beckert and Musselin, 2013) 
and the analysis of government instruments (Hood, 1986; 
Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004). Focusing on the role of 
the commission mandated with price fixing, he shows how 
its role includes that of a valuer, transferring into price 
form different principles of value related to public interest, 
but that it also acts as a planner, aiming to control the 
structure of health expenses through price mechanisms, 
and as a regulator, influencing more or less explicitly the 
strategies of pharmaceutical firms. 
The interview with Mark Mizruchi shows how the question 
of the state can find its place in an intellectual path: retrac-
ing the many questions he has worked on over the last 
thirty years, Mark Mizruchi explains how the political di-
mensions of economic life sometimes appear in the fore-
front of his research questions while sometimes, without 
completely disappearing, fall much more in the shadow. 
This waxing and waning of state-related questions in an 
individual research agenda can be seen as symptomatic of 
the way economic sociology deals with them. 
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Radical America
By Monica Prasad 
Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University 
m-prasad@northwestern.edu  
Everyone knows that America is a country in love with money, 
and that its weak government primarily adopts policies that 
benefit the wealthy. Europeans seem to be particularly con-
vinced of this. From newspapers to the most exalted halls of 
learning all across Europe, the legend abounds that Ameri-
cans do not care about community, are not bound by norms 
of redistribution, and do not want to tie down their large 
corporations in any way. This laissez-faire, anti-government 
attitude is what explains the higher rates of poverty in the 
U.S., these scholars suggest, and explains as well the rise of 
the right from Ronald Reagan through the Tea Party. 
The only problem with this explanation is what to do with 
all the exceptions. Sweep them under the rug, seems to be 
the answer of scholars committed to the idea that a na-
tional culture of individualism and respect for the market 
drives American history. But so many exceptions have piled 
up at this point that the rug does not seem large enough 
to cover them. 
Case in point: as Jens Beckert shows in Inherited Wealth, the 
United States actually had more progressive rates of taxation 
on inherited wealth than France or Germany (Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2007). Sven Steinmo, investigating the tax sys-
tems of the U.S., Britain, and Sweden, found that this seems 
to be the case for the tax system as a whole: “to my amaze-
ment, [I] found that the United States received more revenue 
from corporate taxes…than virtually any other OECD democ-
racy…The United States must have one of the most regressive 
tax systems in the democratic world. But I could not find any 
evidence to support this proposition….Sweden had the heavi-
est and most regressive VAT in the world…” (Taxation and 
Democracy, 1993, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, p.xiv; 
see also Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar, “Effective Tax Rates in 
Macroeconomics” in Journal of Monetary Economics 34(3): 
297-323; Lindert, Peter, 2004, Growing Public, Cambridge 
University Press; OECD Tax Ratios: A Critical Survey, 2001; 
Sorensen, Peter Birch, 2004, Measuring the Tax Burden on 
Capital and Labor, MIT Press). 
In corporate regulation, David Vogel writes “the United 
States remains distinctive in that its rules and regulations 
[on corporate behavior] tend to be consistently stricter 
than those of other capitalist countries, and it provides 
more opportunity for political participation by nonindustry 
constituencies” (National Styles of Business Regulation, 
1989, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.9). In a study of 
mining regulation John Braithwaite notes “the U.S. enact-
ed probably the world’s most punitive statute for regulat-
ing business, the 1969 Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act… the broader historical trend…in the United States 
has been toward increasing punitiveness…[in Great Britain 
and France there has been] a much longer shift away from 
prosecution” (To Punish or Persuade, 1985, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, p.3). (On corporate regula-
tion see also Kelman, Steven, 1981, Regulating America, 
Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational 
Safety and Health, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Brickman, 
Ronald, Sheila Jasanoff, Thomas Ilgen, 1985, Controlling 
Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the 
United States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Badaracco, 
Joseph L., Jr., 1985, Loading the Dice: A Five-Country 
Study of Vinyl Chloride Regulation, Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School; Echols, Marsha A., 1998, “Food Safety 
Regulation in the European Union and the United States” in 
Columbia Journal of European Law 4:525-544; Daemmrich, 
Arthur A., 2004, Pharmacopolitics. Chapel Hill and London: 
University of North Carolina Press). 
The U.S. was an early pioneer in efforts to protect the envi-
ronment (although it has since fallen behind): Richard Ben-
edick shows that it was the U.S. that led the successful in-
ternational effort to protect the ozone layer, against EU 
opposition (Ozone Diplomacy, 1998, Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press). 
American bankruptcy law has always been more friendly to 
debtors (who are generally lower in the socio-economic 
spectrum) than to creditors (who are generally wealthier) 
than any other country: “The United States has been the 
most notable exception (outlier?), with a liberal ‘fresh start’ 
policy for individual consumer debtors in effect since 1898 
… [in other countries] Debtors have never been able to get 
an immediate debt discharge as in the States, facing in-
stead various restrictions imposing limited, conditional, and 
suspended discharge rules” (Tabb, Charles J., 2005, “Les-
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sons from the Globalization of Consumer Bankruptcy” in 
Law and Social Inquiry 30: 763-764; Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 
Johanna, 1997, “Changing Directions in Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Law and Practice in Europe and U.S.A.” in Journal 
of Consumer Policy 20: 133; Skeel, David A., Jr., 2001, 
Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Indeed, the trope of the market-friendly U.S. is so prevalent 
that scholars are always surprised when they actually con-
duct comparative studies. Like Sven Steinmo, Rawi Abdelal 
notes his shock at discovering the truth in his study of the 
dismantling of capital controls: “I assumed that I would find 
ample evidence of American leadership, Wall Street’s enthu-
siasm, the U.S. Treasury’s guidance, Rightist politicians, and 
‘neoliberal’ economists and policymakers. I found nothing of 
the sort. Instead, I discovered European leadership in writing 
the liberal rules of global finance, Wall Street’s caution and 
skepticism, the U.S. Treasury’s ambivalence…” (Abdelal, 
Rawi, 2007, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Fi-
nance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, xi). Andre-
as Busch writes: “Contrary to popular conceptions of eco-
nomic life in the United States, American banks operate in a 
highly regulated banking environment” (33); this has been 
the case since the Great Depression. In the U.K. no formal 
regulatory agency exists at all to regulate banks, and Ger-
many and Switzerland both responded to the Great Depres-
sion with lighter regulation than the U.S. (Banking Regula-
tion and Globalization. 2009, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). European banks have never had to contend with 
regulations against branch banking or regulations separating 
commercial and investment banking, for example. (On fi-
nancial regulation see also Jackson, Howell E., 2007, “Varia-
tion in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evi-
dence and Potential Implications” in Yale Journal on Regula-
tion 24(2): 253-291; Coffee, John C., Jr., 2007, “Law and 
the Market: The Impact of Enforcement” in University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 156(2): 229-311). 
Historian William Novak sums up this new generation of 
scholarship: “the American state is and always has been 
more powerful, capacious, tenacious, interventionist, and 
redistributive than was recognized in earlier accounts of 
U.S. history” (“The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State” in 
American Historical Review 2008). 
The point of this new generation of scholarship is that no 
country – not even the U.S. – has made capitalism work 
without heavy state intervention. If we begin from that 
starting point, we get a much better understanding of 
exactly how and why capitalism develops, and why it has 
developed differently in the United States and Europe.  
More specifically, we get a more complete understanding 
of precisely why the United States has a less well devel-
oped welfare state, and consequently greater poverty, than   
any of the countries of Europe. 
In my recent book The Land of Too Much I argue that the 
American state is not less interventionist in general, but Amer-
ican state intervention takes a peculiar form: it is agrarian 
state intervention, a progressive set of interventions driven by 
Southern and Midwestern farmers in the early nineteenth 
century, and it had surprisingly non-progressive results. It was 
American farmers who upheld the tradition of progressive 
taxation and adversarial regulation, but these interventions 
ended up undermining the public welfare state. 
The book begins by noting that from the mid-nineteenth to 
the mid-twentieth centuries, the key difference between the 
U.S. and Europe was the astonishing growth rates of the 
former, compared to the economic difficulties of the latter. 
American productivity was growing by leaps and bounds, 
and new developments in refrigeration and transportation 
brought that productivity all over the world, especially in 
agricultural products. But because of the gold standard, 
instead of leading to prosperity for all, that productivity led 
to price declines everywhere. European farmers were 
crushed by the flood of American grain. They joined coali-
tions in favor of protectionism. American farmers were also 
protectionist, but protectionism was not enough of an an-
swer for them, because it was their own domestic productiv-
ity that was causing declines in the prices of their products. 
What followed in the U.S. was a period of soul searching.  How 
can it be, observers wondered, that producing more goods 
could actually cause such problems? So much effort had gone 
into increasing productivity in the nineteenth century, and now 
that increased productivity lay rotting in the fields. During the 
Great Depression this paradox became almost unbearable. As 
populist Senator Huey Long of Louisiana wondered, how could 
there be corn going unsold while people were hungry? Cotton 
so abundant that farmers could not get rid of it, and yet chil-
dren dressed in rags throughout America? 
What emerged from this puzzlement was a political econ-
omy focused on breaking up concentrations of wealth 
through progressive taxation and through heavy regula-
tions on banks and financial institutions. But the great 
irony of this story is that these instances of greater regula-
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tion, regulation against the wealthy, combined to under-
mine the welfare state. 
Agrarian politicians voted on several occasions against nation-
al sales taxes because of their regressivity. But regressive sales 
taxes, particularly the value added tax, underpin the revenue 
base of every other advanced industrial country. There are 
three reasons why progressive taxation undermines the state. 
First, scholars such as Harold Wilensky have argued that pro-
gressive taxation creates more political protest against taxes, 
whereas the relative invisibility of sales taxes dampens political 
protest, and there does seem to be behavioral evidence sug-
gesting that the visibility of taxes and fees is a key factor in the 
degree to which they generate protest. (Junko Kato has ar-
gued that this was particularly the case in the post-war period, 
because after the onset of economic crisis in the 1970s it 
became difficult to shift to a different tax base: thus, it was 
those countries that had selected value added tax before the 
1970s that did not see widespread protest against taxation.) A 
second reason why sales taxes lead to a larger state is that 
they are less economically distorting, as authors such as Peter 
Lindert have argued. They tax consumption, and thus encour-
age savings, which promotes economic growth. And finally, 
as I show in detail in the book, progressive taxes led to a sys-
tem of tax preferences (exemptions and loopholes in the tax 
code) that undermined the welfare state. 
Meanwhile, agrarians also voted for heavy regulation of 
banking and the financial sector; for example, the Glass-
Steagall regulations separating commercial and investment 
banking, or the McFadden act which prevented branch 
banking across state lines. These curiously stringent regula-
tions were anomalies, not seen in European countries. The 
result of these regulations was that there were many more 
“unit banks” in the U.S., banks that were small and local 
and not part of a larger network of branches. But as econ-
omists point out, policies such as branch banking actually 
make a banking system more stable: unit banks are more 
susceptible to downturns in local conditions, and may not 
survive droughts or runs on the bank. Branch banks have 
deeper pockets and are more diversified against local con-
ditions. For these reasons, greater regulation of finance in 
the U.S. ended up causing a crisis of the financial sector – 
not seen in countries like Canada where the financial sec-
tor was less regulated – which required the state to step in 
and resurrect finance through the creation of an infrastruc-
ture of home mortgage credit. This underpinned the 
“mortgage Keynesianism” of the American state that de-
veloped over the next several decades, and which – in a 
process traced out in more detail in the book – under-
mined the development of the public welfare state. That 
under-developed public welfare state is the reason for 
greater poverty in the U.S. 
Meanwhile, in return for the development of the public 
welfare state, European corporations received a political 
economy biased against consumption, and towards produc-
tion. After the Second World War several European coun-
tries specifically aimed to reduce private consumption and 
channel all profits towards exports. This was a strategy of 
recover after the Second World War, and it was enormously 
successful. Part of this strategy included the looser regula-
tions documented above. These policies focused on promot-
ing producers at the expense of consumers, to the point that 
scholars have called these European policies “supply side.” 
Understanding this history sheds new light on some im-
portant episodes in history. For example, it helps to explain 
the movement for deregulation under Ronald Reagan. 
American corporations were in fact more heavily regulated 
in the 1980s than European corporations, which means that  
Reagan was actually pushing the U.S. closer to the European 
pattern. This history of a Europe focused on production also 
explains why Germany has been so resistant to Keynesian 
stimulus in the current moment: welfare spending in Ger-
many was never part of a Keynesian logic. Rather, it was a 
side effect of a political economy focused on promoting 
investment and production, and Keynesian stimulus spend-
ing is exactly the opposite of that. 
One of the strongest legacies of the neoliberal movements of 
the 1980s is that they have made all of us forget America’s 
radical past. Many scholars now seem to sincerely believe the 
Tea Party version of events – that government intervention in 
the public interest conflicts with American values or American 
traditions. But Americans have been vociferous about using 
the state in the public interest throughout this nation’s histo-
ry. The challenge for scholars now is to develop new theories 
of capitalism that can explain and incorporate this surprisingly 
radical American history. 
Monica Prasad is Professor of Sociology and Faculty Fel-
low at the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern 
University. Her most recent book is The Land of Too Much: 
American Abundance and the Paradox of Poverty Harvard 
University Press), winner of several awards including the 
European Academy of Sociology Award, the Allan Sharlin 
Memorial Award, and the Barrington Moore Award. 
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From Markets as Politics to the Politics of 
Markets: Unpacking the Relationship Between 
State and Firms
By Tommaso Pardi 
CNRS – Laboratoire IDHE, ENS Cachan 
Tommaso.Pardi@ens-cachan.fr  
The analysis of the political relationships between states 
and firms has played a pivotal role in the neo-institutional 
renewal of economic sociology. During the last twenty 
years this literature has produced remarkable studies show-
ing how stable markets emerge when incumbent firms 
manage to control competition through state intervention 
(Fligstein 1990; Fligstein 2001); how political institutions 
shape markets because industrial policies embody culturally 
constructed ideas about efficiency that firms enact through 
their strategies (Dobbin 1994a; Dobbin 2004); how incum-
bent firms define and qualify the content and the out-
comes of political institutions through their policies and 
practices (Dobbin 2009); and how ultimately not only the 
emergence and reproduction of markets as fields, but also 
their destabilization stems “either directly or indirectly from 
‘shocks’ set in motion by actors in state fields” (Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012, 207). 
Yet, most of this literature has conceived of the state “as 
an exogenous force” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 5) and 
approached state-firm relationships mainly from a macro-
institutional perspective. In particular, the way the state 
interacts with firms in building market institutions has been 
almost systematically treated as a black box whose behav-
iour could be deduced from the historical interplay be-
tween changes in the macro structure of markets (e.g., 
changes in the relative positions of incumbents and chal-
lengers) and changes in the political institutions. Typically, 
the problem of characterizing the underlying dynamic of 
institutional creation, reproduction and change in markets 
has been broken down into normative hypotheses to be 
tested on different types of historical datasets. If this ap-
proach has proved highly productive as far as it has al-
lowed the coverage of extended periods of time with rela-
tively few resources, and permitted researchers to confront 
orthodox economic theory on its own ground of quantita-
tive analysis and positivist methodology, it does however 
entail certain limits. 
In this paper we will discuss three in particular: its incapaci-
ty to grasp political institutions as social processes; its diffi-
culty in producing more accurate theories of state action in 
the economy; and its lack of sensitivity to the cumulative 
effect of piecemeal endogenous institutional change on 
the dynamics of market fields. It is not our intention 
though to engage in the usual criticism developed by the 
proponents of more qualitative micro “realist” methods 
against the advocates of more quantitative macro “positiv-
ist” methods, but rather to stress the need to build some 
form of articulation between the two if we want to capital-
ize on the theoretical headways made by macro-
institutional works in this field of research. 
To advance in this direction we propose two steps: first, to 
endogenize policymaking in the analysis of market fields, 
and second, to equip macro-institutional hypotheses with 
more inductive methods to unpack the black box of the 
state-firm relationship. In other words, rather than just 
thinking of markets “as politics” (Fligstein 1996) we pro-
pose to look into the politics of markets as social processes 
which are at least in part endogenous to market field dy-
namics. To be fair, this is also what Fligstein and McAdam 
have proposed (2013, 205-206), at least in theoretical 
terms, but it is not what they do in their case studies, 
where they stick to macro-institutionalist lenses and keep 
treating policymaking in deductive terms1. 
As a way to illustrate our perspective, we will rely in the 
second and third sections of the article on our analysis of 
the decline of the British motor industry under Margaret 
Thatcher (Pardi forthcoming). This is an interesting case 
study for our purposes for at least two reasons. First, be-
cause it is a topic that has been extensively studied, but in 
which little attention has been paid to the role played by 
government policies in the decline of the British motor 
industry during the 1980s2. Second, all the dimensions of 
state-firm relationships that have been highlighted as im 
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portant by macro-institutional hypotheses are present here: 
a key national industry, controlled by powerful incumbent 
firms, which is exposed to destabilizing exogenous shocks 
and to radical shifts in government policies, and eventually 
undergoes a profound transformation of its field structure. 
We will use the case study, firstly, to test the “limits” of 
macro-institutionalism in dealing with the black box of 
state-firm relationships (section 2), and then to show what 
can be gained, both in terms of explanatory power and 
theoretical accuracy, by unpacking the underlying policy-
making as a social process (section 3). 
1 Macro-institutional approaches and 
their limits 
As a range of ethnographic researches in the field of or-
ganizational studies has convincingly argued (Tolbert and 
Zucker 1999; Zucker 1987; Boden 1994), macro-
institutional approaches in economic sociology fail to seize 
institutionalization as an active social process and only 
treat it as a state (Dobbin 1994b). For our purposes, this 
means that macro-institutionalism either takes political 
institutions at their face value, by relying for instance on 
the way politicians, civil servants and industrial representa-
tives publicly introduce and/or justify institutional changes 
using consensual notions of efficiency and public good, or 
rationalizes ex-post the aim of political institutions by look-
ing at their perceived outcomes in the given market fields. 
Both these options are problematic. The first because it 
gives the impression that all political action is shaped by 
values, while, in fact, what makes actions “political” is that 
they are made in the name of values (Jullien and Smith 
2011). The second because it establishes a functionalist 
link between the perceived outcomes of given institutions, 
the interests of certain parties, and the underlying purpos-
es of policy making, as if public action in the economy was 
always perfect and systematically succeeded in achieving its 
precise aims. 
A second limit of macro-institutional approaches concerns 
the normative hypotheses it produces on policymaking and 
state-firm relationships. Whereas these hypotheses make 
insightful predictive statements about the social processes 
involved in policymaking, these statements tend to be 
general enough to be very difficult to falsify as far as they 
always seem capture at least a part of the “truth” (Gold-
stone and Useem 2012). Because of that very reason, these 
statements can vary significantly from one research to 
another without generating internal debate in the disci-
pline. As a result, cumulative work in this field of economic 
sociology does not seem to produce more accurate theo-
ries of state action in the economy, but a patchwork of 
distinct claims tied together by a loose consensus on the 
socially constructed fabric of markets and economies 
(Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Dobbin 2004). For instance, 
the influential works of Frank Dobbin and Neil Fligstein on 
the social construction of markets are almost systematically 
cited alongside one each other as if they agree on the 
underlying processes inherent to the creation, reproduction 
and transformation of markets, but in fact they don’t. On 
the one hand, Dobbin claims that the structure of markets 
in each national economy is determined by the cultural 
values embedded in policymaking and that institutional 
changes happen when there are shifts in values or in the 
way values are interpreted (Dobbin 1994a). According to 
Dobbin, policymaking is therefore exogenous to markets, 
and dominant market actors have to adapt to the institu-
tional environments produced by the state. On the other 
hand, for Fligstein it is the “field structure” of each market 
that shapes the political institutions that allow for its re-
production and ultimately confer on each market its struc-
tural stability (Fligstein 2001). If market institutions do 
eventually change after a certain period of time, it is be-
cause the market structure has been changed under the 
effects of exogenous shocks. Thus, according to Fligstein, 
while policymaking remains exogenous to markets because 
the state is considered as an autonomous field, the out-
comes of policymaking can be considered as endogenous 
to markets because they tend to reproduce the interests of 
dominant firms in each market field. 
What Dobbin and Fligstein do agree on is the fact that 
both “ideas about efficiency” promoted by the states, and 
“conceptions of control” promoted by dominant firms in 
markets, are social and cultural constructions that result 
from contingent historical processes involving agency and 
power. But this loose consensus does not take away either 
their fundamental disagreement about the underlying 
dynamics of policymaking and institutional changes, or the 
surprising lack of debate and research on how to articulate 
these divergent but well established views in any common 
frame. 
A third important limit of macro-institutionalist approaches 
concerns the characterization of institutional change. Ac-
cording to macro-institutionalism, institutional change only 
happens – in markets or elsewhere – when institutions are 
formally changed by “exogenous” state action in reaction 
to “exogenous” shocks and/or shifts in political values. An 
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important critique of this view has been developed by politi-
cal sociologists who have argued that institutional change 
happens continuously, even when political institutions do 
not formally change (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney 
and Thelen 2009). According to this view, self-reflective 
actors are constantly engaged in political projects that entail 
subtle but significant cumulative changes in the way political 
institutions are interpreted and implemented within and 
between markets (Jackson 2005). From a distinct but similar 
perspective, Lawrence et al. (2009) have introduced the 
notion of institutional work in order to grasp how individuals 
endogenously build, sustain and transform social institutions 
within organizations. These critics raise an important chal-
lenge for macro-institutional approaches: how to articulate 
endogenous and continuous “piecemeal” change with the 
effects of exogenous shocks in the analysis of market fields’ 
dynamics. This challenge can also be linked to the first two 
limits highlighted above insofar as it should push researchers 
to look at institutional change in markets’ policies as a social 
process rather than as a succession of states, and to eventu-
ally take interest in what is happening inside the black box 
of state-firm relationships rather than deducing its function-
ing from outside. 
In the next section we will follow this route to understand 
what happened to the British motor industry under the 
governments of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. We will 
first argue that while government’s policies clearly played a 
decisive role in the decline of the “national champion” 
British Leyland, the rationale behind these policies and 
their precise wider implications escape deductive reasoning 
and remain until today an unsolved mystery. We will then 
show how looking into the black box of policymaking not 
only provides a surprising solution to the mystery, but also 
qualifies macro-institutional hypotheses about policymak-
ing and state-firm relationships in important ways. 
2 A case study in decline: the British 
motor industry under Margaret 
Thatcher 
Up to 1973, British Leyland (BL)3 dominated the British 
motor industry. BL was the post-war result of a series of 
government-driven mergers between indigenous carmak-
ers to create a “national champion”. By the early 1970s, 
BL controlled 40% of the domestic market, represented 
over 50% of domestic production, and exported about 
40% of its production. While its profitability was criticized 
as low, the company had not displayed a single year of 
losses since its last merger in 1968. The other two main 
domestic producers were the long-established subsidiaries 
of Ford (Ford UK) and General Motors (Vauxhall), which 
controlled respectively about 20% and 10% of the domes-
tic market. 
In 1973 two important changes happened in the economic 
environment of BL. First, following the UK entry in the 
European Union, duties on imported cars from the EU 
dropped from 11% to nothing. Second, the first oil shock 
caused a sharp drop in the sales of new cars in all the ma-
jor world markets which increased international competi-
tion, in particular by the Japanese whose aggressive ex-
port-oriented strategy was backed by significant cost ad-
vantages (Altshuler and Roos 1984; Freyssenet et al. 1998). 
It is generally recognized by business historians that BL, 
which had not completed the rationalization of its produc-
tion facilities after the last wave of mergers and was af-
fected by several production problems, was particularly 
badly equipped to face the economic storm that fol-
lowed4. By 1975, production volumes were already 34% 
below their 1972 level and the company had to be rescued 
by the state in order to avoid bankruptcy. In order to re-
store BL’s production levels, the Labour government set in 
place an ambitious policy, called the Ryder Plan, which 
consisted of modernizing the product range and the pro-
duction facilities of the company through substantial injec-
tions of public money, but without engaging in major 
restructuring. By the time Margaret Thatcher was elected 
into government in 1979, it was clear that the Ryder Plan 
had largely underestimated the gravity of the situation. 
Production levels had continued to worsen and had 
dropped 45% below their 1972 level. Domestic market 
share had crumbled to 20% while imports had climbed to 
56% from 14% at the beginning of the decade. Further-
more, despite a capital injection from the state of about 
£900 million, the accounts of the nationalized company 
displayed an appalling cumulated loss of £332 million. 
The causes of these “disasters” have been largely debated 
in the literature. Scholars have blamed the poor state of 
industrial relations and the irresponsible attitude of trade 
unions, the lack of managerial competences, and the lack 
of state support in the form of pertinent and coherent 
industrial, incomes and trade policies5. It should be noted 
however that while BL had certainly suffered more than 
most of the other “national champions” in the world au-
tomobile industry, its problems were far from unique. With 
a few Japanese exceptions, all the other major carmakers 
had also suffered massive losses during this period marked 
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by the double oil shocks and the economic crisis, and many 
had to be rescued by their governments and/or were pur-
chased by competitors (Freyssenet et al. 1998). 
By contrast, only BL amongst all these “national champi-
ons” in crisis did not manage to recover market share and 
restore profitability during the 1980s. By the time the 
company was finally privatized in 1988 to British Aero-
space for £150 million, an additional two billion pounds of 
public money had been poured in its accounts (bringing 
the total since 1975 to over £3 billion) without generating 
any profit and without preventing the further erosion of its 
domestic market share to an historical low of 15%. 
As with the 1970’s “disasters”, this prolonged decline has 
also attracted several explanations in the literature, in par-
ticular by business and economic historians, but remains 
even more difficult to elucidate. As stressed by Tolliday, 
“with a modern range of excellent products and a more 
focused strategy, BL/Austin-Rover has done worse in terms 
of market share than it did with poor models and confused 
management in the late 1970s” (Tolliday 1988, 67). The 
same could have been said for almost all the other dimen-
sions of the company. With better industrial relations, 
better management, better products, improved economic 
conditions and continuous government support, not only 
BL did not recover, but kept losing market share and ac-
cumulating losses (Pardi forthcoming). 
One possible explanation of the paradoxical decline of BL 
that has attracted surprisingly little attention is the role of 
government policy. Indeed, with the election into govern-
ment of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, British industrial policy 
had suddenly shifted from an extreme protectionist pro-
gram that supported “national champions” with little 
regards for their competitiveness in international markets, 
to an extreme liberal program that supported free market 
and state withdrawal from economy with little regards for 
its consequences on ailing nationalized industries. In par-
ticular, the appointment of Keith Joseph, the ideological 
father of Thatcherism, as Secretary of the State for Industry 
augured badly for the immediate fortunes of the weak-
ened BL. His removal from office only one year later, in 
1981, at the same time when the new corporate plan of 
BL was under negotiation, has been therefore interpreted 
as a U-turn in industrial policy (Wilks 1988). Against the 
repeated advice of Joseph to close down the company, 
Thatcher eventually decided in December 1981 to invest a 
further one billion pounds in the ailing nationalized car-
maker. According to Wilks (1988), three reasons account-
ed for this shift towards a more pragmatic industrial policy. 
First, the cost of closing down BL was estimated to be 
almost the same as keeping the company alive, at least in 
the short term. Second, under the drastic tenure of Sir 
Michael Ewardes, the unions at BL had come to accept a 
massive restructuring program that entailed the closure of 
thirteen factories and the laying off of 25 000 workers, 
and these were exactly the kind of measures that the gov-
ernment expected in exchange for its support. Finally, the 
British motor industry was still the main exporter and the 
main industrial employer of the country, and it was argued 
that Thatcher simply could not afford the political price of 
closing down the last domestically owned carmaker, which 
still represented 43% of the total British production. 
Yet, one would have expected that once the government 
had made up its mind about supporting BL, and had en-
trusted substantial amounts of public money and political 
capital in the operation, it would have also taken the kind 
of measures that BL required to recover market share and 
profitability. But what the Thatcher government did was 
exactly the opposite. First, it subsidised the entry of new 
domestic competitors in the form of the Japanese carmak-
ers, starting with Nissan in 1984, followed by Toyota and 
Honda in 1989. Second, it deregulated the market for car 
parts and new cars with the declared aim of bringing 
down prices and increasing competition in a market where 
BL was clearly the weakest player (Monopolies and Mer-
gers Commission 1982; Monopolies and Mergers Commis-
sion 1992; Monopolies and Mergers Commission 2000). 
Both these political projects started in 1981 at the same 
time when the new corporate plan of BL was approved. 
As we have argued in Pardi (forthcoming), such a schizo-
phrenic policy did not make a lot of sense: if the govern-
ment wanted to replace BL with more competitive Japa-
nese carmakers, then it should have not invested several 
hundred million pounds per year to rescue the ailing “na-
tional champion”; and if it wanted to restore the fortunes 
of BL as the last owned domestic carmaker, then it should 
have not increased competition when the company mostly 
needed protection to recover. 
Wilks has argued, however, that such misconceptions in 
the field of industrial policy were far from exceptional in 
Britain, and could be explained by the “insularity” of its 
political elites and their tendency to implement “doctrinal 
policies” (Wilks 1988). Not only these elites were “sealed 
from one another to remarkable degree” (Gamble and 
Walkland 1984, 178), but they were also very distant from 
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the industrial interests they were supposed to defend, which 
is why they would tend to implement policies that neglected 
these very interests but were coherent with their own doc-
trinal ideas about efficiency. In the case of Thatcher, these 
ideas were consistent with a dramatic shift from industrial 
policy, based on state interventionism in the economy, to 
enterprise policy, based on withdrawal of the state and 
laissez-faire principles. The “schizophrenic” attitude of the 
government towards BL could be interpreted therefore as 
the on-going result of this shift (Wilks 1988, 301–305). In 
other terms, Thatcher had to accept, temporarily and unwill-
ingly, the need to keep BL alive as a sort of institutional 
heritage from the previous industrial policy, but her govern-
ment could not accept the need to protect the company, 
because this was at odds with its own doctrinal ideas about 
efficiency. From this perspective, the rationale of this contra-
dictory policy was that either BL was able to stand on its 
own legs in a more competitive environment or the gov-
ernment would withdraw its support anyway. 
Such an explanation would be plausible if only because 
Thatcher and her ministries have constantly presented their 
policy towards BL exactly in these terms (Thatcher 1993). It 
would be also coherent with the macro-institutional hy-
pothesis developed by Frank Dobbin that cultural industrial 
policy paradigms – such as Thatcher’s “enterprise policy” – 
“structure[d] the very way in which policy-makers see the 
world and their role within it” (Hall 1992, cited by Dobbin 
1994, p.4). But it would require all the same a very strong 
hypothesis about the blindness of the Thatcher govern-
ment in regard to the consequences of these policies for 
BL, and for the two billion pounds of public money invest-
ed in the company. Furthermore, the reasons why Thatcher 
preferred to disavow her political mentor, Keith Joseph, 
rather than closing down a company that represented 
everything she despised would remain, from this macro-
cultural perspective, difficult to explain. 
By contrast, Neil Fligstein’s meso-institutional hypothesis 
about the power of dominant firms in key national indus-
tries would better account for the support obtained by BL 
despite the ideological hostility of the Thatcher govern-
ment, but would have much more difficulties in explaining 
the implementation of market institutions that were clearly 
detrimental to BL’s interests. Such a paradox would require 
at least the presence of active challengers who could have 
benefited from the new institutions and/or from the de-
cline of BL. As far as the outcomes of this institutional 
change were concerned, the only challengers who could 
seem to have benefited from them were the Japanese 
carmakers. But their record in Europe and in the UK has 
been rather poor: despite important investments, their 
market share stagnated during the 1990s and 2000s while 
the profitability of their European subsidiaries has been at 
best non-existent for Toyota, or clearly terrible for Nissan 
and Honda (Pardi forthcoming). 
In short, neither the hypothesis of the socially constructed 
power of dominant firms, nor the hypothesis of the socially 
constructed power of economic principles could explain in 
deductive terms the odd behaviour of Margaret Thatcher’s 
government towards BL. By contrast, we will see in the 
next section how this apparently “schizophrenic” policy 
can be precisely decoded once the aims and dynamics of 
the underlying policymaking process reveal themselves. 
This in turn will allow us to better test the relevance of 
Dobbin’s and Fligstein’s macro-institutional hypotheses. 
3 The politics of markets or the hidden 
role of the component makers 
To look into the black box of state-firm relationships often 
implies looking into the greyish boxes of archives. In this 
case, the boxes come from the archives of the Department 
of Industry (DoI) and of the Department of Trade (DoT) and 
concern the negotiations of the 1981 and 1983 corporate 
plans of BL and of the future investment of Nissan. Since 
we present these sources in detail elsewhere (Pardi forth-
coming), we will limit ourselves to summarizing the main 
findings for the purpose of our discussion here. 
Let’s start from why the Thatcher government wanted to 
attract Nissan in Britain despite its strong financial com-
mitment in BL. The archives reveal two fundamental rea-
sons. The first one was that the DoI was afraid to lose the 
investment to another Member State of the EU. At the 
time, Japanese imports in the UK were frozen at 11% of 
the market by a quota established in 1975. But if Nissan, 
which was the main Japanese importer in Britain, could 
start production elsewhere in the EU, then they could ig-
nore the quota and increase their market share in the UK 
through “European” imports. Since the UK appeared to be 
the worst equipped amongst the EU member states to 
resist against such imports, due in particular to the com-
mercial weakness of BL, it could be argued that it was in its 
national interest “to pick up the project and gain domesti-
cally rather than suck in the output from another member 
state”6. The argument, however, was contested inside the 
DoI. As one of the chief economists of the Motor Vehicle 
Division emphasized: “it is a far too easy temptation to 
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assume that if the investment did not take place in the UK 
it would take place elsewhere in Europe with the UK thus 
not being saved any possible disadvantages”. By contrast, 
it was quite clear that “increased competition from Nissan 
on this scale will make unviable a BL which could other-
wise have been viable”7. 
The second much more determinant reason which eventu-
ally shifted the balance inside the DoI in favour of the Nis-
san investment and against the interests of BL, was the 
remarkably strong influence that the component industry 
exerted on the Thatcher government. For historical rea-
sons, due to the high degree of vertical outsourcing of the 
British car industry, the main suppliers of BL were large 
companies like GKN, Associated Engineering, and Lucas. 
Unlike BL, these companies had sailed through the 1970s 
economic storm very successfully: they had taken ad-
vantage of the UK entry in the EU to grow internationally 
and displayed high and stable profits through all the peri-
od. For instance, Lucas, whose sales concentrated about 
one fifth of the total turnover of the British automobile 
supplier industry in 1981, had achieved between 1973 and 
1980 a cumulative operating profit of £424 million, with 
an average operating profit rate of 7,5% for the vehicle 
equipment division which represented 80% of the total 
turnover of the company (Pardi forthcoming). 
The main source of the profits of the British component 
makers was not the sale of parts to carmakers, but the 
after-sale market to consumers, which represented one 
third of their activity but concentrated slightly more than 
the total of their net profits (Pardi forthcoming). The British 
component makers controlled 75% of the after sale mar-
ket for non-captive parts of British-made cars, which ex-
plained their exceptional profitability. But they only con-
trolled 10% to 20% of the sale of car parts for imported 
cars, and since the share of imported cars had grown from 
14% in 1970 to 56% in 1980, this meant that the main 
source of profit for the British component makers was 
about to run out. The problem was made worse by the 
strategy of Ford and GM which had started to shift a 
growing share of their production of cars and parts from 
their British subsidiaries to their German and Spanish sub-
sidiaries. As for BL, if it still represented in 1980 43% of 
the total British production and the main source of profit 
for the British component makers, its market share had 
tumbled from 40% in 1970 to 20% in 1980. 
Confronted with such critical developments, the Motor 
Vehicle Component Industry Liaison Group (CILG), which 
represented the interests of the main British suppliers with-
in the DoI, made it clear to the Thatcher government that 
it should not close down BL as Keith Joseph wished, pro-
vided that BL kept the totality of its purchasing in Britain; 
that a new regulation policy was needed to grant British 
component makers greater access to the after-sale market 
for imported cars; and that Japanese investment to substi-
tute for the declining production of BL was welcome, pro-
vided that it came with a very high level of local integration 
(90 per cent) and contractual clauses that would force the 
new entrants to buy only (or mainly) British parts. As the 
following developments show, this was almost down to 
the letter the political agenda implemented by the 
Thatcher governments during the 1980s. 
When John Nott, the Secretary of State for Trade, was 
informed in August 1980 of the possibility of a Nissan 
and/or of a Toyota investment in Britain, he immediately 
suggested to the Prime Minister that  “while some account 
must be taken of the effects on BL of increased Japanese 
involvement in the United Kingdom industry” he hoped 
that “every encouragement can be given both to Nissan 
and Toyota to invest in this country”. He added that such 
investment was “likely to provide a welcome stimulus to 
component manufacture” which was in his view, “likely to 
be far more important to our economy in long-term than 
the assembly of cars”. He suggested however to “negoti-
ate from the outset an agreement with the Japanese that 
government grants etc. could only be available on the basis 
that an agreed proportion of components were sourced 
from British industry”. He also mentioned “the problem to 
which the Price Commission drew attention in their report 
on car parts” which was that “Motor manufacturers im-
pose conditions on their franchised dealers requiring the 
exclusive use of their own components for replacements, 
and now that the majority of cars are imported these con-
ditions exclude our components industry from a growing 
part of the replacement market”. In order to solve this 
problem he indicated how he had referred the practice to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for a “short 
enquiry”, which should soon give him the power “to pro-
hibit or regulate the practice”8. 
The speaking notes for the first meeting between the rep-
resentatives of the DoI and Nissan were also very clear 
about the importance of the component makers’ interests. 
They stated that: “High local content would be a big boost 
to the industry and might offset possible impact on BL, and 
would be essential to favourable HMG response”. In order 
“to satisfy component industry” the local content would 
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have to be “at least of 80% or more, which virtually in-
clude the production of all components other than engine 
and gearbox”. As a way to introduce the topic to the Nis-
san’s representatives, the speaking notes suggested the 
following line: 
“HMG’s substantial support to BL is the main evidence of 
Government’s determination to retain a viable motor man-
ufacturing industry. As you will no doubt have learnt direct 
from Sir Barrie Heath (chairman of GKN), we do however 
have a much stronger components industry”9. 
It should be noted that local content level at 80% was far 
in excess of what the EU required, which was 55%, and it 
also implied very large volumes of production – about 250 
000 cars per year – in order to break even, because the 
economies of scale in component production were much 
more important than in car assembly. It became soon clear 
in the DoI that “volumes of this kind (would) undermine 
BL’s position”10 but the government stuck to its position 
and clearly arbitrated in favour of the component makers’ 
interests. 
The archives provide other examples of situations in which 
the government arbitrated in favour of the component 
makers and against BL. Perhaps the most striking one is 
when Sir Michael Edwardes, the director of BL, announced 
in the first draft of the 1983 corporate plan that BL was 
going to shift 35% of its purchasing abroad, towards 
Spain, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. Edwardes had calculated 
with the support of Honda, with whom BL had established 
an alliance in 1979, that the operation could save to the 
company up to £80 million for 1984 alone and several 
hundreds millions by the end of the decade. The DoI did 
not contest the data provided by the company, but the 
government vetoed the whole project. In this occasion, 
Norman Lamont, Minister of State for the industry, clearly 
stated “that to reduce the UK content of BL cars to 55% 
would make a mockery of the policy of supporting Ley-
land”11. The government also applied to the joint models 
developed by BL and Honda the same rule of 80% of local 
content, and when BL top management asked in 1983 to 
amend the policy to allow the production of Honda models 
in BL’s factories in exchange for BL’s exports to Japan, the 
government again refused, afraid that Nissan might take 
advantage of any break of the rule to renegotiate its en-
gagements with the British component makers (Pardi 
forthcoming). 
As to why the British component makers exerted such a 
strong influence on the Thatcher government, the first and 
most evident raison was purely economic. During the 
1970s, the destabilizing consequences of the UK entry in 
the EU and of the first oil shock had made the production 
of cars in Britain an unprofitable business, but this was not 
the case of the after-sale market and component makers 
controlled the after-sale market for British made cars. Fur-
thermore, the British component makers were amongst 
the largest in Europe and they profited from the European 
integration by increasing their sales and production 
abroad. As a result, by the late 1970s they had become, as 
a group, the dominant firms in the domestic market while 
the once ultra-dominant BL had been downgraded to the 
role of challenger placed under the protection of the state. 
A second raison could be labelled as cultural. British com-
ponent makers were private, family-owned, and profitable 
firms. Thus, they perfectly embodied the model of the 
autonomous entrepreneurial firm that the Thatcher gov-
ernment wanted to revive against the state-led monopolis-
tic model of BL (Dobbin 1993). 
Finally the British component makers were also concen-
trated in a strategic political region, the West Midlands, 
which had been decisive in first installing and then remov-
ing the Conservatives from power in 1970 and 1974 gen-
eral elections (Taylor 1979). Their economy depended on 
the auto suppliers, and their interests were represented in 
the parliament by the very influential all-party Motor Indus-
try Group. 
4 Conclusion 
In the case of the decline of the British motor industry 
under Margaret Thatcher, unpacking the state-firm rela-
tionship radically changes our comprehension of the un-
derlying economic and institutional dynamics. Our analysis 
shows that political institutions did play a key role in this 
story, but for reasons that were very different from those 
deduced by the few works in political science that have 
made this hypothesis. In these works, the government 
action was presented at best as a muddled ideological 
policy, blinded to its detrimental effects on BL by culturally 
constructed ideas about efficiency. Our study shows that it 
was in fact a quite coherent attempt to protect the inter-
ests of the dominant domestic firms in the automobile 
sector, except that these were not anymore the carmakers, 
but their suppliers. Institutional change was required here 
to preserve their profitability and industrial viability that 
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were threatened both by the collapsing market share of BL 
and the growing influx of imports. 
Interpreted as a shift between “industrial policy” and “en-
terprise policy”, the state action towards the automobile 
sector under Margaret Thatcher was in fact industrial poli-
cy disguised in neo-liberal clothes. On the one hand, the 
attraction of Japanese foreign direct investment in the 
sector was constrained by very high local content clauses 
that ensured that British component makers would capture 
between 50% and 60% of the value produced by Nissan, 
Honda and Toyota in the UK. On the other hand, the de-
regulation of the after-sale market was not aimed at bring-
ing down the prices for the consumers, but at increasing 
the control of the British component makers over this prof-
itable market. This also means that these measures did not 
really increase competition for BL, and that the prolonged 
decline of the company was not directly due to the state-
sponsored Japanese invasion nor to the effects of market 
deregulation. The problem of BL was that the priority of 
the Thatcher government was not to restore its long-term 
competitiveness, but to delay its death until the opening 
up new business opportunities for the component industry. 
It is also clear from our analysis that the underlying aims 
and effects of policymaking could have not been deduced 
from macro-institutional hypotheses. Although Frank Dob-
bin’s macro-cultural perspective seemed to provide a rela-
tively better account of the “irrational” policymaking of 
Margaret Thatcher than Neil Fligstein’s meso-institutional 
perspective, we see now how the fact of taking institutions 
and institutional change at their face value does not allow 
us to grasp how actors manipulate the meaning and the 
very substance of political institutions. Indeed, whereas 
Thatcher gave the impression of acting in the name of 
rationalized ideas of efficiency against the interests of 
dominant firms, she was acting in the name of these very 
interests against her own ideas of economic efficiency. By 
contrast, Neil Fligstein’s hypothesis about the power of 
dominant firms, which seemed particularly at odds with 
the politically-driven decline of the “national champion” 
BL, is strengthened by our study, but with two important 
conditions. First, if we want to understand the effects of 
policymaking on market field dynamics, then the social 
processes by which firms become, remain or cease to be 
“dominant” in political arenas must be endogenized in the 
analysis rather than deduced by the relative distribution of 
economic capital or by the perceived outcomes of institu-
tional change in the market field. Second, if want to un-
derstand how the dominants’ “conceptions of control” 
and the state’s “ideas about efficiency” constantly interact 
in policymaking, then the “argumentative” strategies (For-
ester 1993) by which private companies’ concerns are 
translated, more or less successfully, into the “interests” of 
the state must also be taken into account. 
Finally, concerning the dynamics of institutional change, 
the present study suggests that piecemeal endogenous 
cumulative change and the effects of exogenous shocks on 
markets’ field structure are very much intertwined. Indeed, 
the institutional changes introduced by the Thatcher gov-
ernment in the British motor industry might have appeared 
initially as the straightforward consequences of exogenous 
shocks and of exogenous state action, but we have shown 
that they are much better understood as the results of the 
endogenous transformation and reproduction of the field 
under the successful political action of the component 
makers. 
To conclude, the fact that the British component industry 
has not become in the UK “far more important than the 
assembly of cars” as the Secretary of State for trade, John 
Nott, had decidedly assumed back in 1980, reminds us of a 
fundamental aspect of public action in the economy, 
which is that despite its structuring or destructuring role, it 
is frequently ineffective in achieving its precise aims. 
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Endnotes 
1This is particularly clear in the analysis of the “subprime” crisis in 
the US mortgages market. While Fligstein and McAdam (2012) 
show how the federal government and public policy played a 
structural role in shaping the mortgage market, they explain the 
government’s failure in regulating the market and preventing the 
growth and the burst of the real estate bubble by making two 
deductive statements about the underlying process of policymak-
ing. First, they assume that the politicians in Congress and in the 
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federal governments “all viewed their role in creating the possibil-
ity of more homeowners as an important goal of social policy” (p. 
151), and that this political engagement made them deaf to the 
possible detrimental outcomes of a speculative growth of the 
mortgage market. Second, they assume that the faith of public 
regulators in self-regulating markets made them blind to the 
possibility of irrational behavior by market’s actors, which would 
explain why incumbent banks in the mortgage market obtained 
what they wanted from the government in terms of market de-
regulation (p. 158). As we will argue later in this paper, these 
kinds of deductive arguments provide at best a poor explanation 
of policymaking and require a great deal of faith in the supposed 
deafness and blindness of politicians and public regulators. 
2For a critical analysis of the impact of public policies on the 
British motor sector in the 1960s and 1970s see Dunnet 1980; 
Wilks 1988. 
3Before 1975, the company was called British Leyland Motor 
Corporation Ltd., in 1975 it was renamed British Leyland, and 
then simply BL in 1978. BL lasted until 1986, when the company 
was renamed Rover Group. For simplicity reasons we will refer to 
it here as BL. 
4See (Pardi forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of the literature 
on the decline of the British motor industry. 
5For a detailed review of this literature see (Whisler 1999; Fore-
man-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay 1995; Pardi forthcoming). 
6R. Mountfield, Commenting on Mr. Owen minute and possible 
reactions from EU commission and EU partners, July 26, 1980, 
The National Archives: FV 22/133. 
7Alan Whiting to J. Cammel and J. Bowder, Comments on the 
note "possible Japanese investment in the UK motor industry", 10 
September 1980, The National Archives: FV 22/133. 
8John Nott to Prime Minister, Possible Japanese investment in the 
motor industry, 13 August 1980, The National Archives: FV 22/133. 
9J. Mills to Lord Trenchard, Nissan, 30 July 1980, The National 
Archives: FV 22/133. 
10N.C. Owen to R. Mountfield, Nissan: Draft brief for Mr. Oku-
ma's visit, 25 July 25, 1980, The National Archives: FV 22/133. 
11Norman Lamont to S.o.S., October 21, 1982, The National 
Archives: FV 22/95. 
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This paper presents some preliminary results of our re-
search project investigating the largest French firms and 
their directors, from the 1840s to the 2000s (the empirical 
research design is presented in Part III, below). This topic 
had of course already given birth to dozens of fine mono-
graphs and biographies. There was still however a lack of a 
strong synthesis that would integrate insights from eco-
nomic history and economic sociology, as well as from 
studies on the careers of elite actors and the governance of 
firms. Prior to our study, no effort had been made to sys-
tematically document the very list of the largest firms, with 
their main characteristics, for even a few landmark dates in 
the history of capitalism, let alone to list the directors of 
these firms and to investigate their lives. As a result, gen-
eral ideas about French capitalism are still mostly based on 
monographs – or, at worst, on preconceptions about the 
French political culture. We argue that a more systematic, 
quantified description of large firms and their directors is 
necessary to question such preconceptions and to better 
define the enduring idiosyncrasies – if they exist at all – of 
French capitalism. This is not a purely descriptive task that 
would only hold interest for navel-gazing French scholars. 
On the contrary, we argue that the French case has long 
held a significant rhetorical role in social sciences as the 
unquestioned epitome of State capitalism (and of “strong 
State” generally), whether it is discussed as an interesting 
variant among others or as a strange vestige of things past. 
Such an embodiment of a type, or even an ideal-type, by 
one empirical case, holds significant risks when it is used 
for not only illustrative purposes, but also time and again, 
and often implicitly, in presentations of theories. Too often 
it becomes a shortcut to avoid a rigorous specification of 
the type under discussion: the characteristics of “State 
capitalism” have for some time been more or less equated 
to “things the French do” (or are believed to do). The 
inclination of French capitalism toward “statism”, or dirig-
isme, is often presented as inevitable because of its [sup-
posedly?] extremely long roots, dating back to the Old 
Regime. Many (e.g. Guéry, 1989) cite 17th-century minis-
ter Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who created, among other de-
vices intended to promote French exports, privileged man-
ufacturers and official standards on the quality of privately 
produced cloth, along with public officers to enforce them. 
Others focus on the French revolution and Napoleonic 
reforms that generally forbade private collective regulations 
(e.g. by guilds) and gave rhetorical prominence to civil 
servants trained in specific schools and thereby supposed 
to know better about the general interest than entrepre-
neurs (e.g. Chadeau, 2000, p. 191-192). The socialist (and 
other) governments that raised public spending, created 
public monopolies, or monitored a wide range of prices 
from the 1930s on thus become the somewhat unex-
pected heirs of absolutism or Bonapartism. Some authors 
even believe French statism to be so strong as to continue 
to function even at the time of spectacular neo-liberal 
reforms, such as in 1986-1988 (Bellini, 2000, p. 33-34). 
Stretched to this point, the concept loses almost all of its 
value: some sort of State action, direct or indirect, is always 
to be found in economic policy, and this is not specific to 
France. If “State capitalism” covers Colbertian and Napo-
leonic as well as, for example, 1981 socialist policies, it will 
have little descriptive, let alone explanatory, power. But are 
there descriptions of State-led regulation of firms that 
were built independently of some assumption about the 
French economy? In Part I of this paper, we will argue that 
we lack such studies, because the literature on varieties of 
capitalism particularly has shown less and less interest in 
the “State capitalism” variant over the last decades. On 
the contrary, we believe that this variant is still empirically 
important, but that it requires a better definition. We will 
certainly not offer here a full-fledged version of such a 
definition, offering rather a modest but rigorous way to 
build it. It relies on systematic, quantifiable data, but takes 
seriously historical changes and the range of possible roles 
and positions of the State, instead of using a weak State 
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versus strong State dichotomy (on more general problems 
with this binomy, see e.g. Baldwin, 2005). 
In this preliminary paper, we will concentrate on a feature 
of State involvement in capitalism that has arguably been 
the object of the most heated debates and which is very 
strongly associated with France: the weight of State-
owned enterprises (SOEs). For example, Schmidt (2003, p. 
529) stated that “State-capitalist France’s dirigiste or inter-
ventionist state, by contrast, sought to direct economic 
activities through planning, industrial policy and state-
owned enterprises, in addition to all the ways the other 
states promoted business” and Chadeau (2000, p. 180) 
described France as a “homeland for the public sector”, 
with a majority of energy production, telecommunications, 
aircraft manufacturing, insurance and banking being man-
aged by the State in the early 1980s. Since it involves the 
State taking the place, and sometimes literally taking the 
property, of private capitalists, and was indeed considered 
by some political parties as a first step toward socialism, 
the creation of SOEs often bears the connotation of the 
State acting against the “normal” development of capital-
ism, replacing capitalists in a very active, direct way. There 
were however many different reasons for the establish-
ment of SOEs, which were even sometimes demanded by 
business associations. An empirical analysis not only of the 
number and size of SOEs, but also of their relationships 
with private firms is required before we consider their mere 
existence as a proxy for a strong State. Such an empirical 
analysis, especially if it is longitudinal, is useful in order to 
escape simplistic characterizations of national capitalism. 
Neither the number and size of SOEs, nor their relation-
ships with private firms remained unchanged, in any coun-
try, during the 20th century. In fact, in Part II of this paper, 
we will use already published material to point out the 
common rhythms found in many countries in the creation 
and privatization of SOEs. Their presence is certainly not a 
French peculiarity; it is specific to a period of time, not to a 
country or group of countries. 
We do not however argue that national trajectories should 
be disregarded in a study of State involvement in capital-
ism generally, or of the roles of SOEs specifically. We rather 
offer a replicable empirical strategy that can be used to 
produce better international comparisons. We demonstrate 
it in Part III by concentrating on the position occupied by 
SOEs in the French network of interlocking directorates, 
i.e. the ties created between firms by the fact that they 
share one or more board members. On the one hand, we 
find that SOEs have always been quite integrated in this 
network, contrary to what happened in other countries, 
such as Italy from the 1970s onwards. This is an interesting 
thread to follow in order to better understand the role 
played by the State, through SOEs, in capitalism. On the 
other hand, we find that the integration of the SOEs did 
not change the main, remarkably stable features of the 
French network of interlocking directorates. What appears 
to be an enduring French peculiarity, worth investigating 
further, is the particular shape of this network, which 
seems to denote a “status capitalism” rather than a State 
capitalism. 
Building on these initial insights, Part IV briefly discusses 
complementary ways to characterize other dimensions of 
the role of the State in capitalism. We plan to use to them 
illuminate the French case, and we hope that they will be 
used to build other useful comparative typologies.  
I. French Capitalism as an Epitome of 
State Capitalism? 
The debates about the historical trajectories of contempo-
rary capitalisms have been organized around two main 
questions. The first one has to do with the diversity versus 
convergence issue: do these trajectories converge toward a 
neo-liberal, market- and finance-centered, Anglo-Saxon 
model of capitalism (Orléan, 1999) – in which case the 
study of the French trajectory would be of little general 
interest – or are they organized around enduring, hetero-
geneous paths of development (Hall and Soskice, 2001a)? 
If such heterogeneous paths are found, it opens a second 
question: how should we make sense of it? Around which 
criteria should we build typologies of capitalism? The de-
gree to which these typologies do or do not consider the 
weight, role and tools of the State as a particularly relevant 
dimension seems to us to be one of the main substantive 
divisions between them (see for example Streeck, 2012). 
Until the late 1970s, the types of State intervention were 
one of the main criteria used to organize the diversity of 
capitalism, along with business practices and and industrial 
relations (Shonfield, 1965; Katzenstein, 1978; Schmidt, 
1996, 2003 usefully summed up these conceptions; see 
especially Table 1, reproduced below). These criteria were 
used to describe three ideal-types, each of which was as-
sociated with a few countries: market capitalism (United 
Kingdom and the United States), managed capitalism 
(Germany and smaller European countries such as the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden), and State capitalism 
(France and Italy). In fact, the role of the State was every-
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where in the definition of the last type, where the State 
was supposed to lead, control and/or mediate business and 
industrial relations, as well as to play a more general stra-
tegic (defining priorities) or organizing role and to directly 
invest in firms. Conversely, the description of the two other 
ideal-types was organized around the characterization of 
inter-firm and management-labor relations as either com-
petitive or co-operative; the State is assumed to be mostly 
absent (a passive bystander) in these two types of capital-
ism, or could have an enabling and perhaps mediating 
role. As Hall and Soskice put it, “countries were often 
categorized, according to the structure of their state, into 
those with “strong” and “weak” states” (Hall and Soskice, 
2001b, p. 2). 
See Appendix, Table 1: Characteristics of the post-
war varieties of capitalism (1950s-1970s) 
This key role of the State in older typologies contrasts with 
its apparent erasure from the conceptual apparatus of the 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach. On the contrary, 
this approach directly translated the difference between 
market capitalism and managed capitalism into an opposi-
tion between liberal market economies, where “firms co-
ordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and com-
petitive market arrangements”, and coordinated market 
economies, where “firms depend more heavily on non-
market relationships to coordinate their endeavors with 
other actors and to construct their core competencies” 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001b, p. 8). 
This choice to reinterpret part of the older typologies, but 
with the State pushed back into the shadows, is consistent 
with an approach aiming at putting the firm at the very 
center of the characterization of contemporary capitalisms. 
It is not uncontroversial, however, as this erasure of the 
State does not seemed to be based on an explicit assess-
ment of its lack of relevance for the typology. Howell 
(2003, p. 110), for example, states that “the theoretical 
framework of Varieties of Capitalism offers an extremely 
thin notion of politics and state action, in which govern-
ments, whose function is essentially to encourage coordi-
nation among economic actors, act largely at the behest of 
employers. States do not appear to have interests distin-
guishable from those of employers, nor do they have the 
capacity to act independently of, still less against, employer 
interests. Managing the political economy is a fundamen-
tally cooperative venture: coordinating activities, facilitating 
information flows, and encouraging cooperation.” The 
VoC literature mostly does not see the State because it 
presupposes that it has no specific role or interest. 
Have State capitalisms actually morphed into market or 
managed capitalisms? Schmidt points out that the role of 
the State, even in France and Italy, has certainly become 
different from what it was when the older typologies had 
been invented, due to the liberalization of the financial 
markets, privatization and deregulation. It is therefore 
probably more accurate to talk about a “state-enhanced” 
rather (with a “less direct influence” of the State) than a 
“State-led” capitalism (Schmidt, 2003, p. 527). Yet this 
should not lead to the conclusion that the State does not 
play any role at all anymore, or that this role is the same in 
all countries, without consequences for the varieties of 
capitalism. Schmidt also points out that simply viewing 
France, Italy, Korea or Taiwan as latecomers on the road to 
“Anglo-Saxon financial capitalism” or less successful “co-
ordinated capitalisms” (authors inspired by the VoC ap-
proach differ on this diagnostic) leaves behind a large 
number of important economies, possibly still character-
ized by a specific role of the State. 
In our own research, we take the notion of “state-
enhanced capitalism” as a vague but useful point of depar-
ture. More importantly, we consider that such debates 
should lead us to better define relevant dimensions of the 
role of the State (that include various actors and tools 
across various spheres), instead of keeping one simple 
scale from weak to strong State, or from bystander to 
investor/director. Rather than just advocacy for more com-
plex indicators, this specification is a way to better assess 
differences, both between countries and between periods. 
It implies that we actually define criteria and find data 
about them before classifying countries, then deriving 
ideal-types from them. The various roles listed in Table 1 
above, despite the dominance of the weak-strong dichot-
omy in it, can be used as inspiration, as they include e.g. 
arbitrator or facilitator; but they need to be translated into 
something that can actually be observed in empirical data, 
preferably in a systematic and comparative way, on the 
basis of primary evidence. 
In the following sections of this paper, we will try to 
demonstrate the promises of this approach by focusing on 
SOEs, which are nowadays generally considered as one of 
the doomed features of a strong State. We will show that 
using their mere number or weight as a criterion of State 
capitalism (focusing on the State as shareholder or owner 
of firms) leads to the association of State capitalism with a 
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period, or periods (which differ in terms of the exact roles 
for the State) rather than with a country such as France or 
a set of countries (Part II). This does not mean, however, 
that the position of SOEs among firms lacks any relevance 
as a criterion for national types of capitalisms. We need 
more comparative research, however, to characterize varie-
ties in terms of this role, as we will show in Part III. 
II. The Weight of State-Owned 
Enterprises: A Feature of a Time, not of 
a Country 
If we want to take the number or weight of SOEs as a 
criterion in a typology of capitalism, we consider that a 
systematic comparison is more appropriate than a focus on 
individual cases, however striking, such as the fact that the 
French State owned car manufacturer Renault from 1945 
to 1996. We rely here on a synthesis of recent books and 
papers devoted to the growth and decline of SOEs in 
Western countries, and especially on the contributions 
gathered in Toninelli (2000). We read them, sometimes 
against the grain, following insights developed by Mar-
gairaz (1996), Bon et al. (2004), and Millward (2005). This 
allows us to make a general point: when considered in a 
systematic comparative perspective, France appears to have 
been in the middle of the road, rather than as an extreme 
case or as an exception. The more striking differences 
appear between periods, not between European countries. 
These periods were roughly delimited by the world wars 
and the economic crises, which allowed new questions to 
be defined as public problems (e.g. the lack of credit for 
small businesses, the difficulty of providing some sort of 
energy, the crises in entire industrial sectors) and left the 
owners of existing firms or opponents to nationalization 
with less strength to resist the creation of SOEs. While on 
other matters or at other times, national political cultures 
led to different answers to similarly defined new problems 
(Dobbin, 1994), in this case international isomorphism 
seems to have been stronger. Considered in a long-run 
perspective, the presence of the SOEs in France, as else-
where, concerns first and foremost a forty-year period 
after World War II: it barely looks like a defining national 
feature. However, France arguably followed a specific path 
during the demise of the SOEs, from the 1980s on. 
It is often thought that the first rise of SOEs took place just 
after the World War I. What actually changed at that time, 
however, was mostly rhetoric, which expressed an increas-
ing demand for “public services”, especially in transporta-
tion and energy related to the ideal of “general interest” 
(Margairaz, 1996, p. 32). Public services, however, did not 
necessarily involve State property: they had existed without 
it, in the form of concessions, in 19th-century France as in 
other countries, including the United States. Despite of the 
increased involvement of the State in the economy during 
the total war, most of the French were not ready in 1919 
to go on with public controls and consortia, even if regula-
tions increased in some sectors, such as energy. The minis-
ter of Industrial reconstruction Louis Loucheur announced 
that it was time to “return industry to normal competi-
tion” (ibid.; see also Kuisel, 1984). Proposals to nationalize 
the railways were rejected, as they had been during the 
19th century. A few SOEs were created in the late 1910s 
and early 1920s; although these can be seen as important 
pioneers in retrospect, they were not offered much capital 
(as in the case of Crédit national, created in 1919 to fi-
nance small businesses) and often had to compete, with 
little success, with private competitors. For example, the 
Office National Interprofessionnel de l’Azote, created to 
deal with specific issues due raised by the reunification of 
Alsace-Lorraine with France, competed unsuccessfully 
against Saint-Gobain (ironically a former privileged manu-
facture created by Colbert, a quite successful private 
French firms in the 20th century, briefly nationalized in 
1982-86). A similar story happened in the United King-
dom, with an arguably earlier nationalization of the Cen-
tral Electricity Boad in 1926. In the 1920s, Germany was in 
fact the exception as regards SOEs: even before the Nazi 
regime, both the Reich and Länder became involved in 
industrial production in all sectors as well as in public utili-
ties, employing more than a million workers in 1925 (We-
genroth, 2000). 
The economic crisis in the 1930s removed political and 
symbolic hindrances to State intervention in most coun-
tries, even those that remained democracies. In France, 
railways finally became a State monopoly in 1937. Far from 
being the whim of a socialist government (Margairaz, 
1996, p. 38 even describes “a nationalisation alien to Pop-
ular Front ideology”), this decision was negotiated over 
several years, with some of the private company owners 
eager to be bought out by the State, as the private system 
had become unprofitable. In any case, France was not 
really an exception; the London Passenger Transport Board 
was created in 1933, and airlines became partly State-
controlled in both countries. The fascist and Nazi States 
were of course even more radical, especially as regards the 
financial system, which remained relatively untouched in 
democracies (the French National Bank, for example, was 
still private, although its nationalization had been decided). 
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In Italy, IRI was created in 1933 to release the three leading 
Italian banks from their excessive industrial holdings (up to 
42 percent of the overall capital of Italian corporations). By 
the end of the war, the Nazi State controlled half of all 
German stock, according to Wegenroth (2000). 
As for democracies and apart from Weimar Germany, the 
growth of SOEs exploded for the most part at the end of 
WWII – again, not more in France than elsewhere. Within a 
few years, the French and British State took over their 
respective National Banks, coal mines and gas and electrici-
ty industries; the British railway system, waterways and civil 
airlines became SOEs, along with four of the biggest 
French bank networks and most insurance companies 
(Chadeau, 2000, Millward, 2005). Some sectors that es-
caped the nationalization program in France at that time, 
such as iron and steel, did not in the UK. In Italy, the rise of 
the public sector was even more important (Amatori, 
2000; Toninelli and Vasta, 2010). SOEs also took a new 
and large place in smaller European countries such as Bel-
gium, the Netherlands (Davids and van Zanden, 2000) and 
Austria (Stiefel, 2000), and, outside Europe, in Canada and 
Australia. Even in the quite different case of Taiwan, with 
Japanese occupation followed by a party-State, we find 
nationalizations occurring just after WWII and privatiza-
tions beginning in the 1990s (Lee and Velema, 2014). In 
fact, Germany was still the exception, this time with a first 
(controversial) wave of privatizations as early as the late 
1950s; but this wave was hardly complete, as SOEs contin-
ued to be reorganized and diversified at least until the 
1960s (Wegenroth, 2000). 
However, France arguably followed a specific path during 
the demise of the SOEs, from the 1980s on. While Marga-
ret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, from 1979 on, and 
Ronald Reagan in the USA, from 1980 on, implemented 
neo-liberal reforms including, in the UK, a radical program 
of privatization, the socialists who won the French elec-
tions of 1981 launched a spectacular program of nationali-
zation. Focused on finance and industry, it unfolded at the 
same scale as in 1945 in terms of number of firms, alt-
hough it did not create new public monopolies (Chabanas 
& Vergeau, 1996). At first sight, the French chronology 
only seems close to that of Portugal: there, nationalizations 
only began in 1975, when democracy was established, 
they had a perimeter similar to that found in France, and 
privatizations followed after 1989 (Ferreira da Silva and 
Neves 2014). 
Yet the contrast that seems obvious requires a few qualifi-
cations. First, nationalizations of firms struggling with a 
new and more challenging economic atmosphere had 
occurred in in the UK and in Italy as late as in the 1970s, 
while nothing of the sort was to be found in France during 
this decade: the difference was in chronology more than in 
scale or types of firms controlled. Second, in the UK, no 
really large SOEs were privatized before 1984 (British Tele-
com), and most of the privatization wave took place in the 
early 1990s (Millward, 2005). Since by this time the right 
had come back to power in France and had also decided to 
privatize, the empirical chronology, if not that of discourse, 
was in fact quite similar in the two countries. The main 
difference, and indeed the French exceptionalism, was that 
dozens of previously private French firms had lived through 
a spell of public ownership in the 1980s. If we consider the 
whole 20th century and only focus on the number and size 
or SOEs, this interim could seem negligible: the French and 
British trajectories look quite similar to each other, espe-
cially as compared to Germany (with early public owner-
ship, then early privatization) or Italy (where no privatiza-
tions occurred in the aftermath of the economic crises). On 
the contrary, the Italian State bought the minority partici-
pations of private shareholders in the most threatened 
SOEs, then recapitalized them, leading to a sharper divide 
between public and private ownership (Toninelli and Vasta, 
2010). 
When not directly framed as an exception, but considered 
in a more comparative perspective and over the long run, 
the French trajectory in terms of SOEs thus appears close 
to the British one, and more generally to the European 
mainstream. At this very macro level, the role of the State 
as investor or director of the economy, channeled through 
SOEs, does not seem much stronger there than elsewhere. 
Differences in this regard, in fact, are generally less nation-
al than longitudinal. However, small differences between 
countries in terms of chronology, sectors or share of own-
ership might in fact reflect a quite different role for SOEs in 
national capitalisms. As we have seen, SOEs were created 
for diverse reasons. Discussing the French case, Margairaz 
(1996) points out that their creation was often a mere 
change of tool used to continue essentially the same eco-
nomic policy. Depending on whether SOEs also have pri-
vate shareholders or not, whether they are public monopo-
lies or compete with national or foreign firms, whether 
their employees enjoy a status similar to that of civil serv-
ants or not, and whether they were thriving or in crisis 
before becoming State-owned, the role that they enable 
the State to play can vary widely, possibly across the whole 
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range of roles listed in Table 1 above. In this respect, na-
tional differences might reappear, although differences 
between periods are still likely to dominate. Our dataset on 
interlocking directorate does not allow us to directly de-
scribe these roles, but it enables us to better describe the 
position of SOEs among private firms. 
III. SOEs in the French Intercorporate 
Networks: State or Status Capitalism? 
As we have noted earlier, the VoC approach organizes the 
heterogeneity of capitalisms by contrasting the liberal mar-
ket economies and the coordinated market economies, 
leaving barely any room for the State in the analysis of 
contemporary capitalisms. When the State appears to play 
a role, it does so by facilitating the relationships between 
actors in coordinated market economy (see for example 
Hall and Soskice, 2001b, p. 35). The role of the State in the 
coordination process is either direct, through the use of 
dedicated tools such as planning, or more implicit, with the 
intermingling of business and administrative elites. Focus-
ing on SOEs offers a way to better define this coordinating 
role of the State among large firms, in order to empirically 
test this second order and somewhat vague hypothesis of 
the VoC approach. This empirically-grounded discussion 
takes the State more seriously as a potentially autonomous 
actor, with specific interests and the resources to defend 
them. 
SOEs in the big business community: an interlocking 
directorates approach 
When SOEs exist, they are an integral part in networks of 
inter-firm relationships. Depending on political choices and 
on the reactions of private firms, their position could be 
that of outsiders, more or less isolated in a cluster of SOEs 
cut from the remainder of the business community and the 
capitalist economy, or that of insiders, more or less central 
and even potentially in a position to influence private firms, 
especially those in the same economic sector. We will not 
address here their place in networks of ownership or ex-
change of goods and services, but we will discuss their 
position in another specific type of relationship: interlock-
ing directorates. 
When an individual sits on two corporate board concur-
rently, as an external director and/or a top executive, he or 
she is said to hold interlocking directorships with the two 
companies, tying them together at the level of governance. 
The study of interlocking directorates, which began in the 
US in the early 20th century as part of antitrust campaigns, 
has been the basis of hundreds of papers, due to the rela-
tive availability of data (Carroll and Sapinski, 2011). The 
fact that individuals simultaneously hold positions in sever-
al boards can be considered either as a tie between the 
individuals, leading to an analysis of solidarity among the 
economic elite (Useem, 1984) or as a tie between the 
firms. It is this second view that we will consider here: we 
are interested in the positions of SOEs among private firms, 
in terms of the former sharing or not sharing their directors 
with the latter. Interlocks viewed as ties between firms 
have traditionally been considered as an indicator of the 
power structure in the big business community (Mintz and 
Schwartz, 1985). Most studies of interlocks have dealt with 
the US case and especially with the largest firms as listed 
by Fortune, so the position of SOEs was not considered 
relevant. Ties between the State and capitalism were most-
ly viewed through the very specific lens of political contri-
butions, with questions centered on the political unity, or 
lack thereof, of the business community and on the diffu-
sion of political preferences among firms (Mizruchi, 1992; 
Bond and Harrigan, 2011). In this case, the political admin-
istration was possibly an outcome of, among other things, 
the structure of the network of interlocking directorates; 
but the State was nowhere to be seen in the network 
itself. On the contrary, in Europe, the number and weight 
of SOEs makes their position interesting, especially as the 
choice of their board members is one of the things that the 
State generally controls. Does it choose the same individu-
als as private firms, thus creating ties between SOEs and 
these firms or do the boards of SOEs constitute a world 
apart, isolating their directors from the rest of the econom-
ic elite and consolidating exceptional practices? 
Interlocking directorates certainly do not reflect all the 
relationships that take place between firms, although they 
are often used as a proxy in this way, including in VoC 
approaches. In this case, the relative lack of interlocks is 
considered typical of liberal market economies, such as 
that of the UK, and a wealth of interlocks appears in coor-
dinated market economies, for example in Germany. 
Countries generally characterized as having a strong State, 
such as Italy and France, fall somewhere in between the 
UK and Germany in terms of the overall density of inter-
locks (Stokman et al., 1985; Windolf, 2002). The de-
densification of interlocks found in several economies in 
the beginning of the 21st century, for example in Switzer-
land (Bühlmann et al., 2012), could then be interpreted as 
convergence toward the liberal model as well as the prod-
uct of globalization disrupting national networks. Density 
State or Status Capitalism? 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 15, Number 2 (March 2014) 
23 
alone, however, does not describe the shape of inter-firm 
relationships, which may be clustered or integrated, and 
hierarchical or egalitarian. It is in this general structure and 
in the specific position of SOEs that we are interested. In 
terms of interlocks, are SOEs a world apart from the rest of 
capitalism, or are they integrated, and if so how? Do na-
tional peculiarities appear at this scale? 
Empirical research design 
This paper discusses a few of our first research results, with-
out giving all the relevant tables or graphs, although these 
can be provided on demand. More general results will be 
published shortly in François and Lemercier 2014. 
In order to build our dataset, we selected the 50 largest fi-
nancial and the 200 largest non-financial French firms listed 
at the Paris stock exchange during specific years: 1911, 1928, 
1937, 1956, 1979, 1990, 20001. We have used a consistent 
criterion of size, share capital, and a consistent source, the 
Annuaire Desfossés series, for all years. 
In fact, additional datasets, not used in this paper, were built 
on the same principles for 1840 (when financial directories 
appeared), 1857 and 1883. Still other datasets were centered 
on the 120 firms with the largest market capitalization for 
1857, 1883, 1911, 1937, 1956, 1979, and 2009; we then col-
lected biographies for one to three top executives in each firm 
and for all directors holding at least two seats in these da-
tasets. We are only beginning to analyze the biographical 
dataset. 
The number of firms and the sampled years in the datasets 
that we will use in this paper have been chosen in order to 
allow comparisons with other countries, this research being 
part of a comparative project led by Thomas David and 
Gerarda Westerhuis. In fact, work is still needed to ensure 
more robustness in international comparisons of interlock-
ing directorates networks, as it is difficult to build datasets 
based on the exact same criteria, especially as regards the 
definition of directors, which differs widely from country to 
country and very much influences the shape of the network. 
In fact, this definition also differs from period to period: even 
in our research on France, we had to take additional care to 
ensure longitudinal comparability in this respect. 
French financial directories, which aim at providing inves-
tors with information on firms, also list SOEs, generally as a 
separate category and in a prominent place (e.g. before list-
ing private firms), even when they are 100% state-owned 
and do not have shares or issue bonds. Therefore, we were 
able to include SOEs in our sample along with private firms, 
using the same size threshold – although some inconsisten-
cies between successive directories lead to a few changes in 
our list of SOEs. For dates prior to 1990, SOEs were recog-
nized as such thanks to the descriptions of firms included in 
the source, cross-referenced with published lists (Chaba-
nas/Vergeau 1996). For 1990 and 2000, the source included 
information on the ownership of stock. We considered firms 
to be State-owned when the first shareholder was the State 
and it held at least one-third of the shares. The fact that 
these firms were described in what was effectively a list of the 
largest French firms and a who's who of the business elite is 
in itself significant for our research. It also led us to compute 
indicators on their place in the network of interlocking direc-
torates. While most other teams in this comparative research 
did not do so, we believe that it would be interesting to devise 
such systematic comparisons in the future. 
The position of SOEs in the interlocking directorates 
network: insights for a comparison 
In order to answer these questions, we would need sys-
tematic international comparisons that should not be diffi-
cult to devise, as many datasets on interlocks now exist; 
however, it seems that their authors were not generally 
very interested in the State or SOEs, so we found few re-
sults that could be directly compared with ours. We will 
here focus on a comparison with Italy, which exemplifies 
two different patterns; along with additional evidence for 
four other, admittedly small countries, it will allow us to 
present hypotheses on the way we could make sense of 
the position of SOEs in interlocking directorates networks. 
In addition, a longitudinal comparison in the case of France 
shows a consistent positioning of SOEs, regardless of their 
number. Moreover, the creation of SOEs did not change 
the overall structure of French interlocks, which we found 
to be based on a hierarchy of status among firms. Far from 
disrupting pre-existing patterns of inter-firm relationships, 
the State seems to have adapted to them or even used 
them: SOEs played a role that they did not invent, but that 
they took on together with other firms. 
Let us first briefly describe the Italian case, in order to con-
trast it with the French trajectory. As reported by Rinaldi 
and Vasta (2005, 2012, 2014), the nationalizations of firms 
during the fascist period and after WWII gave birth, until 
the beginning of the 1960s, to a dense and hierarchical 
national network of interlocking directorates. The largest 
electrical companies, which were still private, were at the 
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core of this network. During this period, private firms and 
SOEs were strongly interconnected, sharing many direc-
tors. The nationalization of the electrical industry in 1962 
however dissolved the center of this network. A specific 
type of SOE creation, the establishment of a sector mo-
nopoly, thus had an important impact on the general 
structure of inter-firms relationships, at least in terms of 
shared board members. The network of private firms was 
rebuilt in the following decades, with a new core made of 
financial companies. At the same time, the share of public 
ownership of SOEs was augmented, leading to the disap-
pearance of some interlocks that had apparently been 
based on ownership ties (with seats on the board of a firm 
being held by representatives of firms partly owning it or 
owned by it). From the 1970s on, the Italian network of 
interlocking directorates exhibited a dual structure, with 
SOEs not only becoming marginal, but ultimately constitut-
ing a separate cluster. The Italian case shows that the mere 
number or economic weight of SOEs does not predict their 
position in terms of interlocking directorates; it reminds us 
that this position is likely to depend very much on their 
monopolistic character and on the existence of private 
shareholders. If State capitalism has existed in Italy 
throughout the 20th century, it has produced two very 
different patterns, first of strong integration, then of 
strong separation, between the boards of private firms and 
those of SOEs. 
On the contrary, France exhibits an enduring pattern of 
integration, despite the changing numbers and types of 
SOEs and the changing role assigned to them by different 
political administrations. Some of these changes have in 
fact had an effect on interlocking directorates, but what is 
especially striking in the French case is the consistency in 
the general structure of the network and the fact that 
SOEs seem to have always adapted to it. In order to pre-
sent both the enduring structure of the French network 
and the integrated and even central position of SOEs, we 
can focus on the graph for 1990. It shows that, apart from 
a small number of complete isolates, the largest French 
firms are all part of a dense and centralized network of 
interlocking directorates. This network has a distinct core 
and concentric peripheries; firms in the core have dense 
ties with each other as well as ties with firms in the periph-
eries, while the latter have fewer ties, both with each other 
and with the core. We will come back shortly to the specif-
ic characteristics of firms in the core as opposed to those in 
the periphery. What we first want to point out is the fact 
that SOEs are very integrated in this network, especially in 
contrast with Italy at the same period. None of them is 
isolated, and they are present in the core as well as and 
perhaps even more than in the peripheries. In addition, 
whereas a region at the top-right of the graph shows a 
higher density of interconnected white circles, SOEs also 
show many ties with private firms: they do not constitute a 
separate cluster. 
See Appendix, Graph 1: Interlocking directorates 
among the 252 largest French listed firms in 1990 
Quantitative indicators confirm the impressions derived 
from this graph. Moreover, even if 1990 can be considered 
a high point in the centrality and integration of SOEs, as 
well as in the density of the overall French network of 
interlocking directorates in the post-war period, a similar 
positioning of SOEs can be found in our datasets for 1956 
and 1979 (when there were around 20 very large SOEs 
described in our source, as in 1990) and even 2000 (when 
only seven remained). In 1956, 1990 and 2000, SOEs were 
related through interlocking directorates to a significantly 
larger number of firms than the average large firm in our 
dataset (in network terms, they had a significantly higher 
degree centrality, significance being assessed by random 
simulation). Their average number of ties was close to that 
of private financial firms (even higher in 2000), and fi-
nance, in France as elsewhere, is generally found at the 
core of interlocking directorates networks. Of course, the 
high centrality of SOEs can be partially related to the fact 
that many of these SOEs were themselves financial firms. 
State-owned banks, however, were not the only central 
SOEs: in 1956, it was also the case for the railway, gas, 
and electricity national monopolies; in 1990, many indus-
trial companies, including for example the automobile 
manufacturer Renault and petroleum group Elf-Aquitaine, 
were extremely central in the network. 
Our 1979 sample shows a different pattern, that allows us 
to stress another mechanism explaining the positions of 
SOEs in the network. This sample still exhibits very inte-
grated SOEs. At that time, roughly half of these firms were 
also part of the core of the network, and the State-owned 
bank Crédit Foncier de France, which shared board mem-
bers with 37 other firms, was among the five most central 
firms, along with four private banks. However, the other 
half of the SOEs, including the national electricity compa-
ny, appear at the periphery of our network. The same kind 
of contrast, although weaker, can be found for 1990 and 
2000, dates when we have data on shareholding. For 
these two samples, we can discriminate between those 
SOEs that were 100% State-owned and/or sector monopo-
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lies, which tended to be more peripheral in our network, 
and those in which the State owned a lower share and/or 
which competed directly with large private firms, which 
tended to be more central. Those SOEs that had ownership 
ties with private firms and/or competed with them also 
were integrated, and even central, in the interlocking di-
rectorate network. 
The same pattern can be found in many other countries. In 
the 1976 Austrian network, for example, SOEs generally 
were both very homophilic and extremely central (even 
hegemonic in the core) in the interlocking directorates 
network, but the postal and railway monopolies had few 
interlocks (Ziegler et al. 1985). In Portugal, in the early 
1980s, when the new SOEs were mostly 100% State-
owned monopolies, they did not interlock with private 
firms (or with each other), while in 2010, the remaining 
SOEs had ownership ties with private firms and were quite 
central in the interlocking directorates network (Ferreira da 
Silva and Neves, 2014 ; for the Taiwanese case, see Lee 
and Velma, 2014). The same is true in Italy, but with a 
reverse chronological order: as we have seen, once firms 
get nationalized to rescue them from the early 1970s on, 
they began to be cut from the rest of the network, while 
when they were conceived to be national champions, they 
were very central and homophilic. The important point, in 
the French case, is that even when SOEs were not central, 
they never formed a separate cluster. 
Looking at the characteristics of the firms French SOEs are 
linked to, it appears that SOEs have always exhibited a 
statistical preference for sharing directors with other large 
SOEs, rather than with large private firms – in network 
terms, their homophily was high and significant, as con-
firmed by simulations. The density of interlocking direc-
torates among SOEs (the percentage of theoretically possi-
ble ties that were actually present) was three to ten times 
higher than that of the full network. Yet, as shown on the 
1990 graph – and the situation was the same in our other 
samples – and contrary to what happened in Italy after 
1970, this did not create separate clusters of SOEs, be-
cause they had so many shared board members with other 
firms that quite a lot of them were also shared with private 
firms. This was especially true within economic sector 
(broadly defined, e.g. finance, energy, transportation and 
utilities, so that these ties were not only among competi-
tors). SOEs, like private firms and to an even greater ex-
tent, exhibited a statistical preference for sharing board 
members with firms in the same sector, even with different 
ownership. Finally, the cross-sector ties of SOEs, when not 
with other SOEs, show a statistical preference for the larg-
est private firms. What our results show is that, while 
French SOEs have often tended to share board members 
with other SOEs, neither these nor private firms have cho-
sen to avoid the other. The world of French boards has 
always been a very hierarchical and integrated one, and 
SOEs, since their creation, have been an integral part of it, 
generally in a prominent place. 
State or status capitalism? 
This prominent place SOEs occupy within the interlocking 
directorates network is nothing but a symptom of the way 
they came to embed themselves in a preexisting structure 
they did not disrupt in any major way. The main result of 
our general research on French interlocking directorates is 
indeed that the general structure of the network has re-
mained surprisingly stable since the beginning of the 20th 
century – and seemingly since the last third of the 19th 
century (François and Lemercier, 2014). This stable shape 
can be related to two distinct and complementary features 
of the network, produced by two different mechanisms. 
First, the network is very hierarchical, i.e. not only dense, 
but centered on a core surrounded by successive peripher-
ies. This hierarchical structure is produced by what we call 
a status mechanism, which we will describe below. Sec-
ondly, some smaller and denser sub-regions appear in the 
network. These denser clusters are produced by a group-
building mechanism. Our main result, as regards the SOEs, 
is that they did not disrupt either of these two mechanisms 
when they were created after World War II; on the contra-
ry, they conformed with these two dynamics, in which they 
were soon to play quite a prominent role. 
Let us first consider the group-building mechanism and the 
denser clusters it generates. Before World War II, as seen in 
our 1937 sample, the high density of the network came 
from the existence of very dense clusters where multiple 
board members shared between the same pairings of firms 
were used to create “groups” in the first half of the centu-
ry. These structures were especially prevalent in the electri-
cal industry: neither mergers nor cartels, they did not sys-
tematically rely on ownership ties, but they allowed fami-
lies or other small groups of people to control many differ-
ent large firms. Electricity firms indeed needed very large 
capital, but they flourished in the first decades of the 20th 
century, representing up to one fifth of our sample. The 
very names of these firms show how embedded they were 
in a local context of production and distribution: Electricité 
de Marseille, Forces motrices du Haut-Rhin, Société hydro-
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électrique des Basses-Pyrénées, etc. Yet they were loosely 
linked to each other in a handful of groups anchored in 
wider regions, so that the overall density of interlocking 
directorates in the electricity sector was two to three times 
higher than in the French network generally – even with-
out taking into account the multiplicity of shared board 
members in many pairings of firms. These firms held con-
cessions to produce and/or distribute electricity in specific 
regions or towns and, in the interwar period, were regu-
lated by the State to a greater and greater extent; the 
government had accepted the type of relationships created 
by multiple interlocks between these firms. The birth of 
Électricité de France in 1945 thus destroyed large numbers 
of interlocks as disbursed but highly cohesive firms were 
replaced by a national monopoly. Yet the new SOE re-
tained many employees and many of the organizational 
features of the bygone groups in its internal structure 
(Morsel, 1987; Vuillermot, 2000). The birth of some SOEs, 
namely the monopolies in transportation (railways), gas 
and electricity, actually disrupted the extremely dense inter-
locks that had existed among the many large and central 
firms in these sectors before World War II. In this respect, 
newly born SOEs had a strong effect on the general densi-
ty of the French network, which dropped between our 
1937 and 1956 samples. This impact, however, changed 
some superficial features of the network, rather than the 
underlying group-building mechanism: the new monopo-
lies were built directly from pieces that the pre-war net-
work had already put together. 
The bending of SOEs to conform with preexisting dynamics 
is even more obvious when it comes to the second mecha-
nism: the status logic that shaped the French network long 
before SOEs existed. This status mechanism is the cause of 
the hierarchical structure of the network: firms in its core, 
that are therefore both central and prone to share board 
members with each other, also share a stable set of attrib-
utes that we propose to consider as status indicators. The 
status score of a firm, in each of our samples, is extremely 
correlated with its central position in the network. This 
means that firms with a high status share board members 
with a high number of other firms (they are central in the 
network) and that a high percentage of the firms with 
which they are related also have a high status (they are 
homophilic). Firms on the periphery, on the contrary, have 
few ties with the center and even fewer among them-
selves. 
Our status indicators include a few stable characteristics: 
firms with a high status: are the largest (in the highest 
quartile of our sample in terms of share capital); have 
headquarters in Paris; are active in some specific sectors 
(finance in all of the samples, a few others for some sam-
ples, e.g. transportations and utilities in the first half of the 
century); and were already in our sample at the previous 
date (firms that are old enough and have been very large 
for long enough). On Graph 1, the size of circles is based 
on this very simple status indicator: from 0 to 4 for each 
firm, depending on the number of status criteria that are 
met. Graph 1 shows rather large white circles: SOEs tend-
ed to meet these enduring criteria of status, that were 
established long before their creation. This explains their 
central position in the network: they were chosen as po-
tential sources of shared board members for the same 
reasons as other large, Parisian, rather old and often finan-
cial firms. The status mechanisms that had been at play for 
more than a half-century when many SOEs were created 
after 1945 were not changed by their establishment: being 
owned by the State simply was a new feature that hap-
pened to often be shared by many central, high-status 
firms. 
The State through the lenses of SOEs: State capital-
ism reconsidered 
The fact that SOEs did not disrupt the French interlocking 
directorates network and its underlying mechanisms of 
status and group-building should lead us to reconsider the 
role of the State among large firms . This tendency to con-
form with pre-existing mechanisms can be interpreted as a 
sign that it was not so much the State that shaped inter-
corporate relationships in the post-war period, but rather 
big business that made State-related actors comply with its 
own logic. In the late 1960s, the roles and tasks of SOEs 
were redefined by the French government in a way that 
made this shaping of public actors by private logics quite 
obvious. The government became increasingly aware of 
international competition and commissioned several re-
ports on the reform of firms generally and SOEs specifical-
ly. A radical reform plan for SOEs was enacted in 1971; 
they had to decide on employment plans related to eco-
nomic forecasts, which led industrial SOEs to lose between 
a quarter and a third of their work force in the 1970s, and 
to turn to financial markets (Chadeau, 2000). This adop-
tion of private business logic within the SOEs is directly 
related to the role the State assigns to the firms that it 
owns. While in Italy, since the early 1970s at least, nation-
alization was implemented as a rescue device for lame 
ducks, SOEs were supposed to be national champions in 
France – and hence were expected to adopt business prac-
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tices that would make them highly competitive. This iso-
morphism between private and public practices (from the 
former to the latter) is coherent with the fact that French 
public and private firms have often shared parts of their 
boards: if they are to be run the same way, their managers 
and directors can be exchanged. 
Was then the nationalization program implemented in 
France in the early 1980s an anachronistic aberration, as 
stated by several scholars such as Chadeau (2000)? 
Shouldn’t the adoption of strategies similar to those of 
private firms lead to early privatizations? A different inter-
pretation is also possible, one that sees the nationalization-
privatization sequence of the 1980s as coherent with the 
two mechanisms that have shaped the French network of 
interlocking directorates during the whole 20th century. To 
correctly interpret the adoption of private practices in pub-
lic firms and the sharing of directors, one should keep in 
mind that this isomorphism was more a mean than an end 
in and of itself. The aim was to strengthen SOEs so that 
they would be able to face an increasingly strong interna-
tional competition. Adopting private sector logic was a 
way to achieve this goal. Firms that were nationalized in 
the early 1980s were believed to be extremely weakened 
by almost one decade of economic crisis, and the aim of 
their nationalization was to strengthen them. It was there-
fore not so different from the goal pursued by the adop-
tion of private sector logic within SOEs in the 1970s. In the 
following years, new SOEs were actually strengthened, 
especially on a financial ground, thanks to a massive public 
refunding and the balancing of their debt. Once these 
firms were privatized, between the mid-1980s and the late 
1990s, they were strong enough to successfully face inter-
national competition.  
The exact privatization process is also important for our 
purpose, as it relied on financial strategies directly related 
to the mechanisms of status and group-building. As Morin 
(1996) has clearly documented, privatizations relied on the 
building of “noyaux durs” (“hard kernels”) (also discussed 
by Maclean et al. (2006, 185-187), who, like us, emphasize 
the relative continuity of government policies in this re-
spect). The government and political administration, in a 
context of growing intermingling of financial markets, 
feared that the privatized firms could be taken over by 
foreign, and more specifically US, institutional investors. 
Had this happened, all the efforts by the French State to 
refund these firms would benefit only foreign financial 
actors. To avoid this, cross-shareholding was deliberately 
organized: firm A got privatized through the buying of a 
large share of its capital by firm B, which could also be 
privatized, with its capital bought by firm A. This hard 
kernel strategy is coherent with the two generating mech-
anisms of the French interlocking directorates network. 
This kind of cross-ownership is reminds us of the loose-
coupling dynamics that had led to the constitution of local-
ly dense clusters within the network, for example in the 
electrical industry, as ownership ties often were coupled 
with shared board members. In addition, hard kernels 
involved private firms along with the SOEs that were to 
become private, but the partners always already had a high 
status. Hard kernels increased their ties in ways that only 
strengthened the status mechanism in the overall interlock-
ing directorates network. This hard kernel strategy led to 
the network represented in Figure 1, where SOEs that 
were then in the process of privatization appeared in the 
central core of the network, even more than in 1956 or 
1979. 
IV. Discussion 
This paper advocates for the joint advancement of two 
tasks: on the one hand, specifying roles of the State that 
could become meaningful criteria in typologies of capital-
ism; on the other hand, testing the relevance of empirical 
indicators that could be systematically computed not only 
for various countries, but also for various periods, in order 
to capture such roles. We have shown that it would be 
possible, and useful, to more systematically assess not only 
the number or size of SOEs, but also their position in na-
tional interlocking directorates networks, so as to to better 
understand what role they allow the State to play rather 
than automatically equating the existence of SOEs with a 
specific type of State capitalism. In the French case, contra-
ry to what is often assumed, the number and chronology 
of SOEs do not appear to be very unusual, even when 
compared to the UK, the alleged epitome of a liberal mar-
ket economy. We do not know, at this stage, how the 
positioning of SOEs in interlocking directorate networks 
have differed during the history of these two countries. 
However, by comparing France with Italy and a few other 
countries, we have already shown that different roles as-
signed to SOEs by governments led to different positions in 
such networks. In addition, we have brought to light an 
extremely consistent feature of the French interlocking 
directorates network, that does not fit in the dichotomy 
assumed by the VOC approach between competing firms 
(isolated) and co-operating firms (sharing board members). 
While quite dense, the French network is also extremely 
hierarchical, following a stable status mechanism. SOEs 
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and the governments that decided on their goals have for 
the most part adapted to this mechanism, as well as to the 
secondary group-building mechanism creating denser 
clusters in the network. We do not claim here that this in 
itself represents some sort of third-type capitalism. Howev-
er, we are already able to contend that the status mecha-
nism does not easily fit in VOC typologies; nor can this 
feature be captured by the classical nation of a “State 
capitalism” where the State would mostly direct, organize 
or lead, rarely mediate or facilitate, and never be a mere 
bystander. 
How can we better make sense of the French status and 
group-building mechanisms, and investigate other ways to 
put the State back into typologies of capitalism? At least 
two main investigations should be led from here, in order 
to enlighten how state resources, actors and practices are 
involved in the two mechanisms we have identified. Firstly, 
an important feature of the French interlocking direc-
torates network that partially underlies the status mecha-
nism is related to the State, but it is probably not as much 
of an exception as has often been argued: this is the im-
portance of former civil servants on corporate boards, 
called pantouflage in French (see e.g. Suleiman, 1979, 
Charle, 1987, Bourdieu, 1989, Maclean et al., 2006). Pre-
liminary analyses of our biographical datasets indicate that 
they are disproportionately present among shared board 
members between high-status firms, and possibly among 
shared board members between high- and middle-status 
firms. Their multiple appointments are therefore important 
for the status mechanism. Moreover, it is not a past phe-
nomenon or one related to the golden years of SOEs: like 
the status mechanism itself, it began in the 19th century 
and was reinforced from the 1979 to the 2009 samples 
(François, 2010). Does this imply that the status mecha-
nism is in fact a mere expression of the pervasive presence 
of the State and of State-led policies? Hall and Soskice 
(2001b, p. 35), citing Lehrer (2001, in the same volume), 
suggest that French managers, often coming from elite 
schools and the public service, were “more likely to look to 
the state for assistance than their counterparts in other 
nations”. This is however an important interpretive step 
that deserves empirical examination, as former civil serv-
ants do not necessarily bring specific, statist policies with 
them. On the contrary, as continuing a career in the pri-
vate sector is a reasonable step for people holding certain 
offices in the administration, they could very well act ac-
cording to this perspective from the very beginning of their 
career; Jabko and Massoc (2012) have thus argued that 
the proximity between the financial sector and the admin-
istration hindered reforms after the 2008 financial crisis, 
just as Johnson and Kwak (2010) did for the US case. We 
need more systematic and careful comparisons with other 
famous cases of careers spanning the public-private divide 
in different countries (e.g. Useem, 1984, Colignon and 
Usui, 2003) before coming back to simple characterizations 
of an exceptional French statism. 
Likewise, the study of what we called a group-building 
mechanism, which is obviously related to competition 
policies, would benefit from a more systematic study of 
such policies. In this realm, the US anti-trust laws have too 
often been considered as the sole benchmark; in recent 
years, a growing interest in cartels has added an alternative 
(e.g. Schröter, 1996). However, there are other dimensions 
to the space of possible competition policies than that 
opposing cartels to anti-trust laws. While recent studies of 
US anti-trust laws have emphasized that they were chosen 
following political debates, at specific moments, from a 
wide range of alternatives (see especially O’Sullivan, 2000), 
research on the UK and on France (Cheffins, 2004 Chatri-
ot, 2010, Stanziani, 2012) has discussed the effect of legis-
lation that did not as strictly forbid cartels as in the US, 
while they did not promote them or make them official as 
had long been the case in Germany or Switzerland. How-
ever, we lack a systematic study on how such regulations 
impacted cross-shareholding and interlocking directorates 
networks. However, it is already interesting to consider 
that, in terms of cartels, the French State was much less 
interventionist than many others, and some of its SOEs 
inherited the structures of former groups that were private 
quasi-cartels. 
Exploring further in these two directions (the role of former 
civil servants on boards of large private firms and policies 
of competition) is certainly a necessary step if one is to 
properly understand the mechanisms that have shaped the 
French network over the last century. This exploration is 
also a way to see more clearly how SOEs in France con-
formed to pre-existing structures. It is only when these 
tasks would have been completed, and replicated for other 
countries, that the place of France in the typologies of 
capitalism can be properly assessed, along with the im-
portance of the State in such typologies. 
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Endnotes 
1A full description will be put online soon at  
http://www.cgeh.nl/power-corporate-networks-comparative-and-
historical-perspective , eventually followed by the dataset itself. 
This project was initially funded by CapGemini sponsorship re-
ceived by our research center, then by a research grant of Scien-
tific Advisory Board of Sciences Po, Paris (additional Swiss and 
German funding was received by Thomas David and Paul Windolf, 
who agreed to share data with us). Nicolas Alexandropoulos, 
Gaëtane d'Arbonneau, Sylvain Brunier, Celia Darakdjian, Thomas 
David, Cyril Grange, Florence Largillière, Lena Le Goff, Thomas 
Maineult, Frédéric Rebmann and Victoria Scoffier have contribut-
ed to the data gathering. 
2The adjustment of SOEs to pre-existing mechanisms seems also 
to be found in other countries, while the mechanisms themselves 
differ. In 1976 Finland, SOEs were neither central nor clustered 
together, but were part of several of the separate groups based 
on sector or ideology that made up the national network 
(Heiskanen and Johanson 1985). In Taiwan, the very dense inter-
locking that had begun with Japanese zaibatsu was mimicked by 
SOEs after 1945 and still partly endures after privatizations (Lee 
and Venema 2014). 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the post-war varieties of capitalism (1950s-1970s) 
 Market capitalism Managed capitalism State capitalism 
  (Britain) (Germany) (France) 
Government role    
Policies toward Liberal Enabling Interventionist 
Business Arbitrator Facilitator Director 
Policies toward Bystander Bystander Organiser 
Labour    
Business relations    
Inter-firm relations Competitive Co-operative State led 
 Contractual Mutually reinforcing State mediated 
 Individualistic Network based  
Investment sources Capital markets Banks State 
Time horizons Short-term view Long-term view Medium-term view 
Goals Profits Firm value National political- 
   economic priorities 
Industrial relations    
Management-labour Adversarial Co-operative Adversarial 
Relations    
Wage bargaining Fragmented Co-ordinated State controlled 
Schmidt, 2003    
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Graph 1: Interlocking directorates among the 252 largest French listed firms in 1990 
 
The dataset underlying this graph is presented in the above paragraph about “Research design”. Grey lines represent shared directors; 
the width of the line represents the number of shared directors. Circles represent firms, with white circles for SOEs and black circles for 
private firms. The size of circles represents the status of firms, as defined below in the main text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whither the State When It Acts Through Markets? 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 15, Number 2 (March 2014) 
34 
Whither the State When It Acts Through 
Markets? The Case of Pesticide Reduction in the 
Vineyard of Bordeaux
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The dangers of extensive pesticide usage for human health 
and ecosystems have been known since the 1960s, so why 
do states throughout the world continue to allow this 
practice to continue? Why, for example, is France still the 
third largest consumer country in this domain, and why do 
its vineyards account for a fifth of this consumption? 
(INRA, 2006). Functionalist answers to these questions in 
terms of ‘the need to feed the world’ are unconvincing 
given the alternatives available and the social choices that 
could have been made. Indeed, this is particularly patent in 
the case of wine, a product that, despite its symbolic value, 
can hardly be seen as keeping people alive. Equally, mate-
rial determinist explanations of the persistence of pesti-
cides in terms of ‘the interests’ of chemical producers, 
growers and merchants beg the question of who has been 
defining such interests and how they have been made to 
coincide with ‘the public interest’ attributed to local or 
national societies. Similar explanations in terms of ‘the 
power of neo-corporatist arrangements between interest 
groups and the state’ are also over-general and incapable 
of capturing the dynamism of political economies. 
The alternative explanation developed by much of the 
sociologically-influenced social sciences is to focus analyti-
cal attention upon the very process of defining and concili-
ating interests that lies at the heart of the relationships 
between states and economies. Although this fundamental 
postulate is widely recognized within our respective disci-
plines, nevertheless a great deal of disagreement and con-
fusion remains over precisely how and why states intervene 
in and fit with economic activity. Having first briefly set out 
reasons for this state of affairs regarding research on the 
state, and in particular its sub-optimal effects upon the 
generation of knowledge about why representatives of 
states act as they do, the remainder of this article is devot-
ed more positively to outlining a different approach that 
places greater emphasis upon what occurs within states 
themselves and its relationship to a range of societal ac-
tors. This approach is refined here around a precise, yet 
generalizable question: what happens to a state when it 
acts through markets? It is then illustrated with data from 
a case study of how professional training is currently being 
used by the French state as a primary means of regulating 
pesticide usage in a specific territory and productive sys-
tem: the vineyard of Bordeaux. 
Overall, by melding institutionalist theory to constructivist 
concepts and methods, a key finding is that, at least in the 
wine industry, representatives of the French state now firmly 
believe in the virtues of externalizing such training via a 
market. More fundamentally still, given that this market is 
skewed heavily towards those who essentially seek to repro-
duce extensive pesticide usage, this case study also reveals 
that in this instance at least, and in many others we can only 
hypothesize, French state representatives have given up on 
defining the public interest and acting in its name. 
1 States, Economies and Markets: 
Towards a More Dynamic Framework 
Deep Lessons in Need of Fresh Air  
Since the pioneering writings of authors such as Marx, 
Weber and Polanyi, social science has broadly embraced 
the postulate that states and economic activity are deeply 
interdependent. On the one hand, the development of 
each state has been largely rendered possible by that of its 
economy, the goods and services generated as well as the 
fiscal reservoir this has created. On the other hand, a major 
condition for encouraging durable economic activity has 
been the emergence of the state as a maker and enforcer 
of rules, norms and conventions. 
As is well known, since the mid-1980s, sociological neo-
institutionalism has retheorized the second part of the 
above ‘equation’ and convincingly shown how these insti-
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tutions structure and orientate economic activity. Building 
upon the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (2000), Neil Fligstein 
(2001) in particular has highlighted not only how ‘the 
architecture of markets’ is made up of institutions, but also 
the extent to which the state acts as their guarantor. More 
specifically, his contention is that by being principally outside 
the ‘fields’ within which economic activity takes place, rep-
resentatives of the state intervene as ‘third parties’. In so 
doing they sometimes arbitrate between dominant actors 
and their challengers, but more often simply mediate their 
co-existence (Fligstein, 1996). Overall, for Fligstein as for 
Bourdieu (2000: 250), the state is never neutral when it 
intervenes in different parts of the economy, and this be-
cause a separate ‘bureaucratic field’ overhangs and strongly 
influences all its meso and micro level interventions. 
At first sight this conceptualization of the relationship 
between states and their economies is highly seductive. 
First it dovetails with other, less sociological, literatures that 
have sought to capture how each state has regulated its 
economy (Boyer, 2004) and, in so doing, created singular 
but comparable ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Second, it neatly distinguishes between actors who 
are ‘economic’ (firms and their representatives) from those 
who are ‘political’ (politicians and civil servants), thus chim-
ing with a cleavage in everyday use promoted by these 
actors themselves and the media. 
Notwithstanding their usage by a wide range of econo-
mists, political scientists and sociologists, defining ‘politics’ 
and ‘bureaucracy’ as quintessentially national and partly 
external to economic activity is deeply problematic. Firstly, 
as we have shown in detail elsewhere (Jullien and Smith, 
2014), given the impact of both international and Europe-
an scales and the range of ways state representatives inter-
vene in different industries, today at least it makes little 
sense to obstinately search for national patterns and types. 
Instead, a focus upon comparing specific industries and 
their respective markets is more appropriate and methodo-
logically robust. More specifically, each industry needs 
conceptualizing as an Institutional Order composed of four 
groupings of inter-connected Institutionalized Relationships 
(IRs): Employment, Finance, Sourcing and Commercial 
(Jullien and Smith, 2008). Each of these IRs is also criss-
crossed by a number of Trans-Industry Regulations (Fiscal, 
competition and environment policy, etc.), all of which 
ostensibly apply to all industries. Tensions within an indus-
try are thus typically either inter-IR or between an IR and 
Trans-Industry Regulations. In the case of wine in Bor-
deaux, for example, reinforced European and national 
legislation over pesticide usage potentially affects first the 
Sourcing IR by setting limits upon how grapes are treated 
with chemicals. However, because of the perceived risks 
and opportunities associated with changing agronomic 
practices, the legislation could also become an issue within 
the industry’s Employment (e.g. health and safety, labour 
ratios), Finance (support from banks) and Commercial 
(pricing, labelling) IRs. 
Indeed, it is precisely over whether or not issues in these IRs 
are transformed into ‘public problems’ (Rochefort and Cobb, 
1994) that a second step forward for research needs to be 
made by embracing agency and abandoning the anthropo-
morphic definitions of politics that still dominate socio-
economic analysis. Instead of limiting politics to what politi-
cians or administrators do, it is defined here as all activity 
that seeks to change or reproduce institutions by mobilizing 
or silencing values (Smith, 2013). One of the advantages of 
this definition is that it focuses analytical attention upon the 
co-production of the economy’s institutions by contingent 
hierarchies of actors within which state representatives may, 
or may not, play a dominant role. In so doing, this approach 
builds upon the concept of ‘institutional work’ which high-
lights the importance of agency in the creation and repro-
duction of economic institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006; François, 2011). More specifically, we hypothesize 
that such work becomes ‘political’ around either the explicit 
evocation of values (politicization), or their downplaying 
(technicization), through which struggles for institutional 
change or stasis are legitimized. 
A Focus Upon States Acting Through Markets  
In applying this approach to the issue of pesticide reduc-
tion, the angle on the state-economy relationship devel-
oped here is why, how and with what effects have seg-
ments of many contemporary states chosen to act upon 
public problems by creating markets? Over the last thirty 
years this practice has become increasingly common in 
issue areas ranging from health and infrastructures to 
energy, a trend over which research has produced three 
broad interpretations but little in the way of causal evi-
dence. 
The first of these lines of analysis is centred upon reforms 
of the state. It postulates that inspired and legitimated by 
neo-classical economics, advocates of New Public Man-
agement (NPM) have become dominant within states 
themselves. In so doing, one of their priorities has been to 
‘externalise’ much pre-existing state activity by creating 
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markets for the provision of public services by private ac-
tors. Much valuable research has been devoted to this 
question (Saint-Martin, 2001; Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004; 
Bezes, 2009). However, little knowledge has thus far been 
generated on the precise causes of state representatives 
choosing to intervene via markets, nor upon their effects in 
terms of political economy. 
This question is addressed more directly by a second strand 
of research focused upon policy instruments. Having exam-
ined the production and implementation of such instru-
ments in the British health and local government fields, Le 
Galès and Scott go so far as to conclude that recourse to 
market mechanisms has actually strengthened the state 
(2008; Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2007). More precisely, 
this strengthening is attributed to state representatives 
developing through markets a capacity to ‘govern at arm’s 
length’ and thus avoid the trap of neo-corporatist relation-
ships with socio-economic actors. Although this thesis 
merits taking seriously, the research behind it has yet to 
either seriously study the long-term effects of this mode of 
governing, nor its numerous failures (eg. British railways). 
Consequently it risks guiding research to overestimate both 
the actual capacity of state actors to orientate economic 
activity through markets, as well as their continued will-
ingness to do so. 
Indeed, the third and final interpretation of states operating 
via markets argues conversely that this practice reflects a loss 
of state power in general, and its transfer to business elites 
in particular (Jobert 2003; Crouch, 2005 & 2011). According 
to this view, state actors have given up large swathes of 
interventions by either transferring them to public-private 
partnerships or by recalibrating their own practices upon the 
template of the private corporation. This process is seen as 
self-perpetuating because, in so doing, states have lost 
much of the expertise and personnel they once had, thus 
further delegitimizing themselves by becoming both ‘unin-
formed’ and ‘powerless’. As seductive as this thesis seems, 
however, little research has thus far been undertaken to 
validate it. 
Overall, these three views on why states have increasingly 
sought to intervene in the socio-economy through markets 
are both stimulating and frustrating because they all prom-
ise important lines of enquiry but fail to follow through 
with adequate methods and data. Fully conscious that our 
modest study of pesticide reduction in the Bordelais cannot 
on its own pretend to plug the gaps created, nor by any 
means totally capture what the state-economy relationship 
has become, the following pages are nevertheless an at-
tempt to head research in this direction by wedding our 
limited empirical example to the theoretical and conceptual 
propositions traced above. 
2 A State-Created Market for Certifying 
Pesticide Users: Rules and Dependencies 
Reducing pesticide usage has recently been given impetus 
by a European Union (EU) directive from 2009 (EC 128/2009) 
and, in France, by a series of measures adopted after a ‘na-
tional debate’ on environmental protection (le Grenelle de 
l’environnement) that same year. Socio-economic actors 
from Bordeaux’s vineyard have reacted to this trend, and 
partly anticipated it, through a range of adjustments that 
include financing better meteorological instruments and 
creating networks to encourage the transfer of ‘best prac-
tices’. In this way, they have sought to confine the ‘prob-
lem’ of pesticide reduction to an issue of ‘reasonable us-
age’ by individual growers. Meanwhile, from the point of 
view of the state, and in line with the directive, the princi-
pal policy instrument used has been a programme, located 
within the industry’s Employment IR, which seeks to train 
and certify all pesticide users by the end of 2013: 
Certyphyto. If EU legislation sets out the broad content of 
this programme, it has not however imposed the process 
through which it should be implemented. In the French 
case, national and local representatives of the state have 
thus freely chosen to delegate the training of pesticide 
users to non-state actors by putting in place a market for 
this purpose. By examining first the creation of this market 
then its regulation, data regarding the positioning and 
power of state actors will be highlighted1. In so doing, it 
will also be shown why the ‘problem’ of pesticide usage 
has been reduced to one of training individuals to dissemi-
nate chemicals ‘reasonably’ into the environment. 
A market reinforcing state dependence upon service 
providers 
The first steps in creating this market entailed the French 
state publishing a call for participants, then validating their 
applications. In the Bordelais, four principal operators, all 
already heavily involved in agricultural training, applied and 
were accepted as participants: the Chamber of Agriculture, 
Public Education and Training Schools, a ‘rural develop-
ment’ association (les Maisons Familiales Rurales) and, 
more unusually, a major supplier of pesticides (Vitivista 
Ltd.). In so doing, other potential trainers advocating alter-
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native crop treatment methods, such as associations of 
organic producers, were excluded from the outset. 
From the point of view of the selected operators, 
Certyphyto was seen as a considerable opportunity firstly 
because in the Gironde alone in 2009 there were 9432 
registered farmers. 7400 of these grew grapes and em-
ployed in total 25.000 workers, most of whom would have 
to obtain a certificate to use pesticides by the end of 2013. 
At a time when numbers of farmers and farm employees in 
France are continuing to decline, conducting courses with-
in the Certyphyto programme was seen as a considerable 
opportunity to make profits. 
Indeed, for all of these operators this opportunity was also 
of great interest because it logically would enable them to 
train and thus be in contact with a range of farmers and 
growers with whom they had never had, or no longer had, 
a relationship. In the name of ‘the crisis’ that had affected 
wine prices in the mid-2000s, many growers had cut back 
on both their training and pesticide budgets. In the first 
instance this meant they were decreasingly in contact with 
the Chamber of Agriculture and Public Training Schools on 
the one hand, and had less dealings with companies selling 
pesticides, on the other. As a representative of the Cham-
ber put it on interview: ‘Today the difficulty is to get farm-
ers to undertake professional training. We have trouble 
getting them to come and one needs bait. Because certifi-
cation was compulsory, we had our bait’. Training farmers 
and growers so they obtained a Certyphyto certificate was 
thus seen as enabling all these organisations to establish or 
re-establish links around which other services could later 
be marketed and sold. 
Of course, these market opportunities cannot be separated 
from the pricing arrangements put in place by the French 
state. From the point of farmers and growers the key point 
here is that the two-day courses were free of charge, and 
thus subsidized 100% by the state and training fund fi-
nanced by levies on all agricultural products (VIVEA). This 
aspect of the market was clearly attractive to operators, 
notably with a mind to the long-term relationships they 
hoped to expand around Certyphyto. But the main attrac-
tion was a system of pricing which generously remunerat-
ed these operators to the tune of 22euros per hour and 
per trainee from 2009 to 2011. Even if thereafter this price 
was reduced to 15 euros, this was still seen as a profit-
making exercise to be engaged in with vigour. 
The final aspect of the creation of this market that reveals 
just how much the state was prepared to bend over back-
wards to set it in motion, concerns the procedures for 
validating candidate operators. Given that all the latter had 
developed environmental-protection training modules over 
the previous decade, they had little difficulty in satisfying 
the criteria set out by the Ministry of Agriculture concern-
ing the content of each training module. Indeed, our inter-
views confirm that the actual content proposed by each 
operator was not examined closely by representatives of 
the state, and certainly not with a view to reinforcing mes-
sages as regards the damaging effects of pesticides for 
human health and the environment. More importantly still, 
nor were operators specifically encouraged by the state to 
include in their training the alternative production methods 
adopted by growers committed to ‘bio’ or ‘bio-dynamic’ 
viticulture. Rather, as the representative of Vitivista Ltd. put 
it on interview, applying ‘was an administrative procedure, 
that’s all. What we had to do was put the right people 
with the right CVs in the right boxes’. To quote an agent 
of the funding agency VIVEA: ‘as soon as they applied we 
accepted them. We did not make any selections’. State 
representatives justified this policy of non-choice in the 
name of the ‘urgency’ of getting all the target population 
certified in time. But of course this bureaucratic construc-
tion of time is by no means neutral. Indeed, it is highly 
revealing of the priorities and values of the state actors 
concerned, and in particular of their low level of commit-
ment to pesticide reduction. 
In summary, the creation of this market for training grape 
growers in the Bordelais did not oblige the organizations 
to do anything different from what they were already 
doing (so imposed no investment costs), did not make 
them compete amongst each other at this stage and thus 
ended up as being a mere process of registration. No entry 
barriers were raised, thus largely reproducing from the 
outset the (low) constraints on pesticide usage present in 
the local wine industry’s Employment IR and, above all, 
preventing them spilling over into the Sourcing, Finance 
and Commercial IRs. 
Market regulation when the state stands aside 
Once in place, competition between the four operators for 
trainees began in earnest. For the reasons listed earlier, 
each organization re-arranged itself internally so as to 
attract clients quickly and thereby make the most of the 
generous pricing system. What is of much greater analyti-
cal interest, however, is the role representatives of the 
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state have played since 2009. Whereas advocates of the 
‘strengthened state’ hypothesis might have expected these 
actors to intervene regularly with consistent demands that 
differentiated themselves clearly from commercial opera-
tors, in practice they have generally stood back and al-
lowed these training organizations to act as they see fit. 
The first issue that many would have thought the state 
representatives would be active over concerns the provi-
sion of information about the new regulatory require-
ments. Given that such basic information is generally seen 
as a pre-requisite for ‘efficient’ markets, many would in-
deed see the state as its logical provider. In the Bordelais 
case, however, private operators have dominated infor-
mation provision to growers through thinly disguised forms 
of advertising. Not only have state representatives not 
intervened over cases of advertising that slightly distorted 
the regulatory requirements, they have also soft-pedalled 
over a blatant case of abuse of dominant position. This 
case concerns the Chamber of Agriculture and, more spe-
cifically, the relationship between the département-scale 
Chamber and that at the scale of the region. Whereas in 
the past both were ostensibly integrated, a formal separa-
tion now exists which allows the organization at the dépar-
tement-scale to dispense training commercially whilst their 
regional counterparts receive state and EU subsidies to 
provide information to all farmers and growers, regardless 
of their direct links to the Chamber of their département. 
In this instance, however, the regional Chamber’s infor-
mation contained a distinct bias towards its organizational 
cousins. On interview, an actor from the regional organiza-
tion admitted that they had been slightly ‘told off’ about 
this. But no further action has been taken. 
Once the training courses were up and running, one might 
also have expected state representatives to seek to regu-
late the market they had created by monitoring it through 
spot-checks which, under French law, are supposed to be 
obligatory. However, by the time we conducted our inter-
views in mid-2012, no such controlling events had taken 
place. Instead, some representatives of the funding mech-
anism, VIVEA, had visited the occasional training course on 
an ad hoc basis, and this having received no prior training 
themselves and with no legal authority to back their opin-
ions up. Given the unsystematic and informal nature of 
these exercises, unsurprisingly they found what they wit-
nessed to be ‘coherent’. But the state itself has not even 
given itself the opportunity to formulate any point of view 
on this subject. 
Indeed, given this lack of monitoring it is also not surpris-
ing that each of the operators concerned has designed 
their training courses slightly differently. For example, 
some bring in external experts on subjects like health and 
safety, whereas others just make do with their own per-
sonnel. The issue here, of course, is ultimately the value of 
the certification being promoted and part-financed by the 
public purse. On one level this value can be immediately 
questioned because any farmer or grower who stays until 
the end of their two-day course will get a certificate, re-
gardless of whether they really followed its content or not. 
In keeping with the bureaucratic logic behind policy-
implementation in this region, because there is no exam or 
test, all participants are simply certified. In some instances 
the co-operative movement has taken a stand over the 
quality of training provided by advising its members to only 
take courses it has validated. But observation of how the 
co-operatives have played this brokering role in some in-
stances only serves to highlight the generalized absence of 
the state even more. 
Moreover, the question of the value of Certyphyto can and 
should of course be analysed at the deeper level of the 
ideological standpoints and power relations its implemen-
tation reveals. Why have state actors stood back and al-
lowed commercial operators to make the most of the 
funding on offer without putting in place criteria-driven 
demands upon them? Why are the only criteria ever used 
purely bureaucratically concerned with meeting the re-
quirements of national and EU law? Why, in a wine region 
known to be polluting its environment and putting its 
workers at risk with pesticides, have representatives of the 
state not developed and fought to impose a tougher poli-
cy-line in the name of the general interest? 
More research obviously needs to be undertaken to fully 
answer these deep questions, but at this stage two levels 
of reply have emerged. The first concerns how state repre-
sentatives now interpret their own overall social and socio-
economic role. After years of digesting ‘New Public Man-
agement’ discourse and staff reductions due to budget 
cuts, many of the actors now consider it natural to reduce 
the regulatory role of the state. Secondly, and more fun-
damentally, this stance is seen as so ‘normal’ that it is any 
suggestion they should be acting otherwise that is seen as 
deviant. For example, in our interviews with state agents 
we repeatedly encountered a faith in externalization as an 
efficient and unproblematic means of making ‘supply’ 
meet ‘demand’. Indeed, in virtually all these interviews it 
was as if the postulates of simplistic versions of neo-
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classical economics, so prevalent now in French society at 
large, were merely being recited to us as if from a hymn 
book. 
Conclusion 
The case study presented here of pesticide reduction in the 
Bordelais has revealed and analysed an instance of how 
contemporary representatives of a reputedly strong state 
now represent and practice their relationship to the econo-
my. Contrary to the thesis that ‘hands off’ government has 
actually strengthened the state (Le Galès and Scott, 2008), 
here we have shown that its personnel actually consider that 
their role is to intervene minimally in the economy and, 
thereby, give free rein to commercial operators. Far from 
being just a rhetorical stance, this positioning has resulted in 
practice in training organizations using the liberty accorded 
them to actively reproduce a highly permissive approach to 
pesticide usage. Further research on the contemporary 
French state needs not only to focus on other sectors and 
other regions. It also needs to test whether representatives 
of the state located in Paris have reduced their ambitions as 
regards regulating the economy as much as their colleagues 
located in the Bordelais have done. 
More generally, the article has set out an approach to the 
regulation of economic activity centred upon reproduction 
and change of institutions at the level of specific industries 
such as wine. Melding together an ontology and concepts 
from institutionalism and constructivism, we have shown 
how economic practices like pesticide usage are deeply 
anchored in an Institutional Order through its four Institu-
tionalized Relationships (IRs). As with many other wine 
regions, in the Bordelais pesticide usage is so deeply in-
grained in agronomic practice because since at least the 
1950s it has lain at the heart of the wine industry’s Em-
ployment, Finance, Sourcing and Commercial IRs. Recent 
EU and national legislation to alter the recourse to pesti-
cides by growers could have had wide and deep ramifica-
tions for these IRs in the Bordelais. However, in this region 
as elsewhere, representatives of growers, training organi-
zations and the state have conducted ‘institutional work’ in 
order to ensure that any discussion of pesticide usage 
remains confined to only the Employment IR. Controlled by 
employers, this IR has provided a safe haven for imple-
menting externally imposed legislation in ways that have 
not ‘contaminated’ the other IRs. Little wonder then that 
productive and commercial practices in the Bordelais have 
barely been grazed by attempts to inject ‘the general inter-
est’ into their regulation. However, the effacement of the 
state that has occurred in this instance gives much greater 
cause for reflexion. Indeed, though facilitating the con-
finement of an issue to only one part of the industry’s 
institutional order, our case study reveals an angle on the 
state’s involvement in markets that could be of wider in-
terest to all sociologies of political economies. 
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Endnotes 
1This data was principally gathered through 17 semi-structured 
interviews conducted in mid-2012 with protagonists working 
within the state, for producer interest groups or for training or-
ganizations. For example: Aquitaine’s Chamber of Agriculture 
(Environment adviser); Gironde’s Chamber of agriculture (the 
heads of its Environment and training teams); Vitivista Ltd. (the 
head of its Environment team); Ministry of agriculture, agrifood 
and forestry, Regional offices: its  Training and development team 
(policy officer) and Pesticide and veterinary control team (head). 
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This article brings together two streams of research which 
have had important developments over the past years 
without coming together around a single empirical object. 
The first of these streams has developed in economic soci-
ology around questions of valuation and pricing (Aspers 
and Beckert, 2011; Hegelsson and Muniesa, 2013; Vatin, 
2013). If the majority of these works are more interested in 
processes of qualification than in processes of pricing, this 
gap tends to be filled by studies that are primarily focused 
on the formation, the circulation and the social uses of 
prices (Beckert, 2011; Chauvin, 2011 and previous issue). 
However, as Beckert (2011) emphasizes, these works have 
often neglected the role of institutions in general, and of 
the State in particular, in the determination of prices. The 
second stream of research has developed in the policy 
analysis around “government instruments” (Hood, 1983; 
Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004) used by the State to gov-
ern different social spheres, and in particular the market 
(Hall, 1986; Dobbin, 1994 ; Jullien and Smith, 2008). These 
works have often emphasized the use of the tax system 
and public expenditure (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004; 
Bézès and Siné, 2011) as classic government instruments, 
but on the other hand they have given little attention to 
control of prices by the State. 
However, according to the analysis of Dobbin (1994) on 
the development of the railway industry in the 19th centu-
ry, the fixing of rates was a central issue in industrial policy, 
not only in France but also in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Fixing the rates of rail transport allowed 
for the promotion of equality between territories and per-
sons, for the regulation of competition between rail com-
panies, and for influencing the development of the rail 
lines in the directions preferred by the State. But price 
control is also an important instrument of macro-economic 
policy, which has been applied to many sectors, and not 
only in the Soviet Union; price control was the rule in 
France from 1936 to 1986, but also in the United States 
during the two world wars and under Nixon’s presidency. 
Hervé Dumez and Alain Jeunemaître (1989), who have 
studied closely price control policy, have noted the variety 
of ways it was used in France in terms of both eras and 
sectors: far from being a secondary or inefficient govern-
ment instrument, price control has been shown to be, at 
least in the case of France, a powerful method of econom-
ic regulation by the State. 
The French medicine market is one of the last representa-
tives of this price control policy; since the 1930s until today 
the prices of reimbursable medicines have been fixed by 
the state. Relatively unusual both in the European and 
global contexts (Lecomte and Paris, 1998; Sermet, 2007), 
this administrative price fixing is justified in the case of 
medicines by the necessity of controlling socialized spend-
ing on health: the State represents the aggregated de-
mand in the face of laboratories that have a quasi-
monopolistic position. This State control over the price of 
medicines has nevertheless been the subject of numerous 
criticisms: for its interventionism (that prevents the estab-
lishment of any real price competition); for its lack of 
transparency (marked by arbitrariness and corruption); and 
its ineffectiveness (weak prices given to the medicines are 
“compensated for” by the laboratories through “artificial” 
strategies of innovation and incentives to doctors to pre-
scribe higher amounts, therefore continuing to inflate 
health expenditures) (Jeunemaître, 1985; Chauveau, 
1999). Within the framework of European harmonization, 
this policy underwent important reforms during the 1990s; 
from that point the fixing of prices was entrusted to the 
Economic Commission for Health Products (hereafter “the 
Commission”). Unofficially created in 1994 and formalized 
by decree in 1997, this Commission includes representa-
tives of different ministerial departments (Health; Social 
Security; Consumerism, Competition and Fraud Prevention; 
Industry) and of (universal and complementary) health care 
organizations, and is responsible for negotiating with the 
pharmaceutical industry the prices of medicines reimbursed 
by health insurance around a number of objectives: 
The mission of the commission is to obtain the most advanta-
geous price and the economic conditions for the health insur-
ance service, taking into account both the global medicine 
market and the constraints of the National Target for Expend-
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itures on Health Insurance, the requirements of public health 
and the need to treat enterprises equally. (Report of the Com-
mission, 2004, p.60). 
In this article we examine in more detail the role played by 
the Commission in price fixing and regulation of the mar-
ket. The fixing of prices by the Commission reaches across 
three different areas of political economy. First of all, the 
Commission presents itself as a valuer, responsible for 
translating in the prices of medicines a range of principles 
of value reflecting different definitions of public interest in 
terms of medicine. Then, the Commission appears as a 
planner, supposed to control, through the fixing of prices, 
the development of the volume and the structure of health 
expenses. Finally, the Commission also assumes, more or 
less overtly, a role as regulator of the market, using the 
prices to influence (or not) the investment and competitive 
strategies of pharmaceutical companies and, to a lesser 
degree, the prescription of medicines. 
Valuing the Public Interest 
The Commission defines itself, first of all, as a representa-
tive of the interests of the aggregated demand for medi-
cines, responsible for defining “collective preferences” in 
the area of public health and for negotiating, in the name 
of the payers, the fairest price with the pharmaceutical 
companies. But in order to determine these collective pref-
erences, the Commission must balance three partially con-
tradictory principles of valuation (Boltanski and Thévenot, 
2006; Stark, 2009; Vatin, 2013): a public health rationale 
according to which the prices should valuate the health 
needs of patients and the therapeutic value of the medi-
cines; a financial rationale according to which the price 
should valuate the financial imperatives of the Social Secu-
rity; an industrial rationale according to which the price 
should valuate industrial development. 
This compromise is established around the assessment of 
the therapeutic value of the medicine by the Commission 
of Transparency. This commission, which used to fall under 
the French Drug Agency and was integrated in 2004 to the 
“Haute Autorité de Santé”, is composed of doctors, phar-
macists, and specialists in medical research and epidemiol-
ogy. It uses clinical data provided by laboratories to assess 
the Improvement in Medical Service (IMS/ASMR in French) 
of a drug, the therapeutic “value-added” of this medicine 
compared to others in the same therapeutic class. There 
are five levels of IMS, ranging from I for a major therapeu-
tic advance to V for a lack of improvement. The Improve-
ment in Medical Service plays a central role in the negotia-
tions between the Commission and the laboratories, since 
it will determine the “acceptable” price range for both 
parties and legitimize the final price. 
According to the agreement signed between the Commis-
sion and the union of the pharmaceutical industry, the 
medicines which have been ranked IMS I to III (major to 
moderate) are supposed to receive a price “coherent” with 
those used in four other European countries, of which two 
(Germany and the United Kingdom) have unregulated, 
elevated prices and two (Italy and Spain) have fixed, weak-
er prices. Granting in this way higher prices to medicines 
having greater therapeutic benefit both indicates the im-
portance of these treatments for public health and “com-
pensates” innovative laboratories, while taking care not to 
strain the budgets of the health insurance service. For all 
that, the “fair price” is never completely self-evident, as is 
regularly shown by the case of “orphan drugs.” As these 
medicines affect only a very small number of people suffer-
ing from problems which are often serious1, access for 
these patients is crucial; but the few laboratories that in-
vest in research on these medicines face limited markets to 
profit from them and therefore often demand extremely 
high prices. The negotiations within the Commission and 
between the Commission and the firms are often therefore 
very difficult. 
Another example of these difficulties of “assessment” 
relates to the medicines rated as IMS IV (minor), for which 
the therapeutic value is not high enough to include the 
medicine within a European price bracket, nor weak 
enough for the company to accept a price lower than that 
of comparable medicines. It is therefore not unheard of for 
a company to demand a price ten to twenty times higher 
than that of equivalent drugs for a new form of one of its 
medications which has a grade of IMS IV. In this case, 
matching therapeutic benefit with price can prove to be 
particularly problematic, with the representatives of the 
Health Ministry hoping to offer patients the benefit of this 
new medicine while the representatives of Social Security 
or of the healthcare organizations refusing to pay a high 
price for a minor innovation. 
Financial considerations are even more evident in the case 
of the medications that do not offer an improvement (IMS 
V), which represented 60 to 80% of the medications eval-
uated by the Transparency Commission from 2000 to 
2006. The Social Security Code stipulates that in the ab-
sence of therapeutic value, a medication should not be 
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included on the list of reimbursable medicines unless it 
allows for savings for Social Security. However, the Com-
mission elaborates in one of its reports that “the expected 
savings are not measured by the unit price gap between 
the new medicine and those, already included, with which 
the Transparency Commission compared it, but as savings 
in expenditures, which is the product of gaps in the price 
per volume” (Annex 1, Report 2002, p.40). Moreover, the 
arrival of a new medicine modifies the competitive struc-
ture within the market of that therapeutic class, which 
affects at the same time the global volume of sales and the 
structure of market shares. For the Commission, then, the 
issue consists of fixing a price for this new medicine which 
takes into consideration the probable evolution of its sales 
volumes but also those of other medicines and therefore 
integrates market regulation and expenditure planning. 
The Commission’s approach to assessing medicines has 
recently been criticized as inflationist by both politicians 
and economists. For example, in a recent study of the 
“determinants of price gaps between similar medicines 
and the first on the market of a therapeutic class,” some 
researchers (Sorasith et al., 2012) find “the existence of 
occasionally important price gaps between similar medi-
cines, which have the same indications and which are 
therefore postulated to be a priori equivalent” (p.30). 
While these gaps result from the principles governing price 
fixing in France (the date of market launch and IMS), the 
researchers question the foundations of these principles 
since “the majority of minor innovations lead to these price 
gaps within a class […although] for the doctor who pre-
scribes them or the patient who consumes them, they are 
in most cases interchangeable” (p.30). These researchers 
therefore find that it would be wise to question the role of 
the criteria of innovation in the assessment of medicines to 
offer more weight to financial imperatives. 
This critique appears to be well founded as long as it re-
duces the activity of the Commission to an assessment of 
the therapeutic innovation offered by a medication. But in 
reality, the Commission is not content to just valuate the 
therapeutic interest of these medicines; it also aims to use 
its control over prices to plan the evolution of health ex-
penditures. 
Planning Health Expenditures 
In his study of railway policy in the 19th century, Dobbin 
(1994) tends to separate planning policy from pricing poli-
cy. However, price fixing has been an important instrument 
in French planning (Fourquet, 1980 ; Dumez and 
Jeunemaître, 1989). In the 1990s, administrative price 
fixing of medicines was the subject of numerous critiques 
(Jeunemaître, 1985 ; Chauveau, 1999). It did not seem, in 
fact, able to curb the growth of medical expenses without 
strict controls on the volumes sold and therefore on pre-
scriptions. The equilibrium resting on fixed, weak prices 
and free, high volumes was not satisfying in terms of fi-
nances, since it did not allow limitations on medical ex-
penses, nor in terms of health care, since overconsumption 
of medicines entailed iatrogenic risks for the patients, nor 
even in terms of industrial development, since the weak 
and relatively homogenous pricing did not encourage the 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in the research and 
development of truly innovative medications. The creation 
of the Commission in 1994 and the establishment of the 
“Plan Juppé” in 1996 aimed to address this problematic 
situation by making the Commission a true planning au-
thority, empowered to control the evolution of medical 
expenses by acting not only on the prices but also on the 
volumes of medicines sold. 
The Commission therefore has the mission of ensuring that 
the growth of reimbursable medical expenses is consistent 
with the National Target of Health Insurance Expenditures, 
voted on by the Parliament every year since 1996 within 
the framework of the Social Security Financing Law. To 
achieve this consistency, the Commission applies the “K 
rate” of growth of Health Insurance Expenditures defined 
by the Social Security Financing Law at a different rate for 
each of 65 pharmacotherapeutic groups, grouping togeth-
er medicines considered therapeutically equivalent. The 
first step is evaluating the perspectives of a “normal” evo-
lution of sales within each therapeutic class starting from 
the demand for the drugs (prevalence of the illness to be 
treated and public health priorities) and their promise (pre-
dicted development of innovations or generic medicines). 
A second stage aims then to “identify the classes within 
which [the Commission] calculates that, at the currently 
observed levels of sales, the prices are – at least relatively, 
considering the global constraint on expenditures set by 
the Parliament – too high” (Annex 2, Report 2002, p.46-
47) in terms of the assessment of the interest in that ther-
apeutic class, the length of time that the medicine has 
been on the market and the volumes of sales. In this sense, 
the Commission plays a central role in planning through its 
capacity to control not only the levels but also the structure 
of medical expenditures, based on its evaluation of public 
health needs, public finances, and the growth of the mar-
kets. 
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To “execute the plan,” the Commission can act not only 
on the prices of medicines but also on the volumes and 
structure of sales. First, the Commission can modify prices 
based on the observed sales volumes of the medicines. In 
the case of older therapeutic classes for which generic 
medicines are widely available, the Commission has, on the 
request of Parliament, implemented important price cuts 
between 2000 and 2012, in order to get the sales price as 
close as possible to the cost of production. Otherwise, the 
prices granted to innovative medications are usually ac-
companied by provisions under which passing a certain 
volume (of global sales or daily treatment) can lead to the 
lowering of the price of the medicine. These provisions aim 
to ensure that the laboratories do not pressure doctors to 
prescribe the medications unless indicated, jeopardizing 
not only the balance of health expenditures but also public 
health. In cases that significantly exceed the sales targets 
fixed in these provisions, the Commission can theoretically 
lower the official price of the medicine. In fact, lowering 
prices in this way provokes the hostility of the pharmaceu-
tical companies, since it threatens not only the price estab-
lished in the French market, but also more broadly that of 
the European market, via the system of cross-referencing 
among European countries.  
A second instrument is therefore preferred both by the 
companies and by the Commission: the end-of-year re-
bates. These rebates, paid by laboratories to the health 
insurance system in the case of exceeding the volumes 
“authorised” by the Commission, permit the health insur-
ance system to get a real price lower than the official price 
without changing the latter. Finally, a third instrument 
aims to act from a distance on medical prescriptions by 
regulating the amount of doctor visits by pharmaceutical 
representatives. In 2004 a “doctor visit quality chart” was 
agreed between the Commission and the pharmaceutical 
industry union in order to “promote the quality of medical 
treatment by avoiding the misuse of medicines and unnec-
essary expenditures and by participating in informing doc-
tors” (Medical Visit Charter signed by the Commission and 
medical companies in 2004). While this Charter only re-
lates to the content of medical visits, the Commission has 
moreover negotiated with the laboratories to fix the num-
ber of doctor visits they can make within therapeutic clas-
ses; passing this number can lead to sanctions (price lower-
ing or rebates). By this logic, actors in the health field (doc-
tors, patients, pharmacists) appear almost negligible since 
the Commission and the laboratories agree to fix the “ac-
ceptable” prices and volumes of sales and of medical visits, 
without considering doctors’ actions or opinions. 
Beyond these different instruments, a “contractual” 
framework contributes to assuring the planning of health 
expenditures. Almost all of the pharmaceutical companies 
have chosen to sign contracts and support a policy of ne-
gotiations, not so much for financial reasons as because 
this policy gives them the opportunity to negotiate prices 
directly with the State, mediated by stable rules which 
engage both parties. The policy offers the companies a 
handhold in the fixing of prices through the devices and 
rules established by the Commission, and gives the State 
influence over the conduct of companies and doctors. 
Moreover, by engaging the Commission and the compa-
nies on the basis of a five-year contract, this policy allows 
both stakeholders to plan the evolution of medical expend-
itures over the medium-term: the Commission can protect 
itself from a sharp drop in sales (and therefore in medical 
expenditures) and the companies can protect themselves 
against any temptation by the government implement 
short-term savings by unilaterally changing the prices. 
The Commission therefore plays a planning role responsi-
ble for guiding the evolution of medical expenses based on 
objectives and priorities fixed by the government and by 
commitments with the pharmaceutical companies. We are 
left with a third role that implies relatively contradictory 
arguments: should the Commission also use the prices to 
regulate the market? 
Regulating Health Industries 
Neo-institutionalist works have emphasized the key role of 
the state in the structuring of markets and the organisation 
of company strategies (Dobbin, 1994; Fligstein, 2001). 
Based on the laws that have been adopted, the State is 
able to promote strategies of cooperation, of price compe-
tition, or of merger among companies (Dobbin and Dowd, 
2000). Through its decisions whether to fix a single rate or 
leave companies free to fix their own rates within the rail-
way sector, the State either promoted the establishment of 
a substantial margin for the enterprises in the sector or on 
the other hand allowed an unbridled and ruinous price 
competition to take root (Dobbin 1994). In the French 
Case, two questions have been particularly important in 
the debate around market regulation. Should the Commis-
sion use its control over prices to subsidise the French and 
European pharmaceutical industry or should it respect 
equality of treatment across companies? Should the Com-
mission use its control over prices to encourage price com-
petition among enterprises and in this way “sacrifice” the 
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pharmaceutical industry in the search for lower health 
insurance expenditure? 
The first question has been raised recently by two profes-
sors of medicine (one of whom is a member of Parliament), 
Philippe Even and Bernard Debré. From a table showing 
the price gaps between “similar” French and foreign medi-
cines, the two authors accused the Commission of privileg-
ing “first French firms, then foreign firms established and 
producing in France, and, finally, foreign firms producing 
elsewhere and without plans to establish themselves in 
France” (p.61). According to them, this “national” or “Eu-
ropean preference” is a result of the strong influence that 
the Ministers of Finance and of Industry have over the 
decisions of the Commission, which lead it to privilege an 
industrial logic over a public health or a financial rationale 
in fixing prices. The two authors note an important ambi-
guity in the political economy of medicine in France: 
should the Commission use the price fixing of medicines as 
a tool of industrial policy or should it observe a strict prin-
ciple of neutrality towards different companies? 
While each of the annual activity reports published since 
1999 contain the reminder that the Commission intends to 
respect a perfect equality in the treatment of companies and 
a set of rules have been progressively enacted to translate 
this principle into price decisions, the relations of the Com-
mission with the companies seems to have evolved the ac-
cording to the involved branches of government (and in 
particular the weight of the Ministry of Industry), the eco-
nomic conditions, and the positions of its presidents. In this 
way, the policy initiated by the first president of the Com-
mission, Jean Marmot, and theorised in a 2004 report 
(Marmot, 2004), had a clear industrialist angle: the issue was 
to use price fixing to promote the development of a compet-
itive French industry and to take into consideration the ob-
jectives of growth and employment alongside the objectives 
of controlling health insurance expenditures and the needs 
of public health. On the other hand, Noël Renaudin, who 
presided over the Commission from 1999 to 2011, defend-
ed a principle of neutrality on industrial issues. He consid-
ered that the protection of employment and growth in 
France should not be part of the criteria for price fixing and 
that equality of treatment across enterprises, “as much for 
the legal certainty it provides as for the rational expectations 
that it makes possible, constitutes a significantly attractive 
element” (Commission Report 2009, p.44). 
The positions of Jean Marmot and Noël Renaudin offer an 
illustration of two opposing conceptions, protectionist and 
liberal, of industrial policy. The political economy of medi-
cine, as it is designed in the rules and price fixing instru-
ments utilised by the Commission, constitute a unique 
compromise between these two extreme positions. The 
principle of equality of treatment and of respect for com-
petition among enterprises appears in the system of distri-
bution of “rebates” at the end of the year. The rebate paid 
by each company is based partially on the sales rate within 
the pharmacotherapeutic group concerned (65%) and 
partially on the growth of this sales rate (35%). The com-
petitive neutrality principle of pricing policy would have the 
rebates based exclusively on the sales rate, but at the same 
time, the contracts discourage the systematic penalization 
of the same enterprises through the rebate system, be-
cause otherwise the companies would prefer the non-
contract route. This system seems therefore to be a meth-
od of taxing all the companies without “distorting” the 
competition within the different therapeutic classes. 
On the other hand, the principle of the promotion and 
protection of French and/or European industry is applied 
through two instruments. The first of these is the valuing 
of innovation by “European” prices and the establishment 
of partial or complete exemptions from the rebates over 
the course of several years for medicines with high IMSs. 
This principle has crucial implications for the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, since it reinforces the separation between the 
(large, international) companies which innovate and access 
European prices but don’t necessarily develop their re-
search and production activities on French or European 
territories, and the (smaller, national) firms which concen-
trate on the exploitation of older or generic medicines and 
which often guarantee operation of their industrial sites on 
French territory. The second instrument aims to strengthen 
the attractiveness of France and the European Union for 
pharmaceutical research, development, and production 
activities. Based on the recommendations of the Marmot 
Report in 2004, a Strategic Council of Health Industries 
(SCHI, CSIS in French) met in 2005 under the auspices of 
the Prime Minister and entrusted the Commission with the 
distribution of credits (reaching a global annual sum of 
around 50 million euros) intended to finance “hard” in-
vestments (production factories, research centers, distribu-
tion platforms of headquarters) already implemented or 
under construction. While ostensibly recognizing the im-
portance of industrial development within medical policy, 
the SCHI credits in reality enable the separation of industri-
al development policy from the price fixing of medicines. 
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The second problematic concerns the use of price controls 
to promote price competition among firms. The generic 
medicines policy which has been developed in France since 
the 1990s has led the government to construct a “price 
competition market” while at the same time maintaining 
the administration of prices and the socialization of health 
expenses (Nouguez, 2010; forthcoming). In the absence of 
micro-economic devices of price competition, the Commis-
sion has played the role of a Walrasian Price Commissioner 
groping to establish by trial and error a “perfect competi-
tive price” that approaches the production cost of generic 
medicines: the price of a generic medicine, which is fixed 
by the Commission, has in this way gone from 80% of the 
price of the original medicine in 1994 to 40% in 2012; at 
the same time, the prices of original medications now 
competing with generics were lowered by the Commission 
from 80% of their original prices in 2006 and to 70% by 
2012. Finally, on the request of the government, the 
Commission has developed since 2010 a policy of price 
convergence within therapeutic classes in which generic 
medicines were strongly present but did not manage to 
compete with certain patented medicines because of the 
marketing strategies of laboratories (Nouguez, 2007). 
Rather than leaving it to market actors (laboratories, doc-
tors, patients) to organize a true price competition, the 
Commission has therefore used its control over the prices 
to “mimic” the effects of price competition. In this sense, 
it plays a major role in the regulation of the market and 
the industry. 
The use of prices as an instrument of market and industry 
regulation has therefore been an important issue of con-
flict, muted but real, raising the question of the autonomy 
of the Commission from ministerial “guidance” and indus-
trial “influence.” The economic crisis and the growth of 
unemployment can be seen as factors reinforcing the in-
dustrial logic within the decisions of the Commission, but 
they also contribute to strengthening the financial perspec-
tive and the pressure to lower the prices of medicines and 
optimize the savings of the health insurance system. Thus 
the balance between public health, financial, and industrial 
rationales in the assessment of medicines, far from being 
static, evolves notably based on ministerial guidance, rules 
elaborated by the Commission, and their use by public and 
private actors. 
Conclusion 
Two conclusions in particular stand out from this study of 
the pricing policy conducted by the Economic Commission 
for Health Products. The first is consistent with the work 
that has been done in economic sociology on the architec-
ture of prices (Chauvin, 2011 and 2013). In the French 
medicine market a multiplicity of prices can be seen, the 
form, the status and the use of which vary significantly. 
We have seen that the system of rebates leads to a differ-
entiation between the official price, written on the box, 
and the price actually paid by the health insurance system  
(Aspers and Beckert, 2011). This gap between the two 
prices is explained both by the capacity of the Commission 
to negotiate rebates with the laboratories, and by the 
eagerness of the latter to display a consistent (if not 
unique) price across the European (if not global) markets. 
While price fixing remains a national prerogative within the 
framework of the European Union, decisions in terms of 
price increasingly fall into a network of cross-references 
that tend to homogenize them. But the policy adopted in 
France (as in the majority of European countries) tends to 
create a price hierarchy based on the degree of innovation 
of the medicine, since the medicines judged to be of little 
innovation or that have been on the market longer are 
subject to strong policies of price competition aiming to 
reduce their costs for the collective and for individuals. 
Our second conclusion emphasizes the need to further 
refine research on price controls as an instrument of gov-
erning markets. Studying the activity of the Commission 
has allowed us to identify three methods of using prices to 
govern the market: a rationale of valuing public interest, a 
rationale of planning health expenses, and a rationale of 
regulating the market and the industry. But, if the Com-
mission offers without a doubt an ideal-typical case of 
price fixing, the examples of direct or indirect State inter-
vention in prices are numerous, whether in terms of salary 
policy (e.g. minimum wage), financial policy (e.g. interest 
rates on savings accounts), or tax policy on activities “in 
the public interest” (e.g. electricity, water, gas…) or again 
on highly symbolic goods (e.g. tobacco, books, bread…). 
The systematic study of price policies developed in these 
different sectors should allow for the refining of the typol-
ogy that we have outlined here and for more thinking 
generally about prices as a significant instrument of gov-
erning markets. 
Etienne Nouguez is a researcher at the Centre National 
de la Recherche Scientifique, and a member of the Centre 
de Sociologie des Organisations (CNRS/Sciences-Po Paris, 
France). His research interests are economic sociology, 
health sociology, organizational studies and policy analysis. 
After completing a PHD dissertation on the formation of a 
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French market for generic medicines (which will be pub-
lished by the Presses de Sciences-Po in 2014), he has 
worked on the creation and the diffusion of a French pro-
gram for the prevention of childhood obesity. His research 
is now focused on the study of the genesis and regulation 
of an European market for "health" food. 
Endnotes 
1The term also refers to drugs aimed at treating diseases suffered 
primarily in poorer countries, where the potential return on in-
vestment is low. In the European context, it is the first definition 
which is more relevant. 
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The State and the Structure of the Business 
Community
Mark Mizruchi interviewed by Pierre 
François 
Mark S. Mizruchi is the Barger Family Professor of Organ-
izational Studies, Professor of Sociology, and Professor of 
Business Administration at the University of Michigan. He 
works in the areas of economic, organizational, and politi-
cal sociology, as well as on the methods of social network 
analysis. His publications include The Fracturing of the 
American Corporate Elite (2013), The Structure of Corpo-
rate Political Action (1992), and The American Corporate 
Network, 1904-1974 (1982), as well as more than 100 
articles and reviews.  
mizruchi@umich.edu  
1 You are best-known as “Mr. 
Interlock.” I would like to know how 
you began to work on interlocks and 
with network methods. 
I was in graduate school at Stony Brook in the 1970s, and I 
was interested in questions around Marxist theory, but I 
had started college as a math major. I had always liked 
numbers, but by the time I got to graduate school I had 
developed this aversion to quantitative sociology, and I 
didn’t want anything to do with it. In my second year of 
graduate school I went to a practice job talk by Beth Mintz, 
who was working at the time with Michael Schwartz. She 
presented a talk on corporate ownership and control. In 
order to empirically address that topic, she began writing 
mathematical models on the board, and drawing circles 
and lines, and she was talking about debates in Marxist 
theory. It had never occurred to me that you could deal 
with interesting theoretical questions and use numbers and 
mathematical models. I was really excited by this. So after 
her talk I went to Michael Schwartz, who had run this big 
project, and I asked him if he was interested in having 
somebody else work on the project, and he got very excit-
ed to have a new student who was interested in it. I 
thought that this question of ownership and control was 
interesting but I didn’t know exactly why it was important, 
I knew it was something a lot of people had argued about. 
But it was never clear for me why these arguments were so 
intense. 
I started to get interested in the question theoretically, and 
then I got interested in interlocks. Companies have boards 
of directors, and if you look at the board of one company 
you see people who also sit on the boards of other com-
panies, so they create ties between the companies. Mi-
chael had worked with Harrison White in the 1960s, and 
he was involved in Harrison’s early work on social net-
works. He was there at the same time Mark Granovetter 
was there.  Mark had developed this idea of weak ties 
versus strong ties, and Michael used this distinction in his 
work on interlocks. My interest grew out these questions, 
rooted in my old interest in Marxist theory, and at the 
same time from my interest in these mathematical models 
and social networks. 
2 Your first book, The American 
Corporate Network, was on the 
evolution of the network of the biggest 
US firms. How did you get from this first 
book to the 1992 book, The Structure of 
Corporate Political Action? 
There was actually a good reason for me to switch my 
approach. When we first started doing these network 
analyses of interlocks, there was a lot of excitement: You 
can draw these really beautiful pictures, and you can show 
that all these firms are connected to one another. It initially 
seemed sufficient on its own just to show that these struc-
tures existed. But after a few years, people started asking a 
question: So what? Does it make any difference that all 
these companies are connected? Are there really any be-
havioral consequences of this? For the first couple of years, 
I just tried to argue my way out of the problem: “Well, you 
can’t observe this kind of thing, we know power when we 
see it!” I even published an article in the Academy of 
Management Review, called “Who Controls Whom?” I 
was arguing that boards of directors, even if they rarely did 
anything, were the primary center of control inside the 
firm, because they had the ability to hire and fire the CEO. 
I made that argument because it was a justification for 
looking at interlocks as centers of power. If directors had 
power inside the firm, then it made sense to talk about 
their power in the economy as a whole. 
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This response worked for a while, but I became increasing-
ly concerned that these critics had a point. I really did need 
to show that there were consequences of these ties. The 
question was how to do it. What I needed was a political 
outcome, because we were arguing that these interlocks 
led to political unity or cohesiveness among the large cor-
porations. How were we going to show that empirically? In 
1982, I was at a sociology meeting in San Francisco, and I 
was talking to one my fellow interlock researchers, Tom 
Koenig. Tom, in his dissertation, had looked at political 
contributions made by corporations. There had been a 
recent law in the United States that allowed corporations 
to form separate entities called political action committees. 
They were legally separate but they could be funded by the 
firms, and they were basically run by the firms. As part of 
the deal, they were required to report all of their contribu-
tions, and the government made these contributions pub-
lic. You could purchase, in those days they were tapes, 
where you could find all of the contributions made by the 
political action committees, including labor unions and 
other kinds of groups, as well as corporations. I started 
thinking: there’s got to be a way that I can use these polit-
ical contributions as an outcome of interlock ties. 
The problem was that interlocks were by definition rela-
tional. They involve relations between firms. If you are 
talking about class cohesion or business unity, you’re talk-
ing about a relational process. But the contributions are 
made by individual firms, so if you want to talk about con-
tribution patterns, your unit of analysis is the individual 
company. I was trying to figure out how I could develop a 
relational analysis using these campaign contributions. One 
day it hit me: I could look at dyads, pairs of companies. If 
you look at a pair of companies, you can ask the question: 
if these companies share an interlock, are they more likely 
to contribute to the same candidates? 
The other thing is that I wasn’t just interested in network 
ties as social connections. I wanted to argue that there was 
a more structural basis for firms to be cohesive with one 
another, that it wasn’t based just on personal friendship. 
The idea I came up with was that the firms’ economic 
interdependence made them more cohesive. It turned out 
that there was a body of scholarship on this in sociology, 
called power-dependence theory, the classic article was by 
Richard Emerson, and this even goes back to Durkheim, 
because in The Division of labor Durkheim argued that 
interdependence was the basis of organic solidarity. Emer-
son made a similar argument, that when people are de-
pendent on one another, they gain a stake in maintaining 
the relationship. If companies are interdependent, then 
they would probably have a stake in maintaining a cohe-
sive relationship as well. The problem was, there was no 
publicly available data on direct transactions between 
companies. But around that time I had come across Ron 
Burt’s early work. He dealt with the problem by looking at 
relations among industries, because those data are availa-
ble in the US. Ron had used these input-output tables to 
predict where interlocks were likely to occur. I wanted to 
use these tables to predict where firms would exhibit simi-
lar political behavior. 
3 After the 1992 book, you seemed to 
get into another main interest: the 
problem of the relationship between 
the state and the economy wasn’t so 
central to you anymore. You decided to 
turn to other questions, such as the role 
of banks in the intercorporate network. 
Why did you move in this direction? 
By the time my 1992 book came out, sociologists, at least 
in the US, had lost interest in questions about class and 
power, about the relations between business and the 
state. What was left of the area was now dominated by 
state-centered theories. There was no real interest in look-
ing at questions like the effect of business on the political 
process. And this was related to a lack of interest in class, 
at least in the US. There was much more of a focus on race 
and gender inequality. 
Meanwhile, although my own work was becoming much 
more rigorous, my focus was getting more and more nar-
row. It was almost as if I was saying: well, I’ll do these very 
well crafted and very rigorous articles, I’ll get tenure, and 
then I’ll go back to working on the big questions. Except 
that one day I realized that this was the only thing I knew 
how to do anymore, the kind of articles that end up in the 
American sociological review or Administrative science 
quarterly. It’s a good way to advance your career, but it 
moves you away from the big questions. And there wasn’t 
as much interest in those questions anyway. 
What interest there was in these questions was coming 
from people in business schools, who were discovering 
social network analysis. They were saying: “You can look 
at these network ties and they will explain firm behavior!” 
Jerry Davis, who is now my colleague, was a graduate 
student at Stanford, and he was writing his paper on how 
interlock ties led to the diffusion of takeover defense plans 
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among American corporations. Another graduate student, 
from Carnegie Mellon, Pam Haunschild, wrote a paper 
showing that companies whose CEOs sat on the boards of 
companies that had recently made acquisitions were more 
likely to make acquisitions themselves. Because of this 
work, interlocks came to be a big deal among people in 
business schools. Sociologists weren’t interested anymore, 
but the business school people were. I had shown that 
connections among firms affected the firms’ political be-
havior, so I wondered if they affected their economic be-
havior as well. 
In the mid-1980s I had begun a project with Linda Stearns, 
whom I had known in graduate school. My dissertation 
focused on changes in network structures over time.  Linda 
had worked on capital dependence among firms over time, 
and it occurred to me that we should put the two togeth-
er. We had started by looking at the relations between 
financial dependence and interlocks. After my book came 
out, we wondered if maybe interlocks could predict firm 
financial behavior: if your company and my company have 
an interlock, maybe we influence each other about how 
we structure our financial portfolio, how much debt we 
use and how much equity. If we could show something 
like that, that even these economic and financial variables 
could be predicted by social ties, this would really show the 
value of economic sociology. We started to do that and we 
had some success. 
In the 1990s, the chief executive of one the largest US 
banks was someone who had a big interest in social sci-
ence, and he set up a research foundation, funded by the 
bank. The foundation put out a request for proposals, with 
the idea that you could get access to the bank and study it. 
Linda and I decided that this was too good an opportunity 
to pass up, and we were able to get one of these grants. 
We were interested in the question of risk, how it could be 
mitigated by social network ties. When we looked at how 
the bank operated, we started to talk with corporate 
bankers, the people who actually made deals with corpora-
tions, and we discovered that they had to use social net-
works inside the organization in order to get their deals 
closed. We ended up doing a study in which we inter-
viewed individual bankers. We got information about the 
structure of their networks, and we were able to show that 
the likelihood of them successfully closing a deal was a 
function of how sparse their networks were. You need to 
pull people together to approve your deal, and the more 
diverse your network is, the greater the probability you 
close the deal. This was consistent with Ron Burt’s argu-
ment about structural holes, that a sparse network gives 
you more resources and information. We published a cou-
ple of articles from this study and they received a certain 
amount of attention, but it was a long way from the early 
questions about class and power from which I started. But 
this is about the time I started thinking about the questions 
that frame my new book. 
4 It seems that in your most recent book 
you came back to these big questions 
you were interested in at the beginning 
of your career… Could you tell us a little 
bit more about the way you came back 
to these questions? 
During this period – this is the 1990s and maybe the early 
2000s – I was still on this path of producing these very 
well-crafted, rigorous studies, with a very clear and possi-
bly narrow focus. They weren’t narrow by conventional 
American sociological standards, they were pretty main-
stream, but they were narrow compared to the questions 
with which I originally started. I had applied for another 
grant from the National Science Foundation. It was a tight, 
solid proposal. One of the reviewers wrote: “this is a good 
proposal, we should fund it, there is nothing wrong with 
it”. Then the reviewer started criticizing me, saying: “this 
principal investigator is a full professor, and this is the kind 
of project an assistant professor should do,” that when 
you’re a full professor you should be thinking about 
broader topics, and doing bigger things, and taking risks. 
And that hurt, because I knew the reviewer was right. 
During these years, I had this nagging feeling in the back 
of my mind: am I really asking the big questions? I even 
wrote something in the conclusion of my 1992 book 
where I said that some critics might accuse me of ducking 
the big questions in this book, but I plead innocent, be-
cause I really was dealing with them, except that I’m not 
sure that I was. I had been thinking for a few years that I 
needed to do something that’s really exciting. 
For a long time, I had this idea that the American business 
community had developed a sort of false consciousness, in 
the Marxist sense that they did not operate in their own 
interest. If you take for example healthcare policy, unlike 
virtually the entire rest of the developed world, there was 
no national healthcare program in the US, except for the 
elderly. Private businesses had basically taken on the re-
sponsibility of providing healthcare for their employees. In 
the 1950s, when healthcare did not cost very much, it was 
not so much of a problem. But by the 1990s, healthcare 
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costs were skyrocketing, and it was putting a huge burden 
on private companies. They were aware of this, and they 
started saying that maybe we need something like a na-
tional policy. When Bill Clinton got elected, one of the first 
things he did was to propose a national healthcare plan. 
Originally, the American companies were supportive of 
this. But there was too much division among them. The far 
right had by then basically captured the Republican Party. 
They were strongly against anything Bill Clinton wanted to 
do. Big business originally supported Clinton’s healthcare 
plan, but then they were frightened out of it by the Repub-
licans in Congress. 
The other thing that struck me was when I thought back 
to the way the corporate elite had been in the 1950s and 
the 1960s. I was a little too young for the anti-war move-
ment, if I had been two or three years older I might have 
been sent to Vietnam, but I was still very critical of the war.  
In college and graduate school we thought that these 
business guys were the bad guys, that they were the ones 
who got us into Vietnam, that they were behind all of the 
racism and imperialism and all the other terrible things that 
the United States did. When we were studying corporate 
interlocks in those days, we were studying those people 
we thought were the bad guys. And yet when you look 
back at that time, by comparison to the present these 
people were pretty liberal. As one of the reviewer of my 
book put it, Chrystia Freeland, the modal position of the 
big business people from that time would now put them 
on the left wing of the Democratic Party. I had a feeling 
that part of the problem that we have in American politics, 
where it seems impossible to accomplish anything, is that 
big business can’t even act in its own interest, to save the 
system from which they are benefiting. 
This, of course, is a pretty broad claim, and I had no idea 
how I was going to do this work: where are my regression 
equations, what is my dependent variable, where is the 
network, how am I going to measure this network? In-
stead, I wrote the book as a historical narrative.  I wouldn’t 
call it pure history. I did use some archival data, but I did 
not spend three years in the archives. I would call it analyt-
ical history, where I have a framework and I try to make 
sense of historical events. I don’t think there is a lot of 
controversy about the facts that I report. But I have my 
own interpretation. 
5 Could you tell us a little bit more 
about this argument? 
The argument is that in the period after WWII, the elite 
members of the American business community had a more 
far-sighted perspective. The term they used was enlight-
ened self-interest. There was an organization called the 
Committee for Economic Development – they still exist but 
they are just a shadow of their former self – they were very 
prominent at the time. They included CEOs of important 
companies as well as academics. Originally the group was 
formed in 1942 to deal with questions about what was 
going to happen to the economy after WWII. It turned out 
that they continued during the 50s and beyond, develop-
ing positions on various issues. They were behind the Mar-
shall Plan, for example, the Employment Act of 1946, a 
bunch of legislation. By contemporary standards they were 
pretty liberal. They represented only a small part of the 
American business community, but they were the segment 
people listened to because they were the biggest corpora-
tions. They made their peace with Keynesian economics, 
they decided that the public needed to have enough pur-
chasing power to sustain the economy, so they needed to 
have high wages and low unemployment. These people 
didn’t love labor unions, no business people do, but they 
accepted them. They worked to find some kind of accom-
modation, which became known as the postwar capital-
labor accord. Some recent labor historians are now criticiz-
ing this idea, they say that there never was an accord, but I 
think they miss the point. Yes, business was always 
fighting labor, tooth and nail, but during that period there 
was what Ralf Dahrendorf called institutionalized class 
conflict. They were fighting, but they were not really trying 
to destroy the unions in the way they would do later on. 
They were fighting in a regularized, institutionalized 
framework. 
The argument I make is that the large companies were 
constrained to adopt this moderate approach by three 
forces. One is that the state was highly legitimate at the 
time. The American public thought that the state was a 
force for good. This was a result of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal. Because of this, the government had a certain 
degree of power, and business could not, like they do 
today, blame the government for everything, they had to 
accept an active government. The second force was orga-
nized labor, which was relatively strong at the time, not as 
strong as the European unions, but certainly much strong-
er than they are now. At a certain point in the 50s, 35% of 
the US labor force was unionized, which is a pretty high 
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percentage. And then the third factor, I argue, was the 
financial community. It is not that the banks controlled 
corporations, but the banks served as a consensus builder. 
If you look at the boards of directors of the big banks, they 
included what an old graduate school pal of mine, Jim 
Bearden, called the corporate all-stars. You could see the 
CEOs of a lot of major companies sitting on the boards of 
the big banks. Through these connections they forged a 
certain normative consensus. Sitting on a board and inter-
acting with people from other industries created a broader 
view of the world, which tended to create a more moder-
ate view as well, because you see the world from different 
perspectives. This was the third force that helped the busi-
ness community to be more cohesive. 
This system worked pretty well through the 50s and 60s. 
There was a lot of turmoil of course in the US, it is not like 
it was a completely stable and happy period, but the econ-
omy was booming, and the average real standard of living 
for an American family doubled between 1946 and 1970. 
The political system also worked in a way that it doesn’t 
work now: members of different political parties made 
deals, they accomplished things, the party that was out of 
power cooperated with the ruling party. The system 
worked pretty well. 
And then in the 1970s it all began to fall apart. There were 
a series of forces. The rest of the world had recovered from 
WWII, Japan, much of Europe, and particularly Germany. 
They started flooding the American market with manufac-
tured goods, which American consumers discovered were 
higher quality. American consumers started buy non-US 
cars. The big American companies had gotten soft because 
they had been in these highly concentrated markets where 
they did not face competition, which meant they did not 
have to innovate. In the 1970s they were now facing com-
petition, and they were completely unprepared for it. So 
they started to experience a crisis. There was an inflation-
ary pressure in the economy. There was the energy crisis of 
1973. The major institutions also began to experience a 
major crisis of legitimacy. As a result of the 1960s, Ameri-
cans began to dislike the government, but they began to 
dislike business as well. The heads of big corporations saw 
themselves as under siege. In order to deal with it they 
reorganized politically, but this time they allied themselves 
with the traditional conservatives. Where earlier they had 
not wanted anything to do with these people, now they 
decided to become allies. Meanwhile Keynesian economics 
was not working any more. We had high inflation and 
high unemployment simultaneously. 
What happened in the 1970s is that the corporate elite, 
aligned with the traditional conservatives, started to push 
back against the forces that had constrained it. They be-
came very aggressive in fighting against government regu-
lation. They became very aggressive going after labor un-
ions. By the time Ronald Reagan was elected, they had 
basically won. Labor was much weaker, business had 
stopped a series of progressive bills in Congress, and they 
had raised the question of whether the real problem of the 
American economy was insufficient supply, and insufficient 
productivity, rather than insufficient demand. 
6 So basically they won, in quite a short 
period of time. And one of the 
paradoxes of your argument is to say 
that once they won, then they became 
weaker. 
That’s a paradox, but I have to be careful: it’s not that they 
became weaker, it’s that they became ineffective on issues 
that required collective action. They had always been rela-
tively unified at the top. In the 1970s, business as a whole 
became unified. And by the 1980s, having won the war, 
having thrown off the basic sources of constraint, they no 
longer needed to be unified. It’s Simmel’s old external 
threat-internal cohesion argument: you get rid of the ex-
ternal threat, there is no need to be cohesive anymore. 
They got everything they wanted, so they started to push 
for their own interests. You start to see this in the 1980s, 
and you see it clearly in the 1986 tax reform. It is widely 
believed by many commentators that business lost in the 
1986 tax reform.  Some people said, I quote them in the 
book, that business could have won if they would have 
fought collectively, but they were too busy fighting for 
themselves. 
There are two other things that happened in the 1980s 
that were very important. First, the last source of cohesion 
among the corporate elite, the banks, fell out of the center 
of the network. There was a whole series of factors that 
led to this. They started experiencing economic difficulty 
because people found alternative ways to use their money, 
in mutual funds and money market funds, for example. 
Companies found alternative ways to finance themselves.  
They used commercial paper instead of borrowing from 
banks. The banks were weakened by this, so they started 
to act like investment banks, moving away from lending 
and toward fee-for-service activities. What’s interesting 
about this process is that you started to see these non-
financial CEOs dropping off the boards of the banks. So 
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the banks, for the first time in the history of interlocks 
going back to the 1870s, started to fall out of the center 
of the network. The second thing was in the mid-1980s 
there was an unprecedented acquisition wave, with a large 
number of hostile takeovers. Managers saw themselves as 
under siege. They were in a very precarious position. In the 
1950s, if you were a corporate president, you could sit back 
and think about the long term implications of your actions 
for the system. But in the 1980s, you could be out of work 
next month, because the company could be taken over, so 
you became much more focused on short term issues. You 
can see a drop in CEO tenure during this period. 
Because of these changes that occurred in the 1980s, the 
elite became fragmented. When they need to act collec-
tively, to deal with issues like healthcare, or the deficit, or 
taxation, recent events have shown that they are incapable 
of doing this, even for situations where it would be in their 
interest. They have completely lost control of the Republi-
can Party. When the shutdown occurred, they said “this is 
crazy, you cannot do this,” but the Republicans basically 
said to big business “screw you, we don’t care.” That would 
never have happened in the 1950s or 1960s. At an individu-
al level, these companies are very powerful. They can get a 
lot of favors, they lobby people in Congress, they get good 
deals for themselves. But for anything that requires them to 
act collectively, they are completely ineffectual. 
 
Book Reviews 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 15, Number 2 (March 2014) 
55 
Book Reviews
Book: David Graeber, 2011: Debt, the First 5,000 years. 
New York: Melville House Publishing 
Reviewer: Jongchul Kim, Columbia Law School,  
jongchul323@gmail.com  
David Graeber offers a new interpretation of the last 5,000 
years of Eurasian economic history. He explains how 
changes in the morality of debt and different ways of solv-
ing debt crises have resulted in a broad historical alterna-
tion between a credit economy and a money economy. 
According to Graeber, this relationship between morality, 
debt crises and the economy remains central to the current 
national and global economy. I believe the book is a must-
read for anyone who wants to understand not only history, 
but also the current global crisis. In this review, I focus on 
some of the theoretical contributions made by this rich and 
vivid work. 
The first theoretical contribution Graeber makes is one that 
has been well recognized by many readers. He criticizes 
conventional wisdom, according to which societies evolved 
from a barter economy to a money economy to a credit 
economy. According to this conventional wisdom, the 
barter economy was the first to emerge, and to overcome 
the difficulty of finding traders whose interests coincide, 
precious metals started being used as a medium of ex-
change. Here, the money economy emerged. And as some 
people began accumulating money, they started to lend it 
those who needed it for business enterprise or consump-
tion. Thus emerged the credit economy. Against this ac-
count, Graeber demonstrates that no society has ever been 
based on barter because barter was carried out between 
enemies or strangers. The actual historical sequence was 
from a human economy to a credit economy to a money 
economy. 
Second, Graeber demonstrates brilliantly how the role and 
social implications of money changed significantly during 
the transition from a credit economy to a money economy. 
The major change that Graeber identifies in this regard is 
very important to understanding what modern money is. In 
a human economy, mutual obligations between people 
were not transformed into the idea of debt, according to 
which everyone must pay what he or she owes. At that 
time, the modern idea that money can finally settle debt 
also did not exist. Rather, one important social implication 
and role of money in the human economy was to 
acknowledge the impossibility of clearing one’s debt. For 
example, when murder was committed and threatened to 
cause social discord, a community’s leaders arranged rec-
onciliation. The murderer was advised to pay money, and 
money here symbolized the impossibility of repaying what 
the murderer owed. But when, in the Axial Age, money 
was used to solve debt crises and the credit economy was 
transformed into the money economy, money acquired the 
opposite meaning – that it can finally clear one’s debt. This 
was the moment when the clear divergence between 
money and debt occurred. Money and debt became oppo-
sites. 
Third, Graeber provides a holistic view on the historical 
transition between types of economies that encompasses 
the relationship between warfare, morality, philosophy and 
the economy. Credit economies before capitalism created 
institutions to protect debtors, or often revived the social 
order by cancelling debts. But when the new moral idea – 
that everyone must pay what he or she owes – emerged, 
leaders attempted to solve debt crises by adopting money. 
This historical process of adopting money was full of war-
fare, violence and slavery. The warfare-coins-mining-slavery 
complex was accompanied by the new philosophy of ma-
terialism. Graeber’s excellent research connecting the war-
fare-coins-mining-slavery complex with materialism fits well 
with Lewis Mumford’s excellent research on the relation-
ship between mechanical technology, materialism, warfare 
and mining in modern times. 
Fourth, Graeber avoids a Eurocentric view of history. Most 
theoretical and historical research on money and debt 
compares primitive societies with modern capitalism and 
compares primitive money with modern money. This re-
search largely ignores how successfully, even if not perfect-
ly, societies during the Middle Ages outside Western Eu-
rope managed debt crises while promoting commerce and 
prosperity. This research thus fails to learn lessons from this 
relative success of non-European societies. According to 
Graeber, it was not coinage, but the new philosophies and 
religions of peace, that ultimately solved debt crises in 
these non-Western societies during the Middle Ages. These 
new religions seriously addressed the social dislocations intro-
duced by debt. In India, Asoka tried to re-found his kingdom 
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on Buddhism. In Rome, Constantine turned to Christianity. In 
China, the Han emperor Wu-Ti adopted Confucianism. In 
Islam was adopted in the near East. Relatively successful solu-
tions in the Middle Ages were achieved in the last two re-
gions, China and the Islam world, where the market pros-
pered and debt bondage was more or less successfully elimi-
nated. The least success occurred in Western Europe, where 
Christianity criminalized merchants and the market. Though 
Graeber does not say so, this least success might explain why 
Western Europe was the first region in the world to return to 
the earlier money-warfare-slavery-mining-materialism complex 
in modern times. 
Fifth, Graeber analyzes how the psychology of debt contribut-
ed to the most inhuman violence of early modern times, in-
cluding the massacre of Aztecs by Spanish conquistador Her-
nán Cortés. This argument, I think, deserves to be extended to 
explain the more systematic massacre of indigenous people 
committed by the United States in early modern times. 
Sixth, his rich and vivid interpretation allows us to look at history 
differently and to remedy the present theory of money and 
banking. Graeber has been able achieve this richness and vivid-
ness because he is free from any settled theory of money and 
any settled perspective of history. He is, in short, insightful and 
free. At the beginning of the book, he adopts a post-
Keynesian credit theory of money, but he freely chooses many 
other useful theoretical and historical findings that go against 
the post-Keynesian view. For example, his differentiation 
between a credit economy and a money economy goes 
against the post-Keynesian reduction of money to credit. He 
also rediscovers an important function of money – to finalize 
debt – when he discusses how coinage was introduced in the 
sixth century B.C. This function has come to be regarded as 
outdated and is thus no longer included in the famous triad of 
money’s functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of ac-
count and a store of value. Coinage was introduced as a 
solution to debt crises because money was institutionalized in 
order to finalize debt. This function differentiates money from 
credit and thus refutes the Post-Keynesian reduction of the 
latter to the former. 
Finally, Graeber’s most important contribution is to raise the 
issue of debt cancellation as a solution to the current global 
financial crisis. In a credit economy, a debt contract can be 
made between two equals, but it creates a relationship of 
inequality until the debtor fulfills his or her debt obligation. 
Historically, unpaid debts often contributed to transform-
ing a society from an egalitarian into an unequal, or hierar-
chical, one. Thus, in credit economies before capitalism, 
the cancellation of unpaid debts was often seen as recov-
ering the relationship of equality, strengthening the social 
order, and contributing to the maintenance of the credit 
economy. For example, in the Babylonian and Sumerian 
civilizations, in which the credit economy was highly devel-
oped, peasant debts were cancelled by emperors in a peri-
odic “redemption” or “Year of Jubilee.” In contrast, mod-
ern society considers strict debt obligations a supreme 
moral good and a way of securing the social order. Grae-
ber attributes the origin of the current crisis to this modern 
morality of debt. 
 
 
Book: Wolfgang Streeck, 2013: Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertag-
te Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus. Berlin: Suhr-
kamp. Engl. Transl.: Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of 
Democratic Capitalism. London/New York: Verso, 2014. 
Reviewer: Philip Mader, University of Basel,  
philmader@philmader.com  
Democratic capitalist societies have been “buying time” 
with money for the past four decades – first via inflation, 
then public debt, then privatised Keynesianism – but are 
running out of resources for postponing the inevitable 
crisis. As a result, we now find ourselves at a crossroads 
where capitalism and democracy part ways. That, in a 
nutshell, is the thesis of Wolfgang Streeck’s new book, 
currently only available in German, but soon to appear in 
English for publication with Verso as Buying Time: The 
Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. 
The book is based on a series of three Adorno Lectures 
given by the director of the Max Planck Institute for the 
Study of Societies (MPIfG) in the summer of 2012 at the 
renowned Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt. Its radi-
cal language and conclusions may be surprising for those 
who remember Streeck’s days as advisor to the “Bündnis 
für Arbeit” initiated by Germany’s former Chancellor Ger-
hard Schröder, which precipitated far-reaching labour 
market and social security reforms, or of Streeck’s de-
mands for institutional reforms to forge a more competi-
tive and flexible low-wage service sector in Germany mod-
elled on the USA (Der Spiegel, 1999). But crises bring new 
beginnings, and Streeck’s defense of democracy against its 
subjugation to the market is auspicious. His analysis of the 
economic, political and ideological straightjacket that 
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states have found themselves in, not just since the crisis 
but certainly more pronouncedly in its wake, ties together 
a revamped analysis of capitalism with a compelling cri-
tique of the “frivolous” politics of European integration. 
With some wit, a characteristic taste for good anecdotes, 
and great clarity Streeck studies the processes of the moy-
enne durée which produced the “consolidation state” as 
the supreme fulfilment of a Hayekian liberal market vision, 
and which brought us to the impasse of the current peri-
od. 
The book begins with a critical appraisal of how useful the 
Frankfurt School’s crisis theories from the 1960s and 1970s 
still are for explaining today’s crises. While their works are 
by no means invalidated, Streeck contends that yester-
year’s crisis theorists could scarcely imagine how long capi-
talist societies would be able to “buy time with money” 
and thereby continually escape the contradictions and 
tensions diagnosed by their theories of late capitalism. He 
explains the developments in Western capitalism since the 
1970s as “a revolt by capital against the mixed economy of 
the postwar era”; the disembedding of the economy being 
a prolonged act of 
successful resistance by the owners and managers of capital – 
the “profit-dependent” class – against the conditions which 
capitalism had had to accept after 1945 in order to remain 
politically acceptable in a rivalry of economic systems. (p. 26)* 
By the 1970s, Streeck argues, capitalism had encountered 
severe problems of legitimacy, but less among the masses 
(as Adorno and Horkheimer had expected) than among the 
capitalist class. Referring to Kalecki, he suggests that theo-
ries of crises have to refocus on the side of capital, under-
standing modern economic crises as capital “going on 
strike” by denying society its powers of investment and 
growth-generation. The 1970s crisis, and the pathways 
that led out of it, thus were the result of capital’s unwill-
ingness to become a mere beast of burden for the produc-
tion process – which many Frankfurt theorists had tacitly 
assumed would happen. Capital’s reaction to its impend-
ing domestication set in motion a process of “de-
democratising capitalism by de-economising democracy” 
(Entdemokratisierung des Kapitalismus vermittels 
Entökonomisierung der Demokratie), which ultimately 
brought about the specific and novel form of today’s crisis 
and its pseudo-remedies. 
The rest, as they say, is history. In the second part, Streeck 
outlines how public debt rose with the neoliberal revolu-
tion, something mainstream economics and public choice 
quickly and falsely explained away as an instance of the 
“tragedy of the commons” with voters demanding too 
much from the state. However, the rise in debt came in 
fact with a curtailment of the power of democracy over 
the state and the economy. First, the good old “tax state” 
was ideologically restrained – starving the beast – and 
gradually found itself rendered a meek “debtor state” 
increasingly impervious to any remaining calls for redistri-
bution by virtue of its objective impotence. Then, the re-
sulting power shift to what Streeck calls the state’s “sec-
ond constituency” – the creditor class, which asserts con-
trol over its stake in public debt and demands “bondholder 
value” – generated a standoff which Streeck observes 
between the conflicting demands of Staatsvolk und 
Marktvolk. The fact that the debtor state owes its subsist-
ence less to contributions from the taxpaying “state peo-
ple” and more to the trust of its creditor “market people” 
leads to a situation in which debtor states must continually 
credibly signal their prioritisation of creditors’ demands, 
even if it harms growth and welfare. Creditors, in their 
conflict with citizens, aim to secure fulfillment of their 
claims in the face of (potential) crises. The ultimate power 
balance remains unclear, but the “market people’s” trump 
card is that they can mobilise other states to fulfil their 
demands, leading to a kind of international financial di-
plomacy in their interest. 
The archetype of such a transnational financial diplomacy, 
Streeck contends in the third and final part, is Europe un-
der the Euro, where we encounter an even more wretched 
type: the “consolidation state”. Consolidation, Streeck 
argues, is a process of state re-structuring to better match 
the expectations of financial markets, and the consolida-
tion state is a sort of perverse antithesis to the Keynesian 
state, acting in vain appeasement of the financial markets 
in hope of one day again being permitted to grow its 
economy. Its story begins with Friedrich Hayek, whose 
1939 essay The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federal-
ism Streeck presents as a strikingly accurate blueprint for 
the modern European Union, complete with references to 
the common market as assuring interstate peace. The 
European “liberalisation machine” slowly and successively 
shrank the national-level capacity for discretionary inter-
vention in markets; but it was European Monetary Union 
which ultimately rendered one of the last powerful (yet 
blunt) instruments available to states impracticable: curren-
cy devaluation. The resulting multi-level regime, a regime 
built on an unshakable belief in European “Durchre-
gierbarkeit” (roughly: the capacity to govern Europe) and 
Book Reviews 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 15, Number 2 (March 2014) 
58 
driven by a bureaucratic centre (or centres) increasingly 
well-insulated from democratic meddling, completes the 
actual European consolidation state of the early 21st cen-
tury. Within this kind of hollowed-out supra-state, individ-
ual countries have to fulfil their duties to pay before ful-
filling any duties to protect; initiatives like Hollande’s abor-
tive “growth pact” are mere political showmanship. In the 
present framework, even more substantial programmes 
would be likely to fail, Streeck argues with reference to 
Germany’s and Italy’s huge and hugely unsuccessful re-
gional growth programmes. Stemming the decline of 
southern Europe with transfer payments while adhering to 
monetary union with Germany is as much an impossibility 
as it is fuel for future discord. 
Now, with tighter financial means, the cohesion of the Brussels 
bloc of states depends on hopes invested in neoliberal ‘struc-
tural adjustment’ with a parallel neutralisation of national 
democracies by supranational institutions and a targeted 
cultivation of local support through ‘modern’ middle classes 
and state apparatuses, who see their future in western Europe-
an ways of business and life. Additional packages for structural 
reform, stimulus and growth from the centre are mainly of 
symbolic value, serving as discussion fodder for the greater 
public and for the mise-en-scène of summit decisions, as well 
as for politically and rhetorically absorbing whatever is left 
over of social democracy. Finally, puny as these may be finan-
cially, they can also be used to distribute loyalty premiums and 
patronage to local supporters: instruments of elite co-optation 
by doling out advantages in the Hayekisation process of Euro-
pean capitalism and its state system. (p. 203) 
What can be done? It would be wrong to describe 
Streeck’s conclusions as optimistic. The capacity of popula-
tions or politicians to resist the imperatives of the consoli-
dation state appears small, even where he argues that 
popular opposition is key, pointing to some rays of light in 
recent social movements. Streeck characterises present 
capitalist society as a “deeply divided and disorganised 
society, weakened by state repression and numbed by the 
products of a culture industry which Adorno could hardly 
have imagined even in his most pessimistic moments” (p. 
217). It is furthermore politically held in check by a trans-
national plutocracy which has far greater sway over par-
liaments and parties than citizens. Given the likely failure 
of the consolidation state at restoring normality, we have 
thus arrived at a crossroads where capitalism and democ-
racy must go their separate ways. 
The likeliest outcome, as of today, would be the completion of 
the Hayekian social model with the dictatorship of a capitalist 
market economy protected against democratic correctives. Its 
legitimacy would depend on those who were once its Staatsvolk 
learning to accept market justice and social justice as one and 
the same thing, and understand themselves as part of one 
unified Marktvolk. Its stability would additionally require 
effective instruments to ensure that others, who do not want to 
accept this, can be ideologically marginalised, politically dis-
organised and physically kept in check. […] The alternative to 
a capitalism without democracy would be democracy without 
capitalism, at least without capitalism as we know it. This 
would be the other utopia, contending with Hayek’s. But in 
contrast, this one wouldn’t be following the present historical 
trend, and rather would require its reversal. (p. 236) 
Small acts of resistance, Streeck notes, can throw a span-
ner in the works, and the system is more vulnerable than it 
may appear; the Draghis and Bernankes still fear nothing 
more than social unrest. For Streeck, projects of democra-
tising Europe, calls for which have recently gained momen-
tum, can hardly work in a Europe of diverging interests. 
They would have to be implemented top-down, and fur-
thermore have to succeed both amidst a deep (public) 
legitimacy crisis of Europe and against an already firmly 
embedded neoliberal programme with a decades-long 
head-start. (Streeck and Habermas publicly clashed over 
this issue in 2013). 
Streeck places his highest hopes in restoring options for 
currency devaluation via a kind of European Bretton 
Woods framework; “a blunt instrument – rough justice –, 
but from the perspective of social justice better than noth-
ing” (p. 247). A newly flexible currency regime would re-
open some alternatives to “internal devaluation” and 
thereby permit a more heterogeneous political economy 
within Europe to match “cultural differences”. The Euro as 
a “frivolous experiment” needs to be undone, Streeck 
claims. But would that really mean a return to social jus-
tice? States like Great Britain or Switzerland hardly suggest 
a linkage, least of all an automatic one. Furthermore, de-
clines in real wages from currency devaluation can mirror 
those of internal devaluation, merely with the difference of 
how politically expensive the process is (and it would still 
likely be central bankers, not democratic institutions, tak-
ing the decision). A return to national currencies looks like 
an easy way out, short of political-economic transfor-
mations for restoring some semblance of social justice to 
capitalism. Nonetheless, Streeck’s is a forceful argument in 
favour of preserving what vestiges remain of national sov-
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ereignty in face of capitalism’s attacks on democracy, as 
tools for gradually pushing back the transnational regime 
of market sovereignty. He concludes that the greatest 
threat to Western Europe today is not nationalism, but 
“Hayekian market liberalism” – whether the one could be 
the dialectical product of the other remains another ques-
tion. 
Above all the analysis of capital as a collective player capa-
ble of acting with guile (Williamson) to ensure capitalism 
remains in its better interests – intellectual traces of 
Streeck’s days as a scholar of collective bargaining, perhaps 
– is one of the most innovative approaches to understand-
ing the class dimension of the political economy of the 
present crisis. Streeck’s anatomy of the type of regime we 
increasingly have to deal with, the consolidation state 
moulded to address capital’s own legitimacy crisis yet sacri-
ficing democratic legitimacy in the process, perhaps offers 
the most cogent picture of the present multi-level political 
economy of debt in Europe (and beyond). Taking back the 
consolidation state and re-appropriating democracy from 
capitalism’s clutches at the crossroads, of course, is a task 
beyond the reach of any book. 
Endnotes 
*All quotations are the reviewer’s own translations from the 
German original. 
 
The Origin of Social Species: 
Organizational Novelty as a Matter of 
Autocatalysis and Network 
Transformations 
Book: Padgett, John F./Walter W. Powell (eds), 2012: The 
Emergence of Organizations and Markets. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, xxii + 583 pages, ISBN 978-0-
691-14887-8. 
Reviewer: Guido Möllering, Jacobs University Bremen, 
g.moellering@jacobs-university.de  
Stromatolites, evidence of the earliest life forms, adorn the 
cover of Padgett and Powell’s (2012) The Emergence of 
Organizations and Markets and the first chapter begins 
with a reference to Charles Darwin: His “question of the 
origin of species is worth posing and exploring as much in 
the social sciences as it was in biology” (p. 1). Biological 
analogies and metaphors have been drawn upon exten-
sively to make sense of social and political phenomena at 
least since Aesop’s fable of the belly and the other parts 
of the body. In organization theory, this is most evident in 
the population ecology literature but also in various 
shades of systems theory and contingency theory. Padgett 
and Powell provide a new landmark statement in this 
naturalistic tradition as they get serious about the ques-
tion of origin, i.e. novelty and emergence, and about 
applying autocatalysis from biochemistry. 
The book is an edited volume with an introduction and 
coda by the two editors Padgett and Powell, six chapters 
by John Padgett alone, two chapters by Padgett and alto-
gether three co-authors, three chapters by Woody Powell 
and four co-authors, and six chapters by neither Padgett 
nor Powell but thirteen other authors. The book is divided 
into four parts. The first two parts on “Autocatalysis” and 
“Early Capitalism and State Formation” are Padgett’s 
terrain, Part III on “Communist Transitions” then opens 
the floor to other contributors, followed by Part IV on 
“Contemporary Capitalism and Science” with chapters by 
Powell and others (see below). The chapters are all new 
but some of them are extensions, revisions or abridged 
versions of prior publications. Institutionally, the book 
project originated from a research project at the Santa Fe 
Institute. In sum, the book is a collective accomplishment, 
rooted primarily in the editors’ own previous work, and a 
combined stock-taking and programmatic effort. 
The more programmatic statements are to be found, un-
surprisingly, in the opening and closing chapters co-
authored by the editors. The opening chapter (Chapter 1) 
places the book’s focus on the understanding of historical 
emergence of organizational novelty in processes of trans-
formation. Padgett and Powell identify autocatalysis as the 
foundational concept they use to devise “biochemically 
inspired models … [that] provide an analytical framework 
for specifying with some precision the social science prob-
lem of emergence” (p. 2). They call for a relational and 
historical turn of mind, which includes sensibility toward 
long term and short term dynamics and co-evolution of 
social networks with organizations as actors whose rela-
tions constitute markets. The common analytical frame for 
the book, as laid out in the opening chapter, links a net-
work analytical approach with three types of autocatalysis 
and eight mechanisms of organizational genesis: transpo-
sition and refunctionality; anchoring diversity; incorpora-
tion and detachment; migration and homology; conflict 
displacement and dual inclusion; purge and mass mobili-
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zation; privatization and business groups; and robust ac-
tion and multivocality. Clearly, there is a lot to each of 
these mechanisms and they are not self-explanatory, but 
Padgett and Powell manage to introduce all of them very 
effectively within a few pages. They also single out issues 
of structural vulnerability and multiple-network poisedness 
as the key challenges for further research in this area. In 
their closing chapter (Coda), the editors do not mention 
autocatalysis anymore when they reinforce the need for 
deep longitudinal research on network evolution and the 
dynamics of multiple networks, for instance different 
types of spillover or relationships as signs of discernment. 
Between the opening and closing chapter, the main parts 
are usefully linked by short introductions that relate back 
to conceptual themes. 
All contributions are extremely rich, based on impressive 
research efforts and marvelous to read but impossible to 
summarize here. Hence, I will provide only a few observa-
tions related to the framework set up by the editors. Part I 
has three chapters by John Padgett, one co-authored with 
Peter McMahan and Xing Zhong. These chapters intro-
duce the reader to the foundational concept of autocatal-
ysis and the application of research on the origins of life to 
organizations (as “one form of life”, p. 31). It is interest-
ing to note that Chapter 2 includes a section in which 
Padgett comments on the apparent similarity of autocatal-
ysis and autopoiesis, only to distance his approach from 
the latter (“Maturana-Varela and Luhmann have taken a 
good idea and have run off with it in the wrong direc-
tion”, pp. 55-56). Chapters 3 and 4 are very technical in 
borrowing from chemistry but fortunately accessible and 
meaningful, which merely left me wondering if I had been 
reading a “chemistry for non-chemists” text, knowing 
how such books tend to avoid the tricky (i.e. truly interest-
ing) issues. I would have liked to see a natural scientist 
authoring one of the chapters in this part, for example 
Walter Fontana or Sanjay Jain who have been involved in 
the Santa Fe program. 
Part II on “Early Capitalism and State Formation” starts off 
the historical case studies that are typical for this book and 
true to its commitment to deep, longitudinal analyses of 
organizational novelty, mostly based on network data 
gathered by various means. In this part, John Padgett 
presents his work on corporate merchant-banks in 13th-
century Tuscany (Chapter 5), partnership systems in late 
14th-century Florence (Chapter 6, abridged from an 
American Journal of Sociology article with Paul McLean), 
joint-stock companies in the 16th-century Netherlands 
(Chapter 7), and Bismarck’s dual-inclusion governance in 
19th-century Germany (Chapter 8, with Jonathan Obert as 
first author). Noteworthy and, perhaps, food for thought 
across the four chapters is that in all cases wars were a 
prerequisite disruption for organizational novelty to 
emerge and, related to this, there was a need for “new 
people” following a disruption of individual and inter-
twined biographies. 
Another chapter by Padgett (Chapter 9) leads over to Part 
III on “Communist Transitions” and compares communist 
economic reforms in the Soviet Union and China in the 
last century. In Chapter 10, Andrew Spicer looks at Boris 
Yeltsin’s rapid mass privatization policy and how new 
organizational forms in the Russian banking sector deviat-
ed from the designs originally intended by the reforms. 
The Russian mobile telecom market, analyzed in Chapter 
11 by Valery Yakubovich and Stanislav Shekshnia, under-
went similarly unplanned transformations when domestic 
business owners and foreign investors started to interact. 
And in the last chapter of this part (Chapter 12), David 
Stark and Balázs Vedres extend their network analysis of 
foreign investment in post-communist Hungary to the 
issue of political ties and different network sequence 
pathways. The notion of recombination is very prominent 
in this part of the book. While the previous part highlight-
ed deep disruptions, such as wars, this part emphasizes 
that emergence of organizational novelty assumes trans-
formations that are no clean breaks from the past but 
developments of previous elements that spill over into 
each other and may “tip” at some point into a new form, 
dependent on the system’s “poisedness.” The more re-
cent historical cases presented in this part support this 
fundamental autocatalytic principle with rich empirical 
material and sophisticated methods. 
Part IV on “Contemporary Capitalism and Science” is 
Woody Powell’s part, if you like, as three out of six chap-
ters are co-authored by him and this part is rooted very 
much in network analysis rather than in the autocatalysis 
frame. All chapters report empirical studies from science- 
and technology-based sectors. These studies continue on 
the theme of “novelty routinely involves the reassembly of 
preexisting elements” (p. 375) and offer deeper insights 
into why some recombinations succeed, while others fail, 
in terms of producing a viable new organizational species, 
such as the “dedicated biotech firm” (Chapter 13 by 
Powell and Sandholtz) and in different geographical re-
gions (Chapter 14 by Powell, Packalen and Whittington; 
Chapter 17 by Fleming, Colfer, Marin and McPhie). Chap-
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ter 15 by Powell and Owen-Smith looks at the emergence 
of “open elite” organizations in life sciences that trans-
cend the boundaries of public and private science with 
their multiconnectivity and multifunctionality. Also related 
to life sciences but using agent-based modeling, Chapter 
16 by Colyvas and Maroulis extends previous work by 
Colyvas and Powell on the Stanford model of academic 
entrepreneurship. This chapter applies the formal model 
of autocatalysis from Chapter 3 and shows that academics 
embrace patenting as a new proprietary practice, some-
what surprisingly, in order to preserve their scientific au-
tonomy from commercial influences. As found in earlier 
parts of the book, people who share information and 
make career moves are identified as important carriers of 
the autocatalytic processes of organizational emergence 
(e.g. Chapter 17). This also applies to the last chapter 
before the coda (Chapter 18) in which Ferraro and 
O’Mahony study an open source community and prob-
lematize the notion of “openness” as this new organiza-
tional form was actually enabled by an emergent group of 
gatekeepers. 
Padgett and Powell have long-standing affiliations with 
the Santa Fe Institute (SFI) and they co-directed an SFI 
program on the co-evolution of markets and states. The 
book documents their personal and joint achievements in 
the SFI context. Any social scientist who has spent some 
time at the institute can relate to the magic of that place, 
up the hill, lucent, quiet, with dry-wipe ink on glass panes, 
breakfast burritos and infectious Nobel aspirations, where 
even social scientists are taken seriously as long as they 
play along in the search for fundamental principles. SFI is a 
shining example of transdisciplinarity evidenced, yet again, 
by The Emergence of Organizations and Markets. Readers 
will have to judge for themselves, if autocatalysis should 
spill over as a fundamental principle that will reproduce 
itself as an explanation of social phenomena. It’s likely, 
even if biochemists still nag that the social scientists’ grasp 
of the matter is patchy and that our applications are too 
flawed to be more than analogies. On the other hand, the 
book itself gradually detaches from its biochemistry foun-
dations along the way and gives primacy to network theo-
ry. In this, the contributors rarely look left or right to dis-
cuss alternative theories of dynamics in organizations and 
markets that are not grounded in natural science or net-
work analysis, such as theories of culture, discourse, fields, 
entrepreneurship, institutions, value and others. Nonethe-
less, Padgett and Powell have put together an imposing 
positive theoretical and empirical account of organization-
al novelty that bears even the potential to inspire the nat-
ural sciences in return, irrespective of any remaining 
qualms on the part of less naturalistic social scientists. 
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Ph.D. Projects in Economic Sociology
Making Brownfields Green: 
Commodification and Valuation of 
Urban Spaces 
Institution: CSO, CNRS, Centre de Sociologie des organi-
sations, SciencesPo, Paris 
Author: Marie Piganiol, marie.piganiol@sciences-po.org  
European metropolises are increasingly constrained by 
international climate agreements to reduce global warm-
ing. Since the 1990’s, protocols have defined a set of solu-
tions to reduce urban energy consumption. Making inner 
cities denser and greener is one of the common remedies 
identified for curbing urban sprawl, decreasing car gas 
emissions and transforming city-dwellers’ habits. Indeed, 
over the past ten years, Sweden and Germany have devel-
oped renowned green housing programs in their town 
centres. Following these urban trends, French cities have 
recently launched eco-neighbourhood projects that are 
essentially made up of green buildings (housing, businesses 
and shops), green equipment (renewable energy technolo-
gies, public transportation networks, green heating sys-
tems, recycling facilities, among others) and parks. Most of 
them are extremely extensive urban projects that are often 
built upon former industrial sites. The scarcity of available 
land in the centre leads local authorities to set up eco-
neighbourhood projects on transitional areas. 
Turning these “brownfields” into green real-estate pro-
grams is a complex and contentious process. Many public 
and private actors are involved in the renewal of industrial 
lands: land owners, city councils, state ministries and agen-
cies, real-estate developers, urban developers, architects, 
experts, industrial firms and construction companies are 
among the main players engaged in the valuation of these 
particular spaces. They use diversified resources to requalify 
and commodify lands, to reconfigure the urban environ-
ment, and to define and singularize the features of the 
real-estate supply. 
Based on long-term fieldwork among real-estate develop-
ers and organizational interviews with the above-
mentioned players, our research questions the way they 
use environmental issues to create economic value on land 
and housing markets. In fact, environmental concerns are 
far from anecdotic and are increasingly used as principles of 
commodification and valuation in urban economies. For 
example, both landlords and buyers now consider soil pollu-
tion as a key criterion to set the price of land. As sanitary 
issues gain momentum, environmental experts have devel-
oped sophisticated tools to economicize pollution. Indeed, 
remediation is central to the requalification process of indus-
trial lands and its cost has deep implications on the valuation 
and configuration of eco-neighborhoods. Another example 
illustrates the way environmental issues and urban econo-
mies are intertwined. In the past five years, institutional 
investors specialized in business real-estate have translated 
green accreditations into investment financial models. Archi-
tects, real-estate developers, construction firms and engi-
neering companies promote greener practices, while inves-
tors consider green building a safer investment. 
The dissertation studies the political and economic implica-
tions of eco-neighbourhoods. On the one hand, institu-
tional actors see these projects as popular and convenient 
political measures that combine urban policies defined at 
different organizational levels. While examining the in-
struments deployed by central and local public actors in 
eco-neighbourhoods, we found evidence that these devic-
es are increasingly based on market mediation strategies. 
Furthermore, our work shows that these high-profit pro-
grams are embedded in broader industrial policies. Indeed, 
they foster both the construction and real-estate sectors, 
and encourage technological innovation. As such, they 
encourage the development of green industrial devices and 
the growth of markets for environmental expertise. 
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European energy industry 
restructuration through French firms 
competitive strategies. The State as a 
ressource for large firms in the 
contemporary capitalism. 
Institution: SciencesPo, CSO/CNRS, Centre de Sociologie 
des organisation 
Author: Scott Viallet-Thévenin,  
scott.vialletthevenin@sciences-po.org  
The State plays a central role in the literature of economic 
sociology. One of the main reasons is that the rules enact-
ed by the State shape markets. We know from the North 
American literature that the State produces rules, which 
are necessary to the functioning of the economy (Fligstein, 
1993; Dobbin, 2009), because economic actors can rely on 
these rules to make projections about the future (Beckert, 
2009). But this perspective reduces the State to some of its 
functions, the very functions neoliberal economists have 
been pleading for: a regulator protecting competitors from 
themselves. But the initiatives implemented by the gov-
ernment have – at least in France – always exceeded this 
single role. Moreover, the processes leading to the adop-
tion of certain rules have not been in the focus of econom-
ic sociologists, and these processes should be analyzed 
together with the consequences they have on firms, in 
order to account for the interactions between large firms 
and the government. If political scientists focused largely 
on economic initiatives led by the State, such as nationali-
zation programs or Keynesian reforms, the most convinc-
ing works are old (Hall, 1989) and do not take firms seri-
ously into account. The varieties of capitalism school 
(Hall/Soskice, 2001) has been trying to overcome this limi-
tation by placing firms at the center of their analysis. Ac-
cording to recent studies (Culpepper, 2006) in France, the 
role of the State has been declining since the 1990s, to the 
point that firms are replacing the State in many of its func-
tions. While following the perspective placing the firms at 
the center of the economy, I nevertheless make the as-
sumption that economic reforms are defined through a 
process that includes both the firms concerned and the 
State. In order to account for this, we need to choose a 
level of analysis between the micro level and the macro 
level, such as that which characterizes studies describing 
the evolutions of the Fortune 500. The industry level seems 
appropriate. To account for the role of the State, we need 
to choose an industry characterized by a strong tradition of 
State intervention, such as the energy industry in France. 
I therefore focus my field work on the energy industry 
reforms that have taken place in France over the last twen-
ty years. The energy industry has been characterized by the 
strong – even hegemonic – place of the State, which struc-
tured the industry according to its energy policy for the last 
several decades. At the beginning of the 1990’s, the sector 
was quite concentrated with less than a dozen firms con-
centrating more than 80% of the revenue. Such a struc-
ture enables a precise depiction of each company at the 
management committee level. Furthermore, the rules of 
the game started to change from 1986, with the begin-
ning of the privatization of Elf, the leading French oil and 
gas company at the time. In 1993, Total (Elf’s main com-
petitor) and Elf were privatized. The more recent develop-
ments modifying the structure of the energy industry can-
not be understood outside of the European context. The 
European energy industry, traditionally organized on nation-
al and often public bases, has undergone a radical liberaliza-
tion movement to comply with the economic philosophy of 
the Maastricht Treaty, based on the free movement of peo-
ple, capitals, goods and services (Chevalier/Percebois, 2008). 
The 1996, 1997 and 2003 European guidelines concerning 
electricity and natural gas have introduced structural up-
heavals, especially in France, where the energy industry has 
long been characterized by a tradition of public monopolies. 
These markets, organized until then on the basis of local or 
national monopolies, have been brutally confronted with a 
spectacular shift to the rules of competition. This transfor-
mation has significantly modified the strategies of the main 
firms in this sector or, as Fligstein (1990) would put it, their 
conception of control. In order to face the stagnation in 
demand during the 1990's, European energy firms in over-
capacity have been looking for outlets beyond their natural 
monopoly territories. 
My dissertation aims at understanding the relationship 
between large firms and the State. It primarily consists of 
mapping the main decision-making centers in the energy 
industry, both in the government and in the companies. 
Based on semi-structured interviews conducted with high-
ranking civil servants and executive managers, archive 
materials, and a thorough press review, I intend to analyze 
both the strategies formulations of firms and the economic 
reforms led by the government under the constraints im-
posed at the European level. I intend to complete my un-
derstanding of the firms’ environment with a network 
analysis of their alliances across Europe. I will show that 
during the 1990s and the 2000s, high-level civil servants 
and company executives have worked together to protect 
the largest firms by helping them reach a “critical size”. 
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Having identified the relevant decision-making centers, I 
mean to identify the shared representations and primary 
institutions giving shape to the field. In the government, 
high-ranking civil servants have acted consistently in favor 
of the most powerful companies during the last decades, 
even if their profile changed and their formal role evolved 
at the beginning of the millennium. They have helped the 
growth of these firms in order to achieve a critical mass yet 
to be reached. This institutionalized relationship rests on 
various supports. The high-level civil servants come from the 
same corps d’Etat as the executive managers. Interacting on 
a daily basis with company representatives, they share the 
same ideas about what should be done. It is also in their 
interest to act in favor of the firms because these companies 
can provide them with future career opportunities, given the 
hierarchical structure of the French administration. 
I have identified substantial changes in the leadership of 
the companies, particularly in the careers of the executive 
managers. In the past, top managers tended to be former 
civil servants, recruited partly because of their social capital. 
During the last twenty years, their profile has changed 
dramatically: many of them have been working in the 
private sector over their entire career. Interestingly, the 
strong minority of those coming from the public sector 
now comes significantly more from ministerial advisors. I 
expect these changes to be linked to the changes identi-
fied through the press review and the first interviews con-
ducted with former civil servants: an intensification of 
competition between the operators through merger and 
acquisition operations abroad and in their lobbying of the 
government. 
 
 
Formulations of the Public Interest. The 
Pricing of Electricity in Postwar France 
(1946-1964) 
Institution: Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation, École 
des Mines de Paris, France 
Author: Guillaume Yon, guillaume.yon@mines-paristech.fr  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the production 
and distribution of electricity were nationalized in France. 
The 1,390 private companies that existed at the time were 
replaced by a public monopoly, Électricité de France (EDF). 
Its management became the responsibility of state engi-
neers (Corps des Ponts-et-Chaussées, Corps des Mines). 
These experts were expected to apply welfare economics 
principles to policy-making in the electric utility sector. In 
short, they were in charge of solving through science the 
political disputes that were arising over the idea of nation-
alization. To do so, these engineer-economists (Marcel 
Boiteux, Pierre Massé, Gabriel Dessus) mobilized the most 
sophisticated theory of their times: Maurice Allais’ théorie 
du rendement social. Through their work on the French 
electricity sector, they made a significant contribution to 
the development of economic thought. What they did 
seems to be based on an objective description of market 
equilibrium and of the laws of supply and demand. This 
discourse is part of the work carried out by the engineer-
economists. However, we want to show that it does not 
properly describe their actual practices. This dissertation 
carefully examines the progressive construction of the main 
management device of the firm: the pricing of electricity, 
completed in the 1960s. Within EDF, economic calculation 
served as a negotiation and intervention tool. It clarified 
the distribution of roles between the state and the mo-
nopoly. It made the construction of a highly complex 
course of action understandable and workable. Through 
the whole national territory, the production, distribution, 
and consumption of electricity were coordinated despite a 
number of complications, such as peaked and stochastic 
demand and production uncertainties. 
This alternative account relies upon a rich body of litera-
ture. With the notion of performativity Michel Callon 
(2007) showed that economic theories are not distant 
descriptions of the laws of the market. They actively build 
and develop new agencements. More recently, Bruno 
Latour (2012) elaborated a definition of the economy that 
suspends the naturalistic account (the economy as a free-
standing object with its own mechanisms: a natural phe-
nomenon) in order to open debate on the composition of 
the common world. We propose to broaden these ap-
proaches by focusing on the issue of truth in economics. 
The EDF engineers-economists elaborated economic theo-
ries and lead demonstrations that were considered to be 
true. Analyzing the kind of knowledge they produced 
allow us to show how economics is used to explore, nego-
tiate and solidify formulations of the public interest. 
The dissertation explores the meaning of this notion – for-
mulation of the public interest – through an investigation in 
the EDF archives. Their high level of details enables us to 
conduct an ethnographic analysis similar to laboratory eth-
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nographies (Latour 2009 presents the use of this method for 
historical inquiries). This methodology pays close attention to 
the emergence of new actors and to the configuration of 
their competences through trials. Based on the organization 
of EDF archives, we start the account with the most theoret-
ical operations performed by the engineers-economists, and 
then we follow the numerous feedback loops between 
theory and practice, between the realm of academic papers 
and the concrete EDF pricing formula. 
The first part of the dissertation shows that economic cal-
culation redefined what public interest meant for the elec-
tricity sector. Through the adoption of marginal cost pric-
ing (selling at marginal cost means fixing a price equivalent 
to the cost of producing one additional unit) the consumer 
has an incentive to minimize the waste of EDF factors of 
production. According to the engineer-economists, the 
scarcity of those factors was the main issue for the public 
monopoly in this period of postwar reconstruction. Moreo-
ver, marginal cost pricing prevented the state from using 
electricity pricing as an indirect tax. And it avoided any abuse 
of EDF monopoly power. Here, we refer to the work done 
by Mary Morgan (2012) and demonstrate that economic 
modelling is not a description of the necessities or the “iron 
laws” of interest. Models redefine actors, roles and respon-
sibilities in order to address specific problems (e.g. resource 
scarcity) and to exclude others (e.g. industrial policy). 
Progressively, the engineer-economists reorganized the 
productive process and the qualification of goods in order 
to stabilize behaviours, or more precisely to (re)distribute 
agency (Callon 2013). The process of formulating the pub-
lic interest cannot be reduced to a mere simulation on 
paper, nor to a linear application of the theory. It is a dy-
namic series of resistances and accommodations to the 
materiality of the good (Bidet 2010). The second part of 
the dissertation shows, for instance, that in 1952, the 
engineer-economists were looking to spread out the 
peaks. By manipulating the load curve, they wanted to 
fund the future development of plant capacities. This for-
mulation of the public interest is quite different from that 
of 1946. An adaptation to the particular technical features 
of the electricity sector occurred in-between. Economic 
truth relies on the capacity of holding together a large set 
of constraints while laying out a course of action. 
The third and last part of the dissertation shows that stake-
holders can then discuss this course of action. They can ex-
press new requirements and consequently reopen the process 
of calculation (Henry 1984). Against marginalist orthodoxy, 
the treasury imposed a balanced budget constraint, a rule that 
the first pricing project did not fulfil. The representatives of 
small rural municipalities promoted price equality between the 
cities and the countryside in each département (French territo-
rial division). This claim for territorial solidarity opposed the 
strict computation of marginal transportation costs. Once 
reconnected to the practical problems it seeks to solve, eco-
nomics is no more the unquestionable displacement from 
necessity to necessity, but a tool for the negotiation of the 
ends and the means of organized action. 
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Regulating industries through markets: 
The social construction of a market for 
electric cars 
Institution: SciencesPo Bordeaux, Centre Emile Durkheim 
 
Author: Axel Villareal, axel.villareal@ens-canchan.fr  
 
Along with other ongoing research in political science led 
by Andy Smith and Bernard Jullien (2008, 2011), this PhD 
dissertation sets out to review the nature and the shape of 
PhD Projects 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 15, Number 2 (March 2014) 
66 
the links between politics, defined as what relates to the 
collective and values (Lagroye et al., 2006), and an indus-
try, defined as an institutional order made of four institu-
tionalised relationships, i.e., sourcing, marketing, labour 
and finance (Jullien/Smith, 2008, 2011). Consequently, it 
focuses principally upon the different processes behind the 
construction of the electric car market in order to identify 
the collective action that has produced standards, rules 
and new institutions, involving both public and private 
actors. My two main objectives are, on the one hand, to 
determine why, how and with what effects a market for 
electric cars was socially and politically constructed in 
France and Europe between 2008 and 2013. On the other 
hand, I try to assess the impact of public policy instruments 
(Lascoumes/Le Galès, 2005) on the architecture of the 
automotive market (Fligstein, 2001). 
To do so, a new theoretical framework has been estab-
lished to analyse the industry and the market and, in so 
doing, avoid the pitfall of excessively formal conceptions 
that reduce “politics” to state intervention (Fligstein, 1990, 
2001; Garcia-Parpet, 2009; Dobbin/Dowd, 2000) or only 
what is commonly labelled “political” (elections, monetary 
policy, etc.). Instead, this framework has guided my re-
search to pay particular attention to the construction of 
representations and values that drive the behaviour of 
political and economic actors, while highlighting how 
these two categories of actors collaborate over such con-
structions (Hassenteufel, 2011). 
We have thus chosen to analyse the social construction of 
the electric car market in Europe through the prism of its 
representations and what Jens Beckert calls fictional expec-
tations (Beckert, 2013). By explaining the political work 
(Jullien/Smith, 2008) carried out by the actors involved in 
this construction, we want to show how these representa-
tions became institutionalized within the industry and have 
given birth to a new market that appears to be encourag-
ing the transformation of the institutional architecture of 
the sector. 
This work is based on three different types of sources giv-
ing an overview of actors’ cognitive frameworks and inter-
actions: almost one hundred semi-structured interviews 
with political, economic and society actors; various written 
sources from press, expert reports, official and unofficial 
documents; finally, some observations realized between 
2009 and 2012 in different social and political arenas. This 
research was mainly located in Paris, Rennes, Brussels and 
Berlin. This allows us to highlight three major sets of ques-
tions and hypotheses: 
Firstly, what were the processes that fostered the construc-
tion of a new automotive market? We think that this con-
struction was induced by a dual industrial and political 
process which benefited from the emergence of a policy 
window (Kingdon, 1995) opened by the 2008 economic 
crisis. The electric car and industrial difficulties were turned 
into public problems (Gusfield, 1984) and their setting on 
the political agenda allowed public and economic actors to 
shape the instruments that would implement their fictional 
expectations of the market. 
Secondly, how did the production of these instruments 
(such as scrapping schemes, purchasing bonuses, incen-
tives ...) gradually oriente and determine the behaviour of 
economic actors? We hypothesize that these instruments 
allowed the representations of certain economic and politi-
cal actors to be institutionalized and legitimized in the 
automobile industry through the institutional work (Law-
rence & Suddaby, 2006) performed by some institutional 
entrepreneurs (Hwang/Powell, 2005). These entrepreneurs 
mobilized some political and symbolical resources in order 
to institutionalize their representations and legitimize the 
very existence of the electric car. 
Finally, what effects were generated by the construction of 
this market? We believe that the institutional work of the 
entrepreneurs has yet to prove fully effective and, conse-
quently, that the market has not been fully institutional-
ized. However, the development of new institutions, the 
construction of alliances and compromises and the circula-
tion of representations, has gradually changed some rules 
and boundaries of the sector. The redefinition of the ac-
tors’ role and hierarchy in the architecture of the market 
and adaptations to new challengers (Fligstein, 2001), has 
partially changed the institutional order of the automobile 
industry. 
Ultimately, our intention with this work is to develop an in 
vivo analysis of the industry in order to assess to what 
extent and by what means politics can regulate the opera-
tion of, and the orientation taken by, an industry. This 
thesis shows that the public policy instruments can have a 
significant impact on the institutional structure of the in-
dustry and that their influence and performativity depend 
on the political and institutional work of entrepreneurs. In 
short, our work reveals the “political thickness” of the 
industry and thus the analytical significance of taking into 
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account social representations as a means of understand-
ing markets and industries. 
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